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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE METAPHYSICS OF CHU HSI AND A. N. WHITEHEAD

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INTRODUCTION

Aim and Procedure

This study is motivated by an interest in discovering the differences between the metaphysical orientation of China and of the West. It is an underlying assumption that when these differences have been made clear, the implicit religious faith of each culture can be discerned, since both metaphysics and religion deal with the ultimate questions of man and his world.

It is apparent that a study of the scope mentioned above covers too broad and complex a subject-matter for a doctoral dissertation. For this reason, I have limited my task to a study of two metaphysical systems of the respective cultures, each having sufficient affinity with the other to make a comparison possible.

By metaphysics is meant a system of generic ideas for the interpretation of experience in a given culture. Since these ideas, by implications, are mutually interdependent, one enhancing the meaning of the other, those points considered as being affinitive to the compared metaphysics exhibit their integral relationship with those points considered to be different from the compared system. Hence the ultimate purpose of comparison is to show the distinct meaning and character of the respective systems. In this way, the peculiarity of one is brought to consciousness in contrast to the peculiarity of the other. This is especially true when comparison is made between two systems each arising from a different culture.

It is believed that when the character and meaning of a metaphysics is exposed, they inevitably disclose concepts implying man's status in the universe

and his relation to the ground of experience. When these concepts are explicitly applied to man, they reveal the philosophical faith of religion. Since a metaphysics presupposes a cultural community out of which it arises, the religious faith implied in the system must have an identity with the empirical religion of the said community. It is in this sense that metaphysics and religion are inseparable. This means a metaphysics often involves a rational interpretation of the empirical religion which is an essential constituent of the cultural experience. Thus there is a mutuality between religion and metaphysics. This view is assumed in this essay.

I have chosen Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Chu Hsi (1131-1200) as the respective metaphysicians. A glance at the date of each man might well make one wonder how they can be compared since they lived seven centuries apart. I offer two reasons for the choice: (1) Each man's philosophy, to my understanding, represents the intellectual fruition of a mature civilization--one sums up the intellectual experience of traditional China, and the other the scientific and humanistic attainments of the modern West. Such a comparison should ultimately reveal the distinct character of the respective traditions. (2) I believe that Chu Hsi's philosophy, when adequately understood and interpreted, provides a sufficient degree of resemblance to the philosophy of Whitehead, and, at the same time, contains significant differences in contradistinction to the Western rationalistic-scientific tradition, which is the basis for the construction of Whitehead's metaphysics.

A third reason for the choice of these two men is based on the conviction that this comparison is also a study of the differences between the contemporary Western philosophy of organism and the traditional Chinese organismic thinking. The relevance of this problem cannot be fully appreciated unless it is discussed within a historical perspective concerning the exchange of ideas

between China and the West in the modern period. This will be the topic of our immediate discussion.

Chinese philosophy was traditionally introduced to the West by scholars who were nurtured largely in the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment. By the rationalistic tradition I mean specifically the Western appeal to reason and objectivity. Reason implies the employment of logical thinking for the enforcement of some method of inquiry aiming at the attainment of knowledge. Such knowledge is objective in the sense that it corresponds to some aspect of the physical world apart from the knower. The major trend of Western philosophy from Aristotle to Kant exemplifies this tradition; hence in the main, the character of Western philosophy can be said to be rationalistic.

At the same time there are expressions in the philosophical literatures of China, such as Tao (reason) or Li (principle), which could impress the Western scholar as having affinity with the notion of reason in the West. Likewise, the notion of "T'ien" (Heaven), being the ground of reason, could readily be accepted as the basis of a rational philosophy. Since they seemed so similar, Chinese metaphysical ideas were introduced into the West through the medium of European rationalism. This outcome may have been understandable since one cannot translate or interpret a body of foreign ideas apart from one's own intellectual and cultural resources.

Besides this conscious effort on the part of the Western scholars, there was an inherent factor at work within the cultural tradition of the West contributive to the outcome mentioned above. This factor is the Western linguistic structure which implies an adherence to the Aristotelian subject-predicate logic, as well as to the metaphysics of substance. Therefore, when the Chinese philosophical ideas were translated into the Western language, they assumed an internal relationship to the Aristotelian orientation. Whereas this was done

more or less unwittingly by the Western thinkers, it was done consciously by the contemporary Chinese thinkers who were eager to "elevate" the Chinese thought into a form of rationalism.

As a Chinese student who has been studying Christian theology and Western metaphysics in America, I find the Aristotelian system, as well as the philosophy of rationalism from Descartes to Kant, so radically at variance with Chinese thought that there is no basis for comparison. I daresay that the basic problems proposed by them, as well as the methods employed therein, are so much at odds with the problems of traditional Chinese philosophy, as well as their treatment, that they stand at opposite poles. The Chinese world-view is concerned with the immediacy of experience, in which freedom, spontaneity, and mystery are located, and the relatedness of things is disclosed. When the categories of the Aristotelian thought or principles of the rationalistic philosophy are applied to the Chinese mode of thinking, the characteristics of immediate experience are obscured, thus the essence of the Chinese philosophy is missed.

On the other hand, my acquaintance with the writings of William James, S. Alexander, Bergson, and Whitehead has opened up for me a new appreciation of Western philosophy. The ways in which these men treat problems have a direct and immediate appeal to me. The reason for this is that there is an affinity between the organismic philosophy represented by these thinkers and the traditional philosophy of China. In his criticism of the Western monistic tendency, Whitehead himself says that his philosophy of organism "seems to approximate more some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than the western Asiatic, or European, thought." These organismic thinkers critically attack the rationalistic presuppositions of the West and attempt to reconstruct Western philosophy on the basis of new assumptions and in terms of a new perspective. What

constitutes "experience," "reality," "nature," "knowledge" in the writings of these men can be readily understood by a Chinese.

Needham thinks that with the availability of the modern organismic philosophy of the West, Neo-Confucianism, of which Chu Hsi is the spokesman, can be re-appraised.[1] Concerning the affinity between Chu Hsi's thought and the Western philosophy of organism Needham says as follows:

> Indeed, I shall suggest that Chu Hsi's philosophy was fundamentally a philosophy of organism, and that the Sung Neo-Confucians thus attained, primarily by insight, a position analogous to that of Whitehead, without having passed through the stages corresponding to Newton and Galileo.[2]

and

> But I am prepared to suggest, in view of the fact that the term Li always contained the notion of pattern, and that Chu Hsi himself consciously applied it so as to include the most living and vital patterns known to man, that something of the idea of "organism" was what really was at the back of the minds of the Neo-Confucians, and that Chu Hsi was therefore further advanced in insight into the nature of the universe than any of his interpreters and translators, whether Chinese or European, have yet given him credit for.[3]

However, I am not overly optimistic about the affinity stated above. Although the similarities between these two types of organismic thinking are worth our notice, there are ultimate differences arising from issues that are peculiar to the respective intellectual history. For one thing, the contemporary Western philosophy of organism, historically speaking, is a direct descendent of the modern rationalistic philosophy even though it protests against the latter. This means that both have inherited a distinct set of metaphysical problems which are native to Western philosophy. To that extent, there is an internal relation between rationalism and organism in the West. On the other hand, the character of the ultimate issues persisting in the Chinese culture

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[1] Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. II: History of Scientific Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 474.

[2] Ibid., p. 458.

[3] Ibid., p. 474.

has given a peculiar orientation to the Chinese organismic thinking. Thus the distinction between them is great.

But, in so far as the contemporary organism of the West has come closer to the metaphysics of China, a conversation between them may be carried on at an exploratory level. Such a conversation would enable the Chinese philosophy to be understood alongside of a contemporary metaphysics while, at the same time, retaining its own unique character. Conversely, the philosophy of organism in the West can be more readily appreciated by the Chinese when seen alongside of their ancient thought. A probing of this sort may reveal the common ground between them as points of contact, whereas the differences between them may be shown to be illustrative of the differences in metaphysical presuppositions between China and the West. Hence it will be seen that there is both "continuity" and "discontinuity" between these two forms of thinking. Whereas aspects of continuity are relatively easy to discern, those of discontinuity tend to evade the eyes of the investigator. This is because the metaphysical presuppositions tacitly assumed by the investigator are the very barriers which prevent him from having access to those elements characteristic of the metaphysics which stand in contrast to his own. It is not easy for one to transcend his cultural orientation. A conscious entertainment of the contrasted elements between the respective metaphysics may therefore precipitate a recognition of the metaphysical presuppositions of the respective cultures.

It is apparently impossible to deal indiscriminately with the metaphysical thought of Chu Hsi and Whitehead since both have written much on this subject. The selection of materials is therefore guided by the criteria of "importance" and "comparableness." Based on these principles, I have chosen four related topics from each man, which, to me, disclose the essence of their respective philosophies. I have chosen them also because they are comparable with the four counter-topics of the other man. Thus from Chu Hsi I chose:

(1) Ch'i (the physical basis of the world) and Li (the ideal basis of the world), (2) the Problem of Knowing, (3) Hsin (becoming or process) and Hsing (structure or order), and (4) Jen (life). From Whitehead I chose: (1) Actual Entities and Eternal Objects, (2) A Theory of Knowledge, (3) Order, and (4) Creativity. Each topic forms a chapter of the thesis. The final two topics, Experience and Knowledge, and Freedom and Human Fulfillment, present the affinities and differences between these two metaphysical systems on the basis of the preceding analysis. Finally, there follows a brief conclusion presenting the results of the investigation in a general way and the contribution which this study makes to an understanding of the fundamental differences between the Western and the Chinese metaphysical presuppositions.

There are, to my knowledge, only two major comparative studies of the metaphysical foundations of East and West in the post-War period. One is F. S. C. Northrop's The Meeting of East and West; the other is W. Haas' The Destiny of Mind. In departing from the old method of piecemeal or concept-to-concept approach, both men adopted a comprehensive and realistic approach to the comparison by discerning the metaphysical characteristics of the respective cultures. Since their studies are of a general nature, neither of them provides a detailed analysis of the comparative thought of any two historical thinkers as an illustration of the contrast between the two distinct cultures. This study is perhaps a fulfillment of this need.

An acquaintance with Chu Hsi's philosophy would soon make one realize that although there are only a small number of metaphysical ideas in his system, almost every one of them conveys different shades of meaning, varying in accordance with the context of discussion. For this reason, it is difficult, and sometimes misleading, to give definitions to these notions. In most cases, the generic meaning of an idea is not sufficient to convey its variation of

meaning. For instance, the word Jen generically means the feeling of self-relatedness. But it also conveys other meanings such as: sympathetic feeling, bodily feeling, spontaneity, immediacy, undifferentiated feeling, life, man, the character of experience, etc. Such being the case, I avoided giving definitions to Chu Hsi's basic ideas. Instead, each major notion, when introduced, is given transliterally, followed by a brief description of its generic meaning; then its other meanings are elucidated depending on the context of discussion in which it occurs.

At this point, it should be made clear that my interest in Chu Hsi is metaphysical--not historical or literary. Such being the case, my chief concern is a systematic translation of his ideas from the Chinese into the English. Since Chu Hsi, to my understanding, is a representative of the Chinese organismic thinking, his ideas, when restated in English, may sometimes strike one as resembling some contemporary philosophy of organism in the West. Where this is the case, it is usually because of the character of his philosophy rather than any effort on my part to bend their meaning in this direction. On the other hand, having become a student of the Western philosophy of organism, the inclination to interpret Chu Hsi from within this perspective is probably unavoidable. However, I have tried to guard against distorting his meaning.

The chief materials which I have drawn from Chu Hsi's works are Books XLII-XLIX of The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, imperial edition. These seven small books, which, with the exception of Book XLIX, have been ably translated into English by J. P. Bruce of England, contain his metaphysical thought. Most of the passages on Chu Hsi quoted in this study are based on Bruce's translation, though I modified them for the purpose of eliminating his Aristotelian terminology and returning Chu Hsi's ideas to the proper Chinese context.

The Historical-Cultural Background of Chu Hsi and His Influence upon the Chinese Culture

Inasmuch as some readers of this thesis may be unacquainted with the cultural background of Chu Hsi's writings and of the developments which led to their dominance in Neo-Confucian thought in China, I shall insert here in the introduction a brief historical account of some of the pertinent facts.

At the turn of the eleventh century A.D., there emerged in China a mode of metaphysical thinking which initiated a new trend of speculative philosophy. This mode of thought owed its birth to nearly a millennium of the inter-crossing of ideas between Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. While it is true that Buddhist thought dominated the intellectual scene from the third century B.C. until the rise of Neo-Confucianism, it is also true that this alien ideology became gradually absorbed into the main stream of Confucian thought during the same period. Both Confucian and Buddhist literatures were a common property for the intellectuals during the past millennium, and Taoism served as a bridge between the two systems since it has an affinity to both. For instance, its skepticism toward social structure or order provided a natural milieu for Buddhism, and its cosmic-aesthetic feeling of Tao could be blended with the social-ethic feeling of Tao characteristic of Confucianism.

It is not without ground to say that during the eleventh century A.D. (in the Sung dynasty), the fusion of ideas between these three intellectual systems had reached such a momentum that China was then ready to give birth to a mode of speculation hitherto unmatched and henceforth unsurpassed until the arrival of the present century. This mode of thought is called Neo-Confucianism.

Between the beginning of the eleventh and the end of the twelfth century A.D. a galaxy of prominent thinkers devoted their lives to metaphysics. Among them the five best known were subsequently called the "Five Philosophers."

They were: Chou Tung-I or Chou Lien-Hsi (1017-1073), Ch'ang Tsai or Ch'ang Heng-Ch'ü (1020-1076), the Ch'eng Brothers--Ch'eng Hao or Ch'eng Ming-Tao (1032-1085) and Ch'eng I or Ch'eng I-Ch'uan (1033-1107), and Chu Hsi (1131-1200). Chou Tung-I was the most original of the five in that it was he who set forth this mode of thinking. The Ch'eng Brothers, as well as Ch'ang Tsai, studied under him. As may be noted, with the exception of Chu Hsi, the "Five Philosophers" were contemporaries in the eleventh century. This means that they shared a common intellectual atmosphere. In reading the writings of these four men, one is struck by the number of common philosophical words. This indicates that in the second half of the century, Neo-Confucian ideas were topics of discourses among the educated.

Among the "Five Philosophers" Chu Hsi was the only one whose life was spent entirely in the twelfth century A.D. This means that as a young man he was nurtured in the Neo-Confucian thinking. However, prior to his time, this philosophy was still in its youth. Chu Hsi's contribution did not lie so much in original thinking as in systematic organization of the thought of his predecessors. He digested their ideas and rendered them into the product of one man.

To say that Chu Hsi's philosophy is comprehensive does not mean that it is methodically and systematically written in the manner of a Western philosophical treatise. Far from it. His work consists of a collection of disconnected, yet interrelated paragraphs. Each paragraph usually contains a discussion of some central idea. Basic categories are few in his thought, but they are constantly reiterated in various contexts of discussion. He likes to explain a concept through the introduction of other concepts. In this way, their interdependence is illustrated. One does not see the structure of his philosophy until one has seen the relationship of these disjointed paragraphs.

In order to do this, a meditative probing into them is necessary. It requires a sort of "existential" reflection rather than logical ratiocination. His philosophical work is comprehensive and coherent in at least two senses: (1) Underlying the numerous paragraphs there is a universal and definite perspective. (2) There is an interdependence among the categories in that the explication of one requires the presupposition of the others.

The importance of Chu Hsi's thought is twofold: First, as has been said, in him the height of Neo-Confucian philosophy was attained. Second, his thought has had a permanent influence upon the subsequent generations of Chinese thought. This was made possible through his editorial works and commentaries on the Four Books (the Great Learning, the Analects, the Mencius, and the Doctrine of Mean). In this way, his metaphysical thinking was transmitted into the Confucian classics. Since his edition was the standard text for subsequent generations, each generation of students read the Confucian classics a la Chu Hsi. Because of this perennial influence, Neo-Confucian thought has become deeply ingrained in the feeling context of the Chinese culture.

It is beyond the scope of this introduction to trace the course of Neo-Confucian metaphysics against the background of the Sung dynasty. However, at least four factors must be mentioned as relevant to its rise: (1) In the turn of the eleventh century, the printing industry became a nation-wide activity in China. Volume after volume describing the three intellectual systems were printed for the first time in history and were circulated for public consumption. (2) The establishment in different learning centers of private academies free from governmental interference was conducive to imaginative inquiries. (3) The constant military and political humiliation in the form of conquests and defeats inflicted upon the Sung dynasty by the northeastern and northwestern non-Chinese empires made the Chinese conscious of their national destiny and

cultural heritage. (4) The geographical migration of the Chinese culture southward caused by the invasion of the non-Chinese empires from the north, brought the Chinese of Chu Hsi's time new environments and unexpected experiences. These novelties, together with the factors mentioned above, must have produced a new national feeling conducive to creative enterprises, one of which was metaphysics.

Neo-Confucianism in Contemporary Communist China

In view of the present day radical displacement of the old by the new in all realms of life, one may wonder if Neo-Confucian thought can have any relevance to modern communist China. Its mode of thinking seems to be at odds with the development of technology on the one hand and with Marxism on the other. However, one should bear in mind that the basic assumption of the internal relatedness of things in Neo-Confucianism, as well as its realism, is in some agreement with both modern sciences and Marxist ideology. As Needham points out, the Neo-Confucian notion of Ch'i, or matter, is close to the concept of energy in the post-Newtonian physical science.[1] Needham also calls attention to the fact that Marxism and Neo-Confucianism have common ground in their concern with the internal patterns or levels of things.[2] Hence he thinks that Marx's philosophy is a form of organicism. Mao Tse-tung, who himself is immersed in both Marxism and the Chinese classical thought, seems to have verified Needham's conviction in the following passage:

> Contrary to the metaphysical world outlook, the materialist-dialectical world outlook advocates the study of the development of things from the inside, from the relationship of a thing to other things, namely, that the development of things should be regarded as their internal and necessary self-movement, that a thing in its movement and the things round it should be regarded as interconnected and interacting upon each other. The basic cause of the development of things does not lie outside but inside

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[1] Ibid., pp. 474-75.

[2] Ibid., pp. 291, 498, 513.

> them, in their internal contradictions. The movement and development of things arise because of the presence of such contradictions inside all of them.[1]

Here Mao Tse-tung's interpretation of Marxism seems to be very much influenced by his cultural inheritance represented by Neo-Confucian thought. Although his notion of contradiction, as the cause of the development of things, is directly derived from Marx, it is not unrelated to the Neo-Confucian concept of Yang-Yin, or the positive and the negative aspects of a thing. Thus in him we already see a surreptitious tendency to relate dialectical materialism to Neo-Confucianism.

There is another affinity between Marxism and Neo-Confucianism; this is the degree to which the belief in the internal relatedness of things is emphasized in the realm of social and ethical activities. The practical orientation of Neo-Confucian thought based on an organismic world-view seems to have provided a milieu for the political-ethical philosophy of Marxism which is also grounded in an organismic presupposition.

It would be assuming too much to say that there is a conscious attempt on the part of communist China to find common ground between Marxism and Neo-Confucianism; yet there are indications that Neo-Confucian thought is still alive at the present, and may even be one pertinent factor contributing to the reception of Marxism by modern China. Inasmuch as this form of thought is still embedded in the Chinese today, and since Chu Hsi is the exponent of this system of ideas, the study reported in the following chapters seems to be timely.

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, On Contradiction (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1952), p. 5.

PART I

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHU HSI

CHAPTER I

CH'I AND LI

Ch'i

Li (理) and Ch'i (氣) are final concepts depicting the ultimate function of the universe. Li is the ideal ground of the universe by virtue of which experience is possible. Ch'i is the physical basis of the world whereby ideas are in the process of realization or have become realized.

Ch'i, in its pure form, is a fluid-like, ethereal, imperceptible matter.[1] Bruce called it "Matter."[2] Needham translated it into "Energy-Matter."[3] When it is consolidated (積), it becomes the material (質) in the perceptible form.[4] However, the material is also called by Chu Hsi the "Chi-Material" (氣質),[5] meaning that perceptible material can generate the imperceptible. This means: although the formation of the material is due to the power of Ch'i, yet the generation of Ch'i is dependent on the material. Hence creation

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[1] Yü Tsuan Chu Tzu Chüan Shu (The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, imperial ed.), Bk. XLIX, p. 15a [hereafter referred to as Chu Hsi; Chu Hsi, Philosophy of Human Nature, trans. J. P. Bruce (London: Probsthain, 1922), p. 186 [hereafter referred to as Philosophy].

[2] J. P. Bruce, Chu Hsi and His Masters (London: Probsthain, 1923), p. 102.

[3] Needham, op. cit., p. 572.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIX, pp. 2b-3a; Fung Yu-Lan, Chung Kuo Che Hsueh Shih (History of Chinese Philosophy) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), p. 904; Fung Yu-Lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. D. Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), II, 543.

[5] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, pp. 3a-3b; Philosophy, p. 83.

requires both the imperceptible and the perceptible of Ch'i. It is as true to say that Ch'i creates the material as it is to say that the material creates Ch'i.[1] Therefore, Ch'i, in the metaphysical sense, includes both the imperceptible and the perceptible--inseparable from each other in the world of flux. One is not prior to the other with respect to time; nor is the one superior to the other on the scale of value. Both are generic. When Chu Hsi speaks of Ch'i in the imperceptible sense, he has the perceptible in mind as its locus. For the sake of clarity, we may say: in contrast to Li, the ideational, Ch'i is physical; but taking Ch'i alone, the perceptible is the physical and the imperceptible the mental.

Bruce interpreted the imperceptible of Ch'i as "spirit." On this basis, he says that Matter, the perceptible, is derived from "spirit."[2] This statement can be misleading; for, conversely, it is also true to say that "spirit" is derived from the material. Chu Hsi himself says that "spirit" occurs when "coarse matter," i.e., the material, is transformed into "fine matter," i.e., the imperceptible.[3] Here, he is speaking of the generation of the imperceptible from the perceptible. This function is just as important as when the "spirit" creates the material.

The physical entity, Ch'i, in terms of process, is characterized by the polarity of Yin (陰) and Yang (陽), or the alternative movement between the active and the passive. We should bear in mind that Yin and Yang are the two poles of Ch'i; not its derivation. Yin is its physical pole and Yang its

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[1] T'ang Chün-I, "Chang Heng Ch'ü Chih Hsin Lun Chi Ch'i Hsing Shang Hsüeh Chih Ken Chü" (Chang Heng Ch'ü's Theory of Mind and Matter and the Basis of His Metaphysics), Journal of Oriental Studies, I (1954), 102-04.

[2] Bruce, op. cit., pp. 103-05.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, p. 8a; Philosophy, p. 91.

mental pole, each referring to the final aspect of the world of flux. Such a notion is seen in the following passage: "Yin and Yang are but the same Ch'i. When Yin flows forth, it is Yang, and when Yang consolidates, it is Yin. They should not be viewed as two things in opposition to each other."[1] However, the polarity of Yin and Yang has a variety of meanings, depending on the context of the discourse. Here we are concerned with its most general meaning. Yin is the state of contraction (斂), quiescence (靜), or actualization (實). It is the condition wherein Ch'i takes account of its experience as a unity. It is the state of inaction (無為) which is, nevertheless, a mode of activity; or a return (復) to a condition in which Ch'i enters into its own being. Yang is the state of expansion (發), action (動), or potentiality (虛). It is the involvement of Ch'i in the world.[2]

The alternative movement of Yin and Yang also characterizes the genetic act of an experience. The potentiality of Ch'i is the state of expansion (神) into the material of other beings. In doing so, the Ch'i of the subject receives feelings from the world into its own.[3] Then there is the internal adjustment of these feelings into one harmonious unit. This is the act of transformation (化).[4]

The preceding description of the genetic movements of Yin and Yang is no other than the two modes of Ch'i. Hence Ch'i is fundamentally a process. The idea of an unchanging and unqualified substratum, either in the logical or ontological sense, is alien to Chu Hsi. However, he is fond of the expression,

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[1] Chou Lien-Ch'i Ch'üan Chi (The Collected Writings of Chou Lien-Ch'i) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937), pp. 6-8. This work contains comments by Chu Hsi.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIX, pp. 29b-31a; Needham, op. cit., pp. 462-64.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIX, pp. 31a-31b.

[4] Ibid.

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[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIX, pp. 31a-31b.

[4] Ibid.

substance-function.[1] "Substance" refers to the morphological aspect of the process of Ch'i, and "function" refers to the dynamic aspect of Ch'i. Other than this, "substance" in Chu Hsi's system serves no important function.

Li

Li, in the literal sense, means as follows: a piece of thread, the markings in jade, the rows of splints in a bamboo basket, the fibrous texture of muscles.[2] They all signify some interweaving pattern in a material object. The literal meaning of Li therefore furnishes an empirical basis for the understanding of the ontological meaning of Li--the ideal ground of the world. Ch'i contains perceptivity (知覺) or vitality (生意).[3] But it does not have the power of individuation; it alone cannot realize a definite experience. The definiteness of an experience depends upon the ingression of some idea into Ch'i. In this way, Ch'i becomes a patterned experience.

In conceiving Li as the principle of individuation, Chu Hsi quotes an ancient phrase for support: "inherent in every single thing, there is a principle [物則]."[4] The word "thing" for Chu Hsi is certainly understood as a sense-object. But there is another expression, "activity-thing" (事物), a compound noun, which is more frequently used, in his works, than the word "thing."[5] Wherever "activity-thing" is mentioned, he has in mind some pattern of activities, i.e., an event, in which sense-objects take part.[6] The aspect

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 10a-10b; Philosophy, pp. 285-87.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 1a, 12b-13a; Philosophy, pp. 269, 290-91; Needham, op. cit., p. 473.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 5a; Philosophy, pp. 62-64.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 5a; Philosophy, p. 13; Odes, Vol. IV, Pt. 2 of The Chinese Classics, trans. J. Legge (London: Henry Frowde, n.d.; reprinted in China, 1939), p. 541.

[5] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 10a-10b; Philosophy, pp. 285-87.

[6] Fung Yu-Lan, op. cit., p. 919.

of events which concerns him most is some relationship among human activities, or between the social and the cosmological activities. Hence: "In summary, what we call the relationship between the active and the passive of Matter, between the minister and his King, or between a son and his father, is but an activity-thing in which man walks."[1] In reading passages such as the one quoted above, one is under the impression that what interests Chu Hsi in particular is not the sense-object but the event or happening. In one place he says outrightly that a thing is like an activity or an affair (物猶事也).[2] He seems to be saying that all sensible objects should be referred to patterns of events which constitute things.

Our previous analysis of the two modes of Ch'i is fundamentally a depiction of what Chu Hsi calls "activity-thing," or that which constitutes the basis for sense-objects. The reverse cannot be the case, for a sensible object is characterized by local motion and spatial permanence.

In those places where Chu Hsi tells of the principle of a thing, or a sense-object, he tends to equate the principle with the functional character of the thing. For instance, the principle of a piece of rotten wood is characterized by its capacity to burn "in the cooking-stove"; the drug rhubarb is characterized by its purgative effect.[3] The following passage would serve as an example:

> Water is that quality in Nature which we describe as soaking and descending. Fire is that quality in Nature which we describe as blazing and arising. Wood is that quality in Nature which permits of curved surfaces or straight edges. Metal is that quality in Nature which can follow the form of a mould and then become hard. Earth is that quality in Nature which permits of sowing, growth, and reaping."[4]

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, p. 10a; Philosophy, p. 286. [2] Ibid.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 29b-30a, 31b-32a; Philosophy, pp. 64-65, 68-69.

[4] Chou Lien-Ch'i Ch'üan Chi (Collected Writings of Chou Lien-Ch'i), op. cit., p. 11; Needham, op. cit., p. 243.

Thus even in conscious discussion on sense-objects, he is surreptitiously conditioned by the mode of relational-thinking. But he does not attempt to demonstrate a methodological procedure whereby "scientific knowledge" of an object may be obtained. In discussing a sensed object, his chief interest still lies in the discernment of some functional relationship between the object and its environment, viewed as an event. What he actually desires to know is some pattern of activities, often of a socio-ethical sort, in which objects participate.

The concept of Ch'i in fact approximates the wave-like character of energy. But Chu Hsi never suggests the notion of a final individual unit of Ch'i. What dominates his discourse on the relation between Ch'i and Li are the notions of flux, change, transformation, all of which imply becoming. In view of this fact I venture to say that in Chu Hsi's metaphysics, the notion of individuality (implied) and process are not in balance. The latter takes precedence over the former. Hence the statement that Li is the principle of individuation, must be qualified. That is to say, this individuation refers basically to a pattern, or grouping of activities, and only secondarily to the idea of substance or unit.

In my previous analysis of Li, I have made two judgments: that Li is functional in character, and that Chu Hsi does not consciously set out a methodological procedure for the knowledge of a physical object. These two judgments seem to be mutually explanatory. The first one means that the perception of an object presupposes the state of the mind of the knower as well as the environment to which the object is related. We can see that all these three components --the perceiver, the object, the environment--are relative; they are viewed as particulars having direct relation to one another. Hence knowledge of an object involves an acquaintance with the event. And from the event, the character of the object is derived. This is what I mean by the functional approach.

Therefore, if one wants to discern Li of the grass outside the window, his initial response is the fact that he sits inside the window, gazing out upon the lawn. And in perceiving the grass he is simultaneously aware of the fact that both the grass and he are situated in a continuum of experience. In view of this approach to knowledge of an object, Chu Hsi could not have felt the need to set forth principles whereby a "scientific knowledge" of an object may be obtained. But this does not mean that he is unaware of the nature of an object in the physical sense. In fact, there are many places in his writings in which he attempts to discuss this aspect, but he simply does not carry through.

If Li should not be conceived in terms of Western scientific thought, then, what is the dominant intellectual discipline which conditions it? The answer is: the Chinese humanistic learning with its emphasis upon ethics. Li is an ethical pattern or order on the scale of existence. There is no separation between Nature and ethics. As a matter of fact, we may say that his metaphysics is motivated by a persistent effort to relate morality to cosmology. Because of this relationship morality is aesthetic and aesthetics is ethical. This may be thought of as a characteristic of his philosophy.

Ch'i and Li

One way of looking at the correlation between Ch'i and Li is through the concept of Nature. (The meaning of Nature will be discussed in the third chapter.) For the present purpose, it suffices to say that Nature for Chu Hsi is an infinite scale of aesthetic-ethic patterns of existence, whose basis is perceptivity (忄生). In fact, Ch'i and perceptivity are identical:

> If what I have said is right, then the out-flowing of Nature is perceptivity. Perceptivity has its root in Nature. There is no such thing as perceptivity without Nature or Nature without perceptivity, each a separate entity unaffected by the other.[1]

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 23a; Philosophy, p. 357.

Perceptivity is the texture of Nature. Even an inorganic thing such as a brush-pen shares it.[1] Life begins when perceptivity is tinged with some degree, however minute, of ethical awareness.[2] And the procession of species of life is determined by the degree of such awareness, including Heaven, which is the highest order of life.

The material from which the measurement of ethics is derived is man. In this respect, the Neo-Confucianists all follow the tradition of Mencius. From man's perceptivity, four basic qualities are abstracted. They are: (1) a feeling of sympathy (惻隱), (2) a feeling of guilt and shame (羞恥心), (3) a feeling of social obligation (禮讓), and (4) a sense of better or worse (是非).[3] However, in appraising them, one must not interpret them too literally. The Chinese way of reflection is not chiefly a logical analysis of words, but a reflection upon meaning that is generated from words. In the Chinese philosophy, the function of words, due to their ideographical and symbolical nature, is to stimulate the mind for the entertainment of ideas which can be immediately perceived. In this regard, the use of words in the Chinese culture is primarily denotative and analogical.[4] In view of this fact, the four qualitative feelings of man mentioned above are not meant strictly as activities of man. In the entertaining of the idea of sympathy, etc., man instinctively feels that he is intimating ideas inherent in the nature of things. Hence, at the outset, we should bear in mind that, although these four feelings are directly derived from human nature, they are at the same time viewed as

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bok. XLII, p. 30a; Philosophy, p. 64.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 32a-33a; Philosophy, pp. 69-70.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, pp. 12a-13b; Philosophy, pp. 407-08.

[4] F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 316-19.

co-extensive with Nature. This is taken for granted in Chu Hsi's thought.

Because of their co-extensive nature, these four feelings should be given a more general interpretation than their ideas suggest, though the concreteness of these ideas should be kept in mind. In this way, immediacy and universality are co-ordinated. Thus, the feeling of sympathy may be interpreted as the continuum of the subject with Nature. It is the awareness of self-relatedness. At the same time, there is a minimum sense of differentiation between the subject and the world. The feeling of "guilt and shame" elicits sensitivity as to the function of the subject in relation to its given world--the "objective nature" of the subject. The feeling of social obligation evokes the sense of solidarity. It is the awareness of the self as a member of the community. The final feeling, the sense of better or worse, enhances the subjective worth. It is the harmonization of the preceding feelings into one distinct feeling in the form of discrimination at the completion of an experience.

These four basic feelings are in fact a process of experience. The first and the third, self-relatedness and solidarity, tend to stress subjectivity; the second and the fourth, sensitivity and worth, tend to stress objectivity. The former signifies the vibration of perceptivity (情發) and the latter refers to the condensation of perceptions (收斂). Again, the polarity of Yin and Yang is here discernible.[1]

We have just described the genetic feelings in Nature. They are, as it were, instinctive activities presented without being interpreted. There is a further need for considering the many facets of rational thought, or for lifting perceptions into knowledge. Chu Hsi relies upon the four cardinal Confucian concepts, generalizing them into categorical ideas. As we well know, these four

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, pp. 3b-4a; Philosophy, pp. 392-93, 402.

Confucian concepts are derived, through the effort of Mencius, from the four basic human feelings described above.[1] Thus, from the feeling of sympathy is derived the idea of love or Jen (仁); from the sense of guilt and shame, the idea of rightness or I (義); from the feeling of social obligation, the idea of reverence or "Li" (禮); ("Li" in distinction from Li--idea or principle); and from the sense of better or worse, the idea of intuitive knowledge or Chih (知).

Although these four Confucian concepts are directly derived from the four human feelings, they, like the latter, are also understood as co-extensive with Nature. What constitutes rationality in them is the presence of ideas in justifying the validity of immediate feeling.

In the following paragraphs I shall sketch the meaning of these four concepts in Chu Hsi's system:

Jen

Chu Hsi uses different similes to describe the nature of Jen or Love. Generally speaking, they may be arranged into two groups.

(1) Jen is described "as seeds, or peach and apricot kernels," which "if sown, will spring into life"; it is the root of a tree or the source of a river.[2] Hence Jen is the creative power of things; it is often depicted as life in contrast to death, or vitality as opposed to decadence.[3] Therefore, it is called the "principle of life" (生之理).[4]

(2) Also Jen is described as "all comprehensive, mild and gentle

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[1] The Works of Mencius, Vol. II of The Chinese Classics, trans. J. Legge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1895; reprinted in China, 1939), pp. 201-03.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 3a, Bk. XLVIII, p. 4a; Philosophy, p. 314.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, pp. 10a-10b; Philosophy, pp. 328-29.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 9a; Philosophy, p. 326.

activities"; it is the mystery (玄妙) in experience; its working is as natural as the flow of water; it is effortless (自然) and spontaneous.[1] This aspect of Jen approximates the Taoist idea of Wu-Wei (無為) or the feeling of undifferentiation.

The first group suggests Jen as the source of life, and the second group suggests Jen as naturalness. Viewing them in relation, we come to the understanding that Jen is the quality of life characterized by spontaneity.

The awareness of Jen in the subject is identical to the feeling of self-relatedness or the sympathetic feeling of the other. This is the basis of the subject which cannot be abstracted. Thus Jen, viewed as a rational concept, is the principle of Subjectivity.

"I"

"I," traditionally translated as rightness, is described as the "path" or "judgment" of Jen. Hence it is the externalization of what is internally felt. It is the exemplification of Jen. Chu Hsi explains this by means of a metaphor:

> Jen is simply the flowing forth; "I" lies in its obligation to flow in a particular direction. Like water, the flowing movement of which is Jen; its flow as rivers, or its collection in pools and ponds, is "I."[2]

The flowing of water suggests the potentiality of life. How this flowing becomes a river is the actualization of life. This notion of "I" implies the acting forth from one's intrinsic being toward the other. It involves courage, decision, and direction. It may be called the principle of Action. Such a meaning must be grounded in the feeling of "guilt and shame" (sensitivity) so that immediacy is retained.

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 1b, Bk. XLIV, p. 7a, Bk. XLVII, pp. 6a-6b; Philosophy, pp. 310, 239, 320.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 4a; Philosophy, p. 393.

"Li"

"Li," traditionally translated as reverence, is described by Chu Hsi as the graceful form of Jen, meaning the awareness of the subject as a locus of actuality and potentiality in relation to other "subjects" with their respective degree of actuality and potentiality. Hence the "graceful form of Jen" denotes the solidarity of the world with its inherent values and beauty. And "Li" is the awareness of solidarity from the perspective of the subject. Thus the subject's experience and destiny are inextricably bound to those of other "subjects." Thus "Li" may be called the principle of Togetherness, grounded in the immediacy of Social obligation.

Chih

Chih, traditionally translated as knowledge, does not convey the idea of "theoretical knowledge" in the Western sense. It is close to the Heraclitean notion of "right intuition" (φρονεῖν), a discernment of what is disclosed in experience of personal and ethical significance.[2]

The unique thing about Chih is that, by itself, it has no independent existence in the process of experience. In other words, there is no separate province of knowing apart from experience. Hence the standard or norm of knowing must be derived from the latter. This aspect is seen in the quotations below:

> Thus, sympathy, guilt and shame, and social obligation, all have something to perform, while knowledge itself does nothing; its province is simply to distinguish what is better and what is worse.[3]

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 8b; Philosophy, p. 401.

[2] Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1948), p. 113.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, pp. 12a-12b; Philosophy, p. 407.

> Knowledge understands, and then hands on the matter to the other three; sympathy, guilt and shame, and social obligation.[1]

These two passages show that the act of knowing is a derivation from the prior phases of experience. Thus knowing as a mental act involves the affirmation of what has been experienced thus far--the grinding of the mental upon the physical.

We may say that an act of experience begins with the encountering of the other while the feeling of subjectivity is aroused. Then there is the manifestation of this subjectivity upon the other in the form of various actions of internal and external sort. Out of these activities there derives a unity of feelings on the part of the subject, which is the summation of the act of experience. This experience of valuation or sense of worth is called Chih or knowledge.

Thus knowledge does not just correspond to what has happened outside, but is also an outcome of an internal experience. It is the derivation of the internal feelings. Chih in this sense may be called the principle of Co-ordinated Understanding.

As will be discussed in Chapter III, the fourfold process of experience is an ontological structure in Chu Hsi's system. It characterizes every experience. If we take Jen or the principle of Subjectivity as the basis of the process, then these four phases of experience are but different phases of Jen. Jen may be considered as the ultimate notion in Chu Hsi's philosophy; it determines and is shared by his other concepts. As the ultimate concept, Jen is variously called Life (生), Vitality (生意), Feeling (情), Mystery (妙). All these synonymies depict the same reality.

This long digression of the fourfold process of Jen explains the structure of Nature necessary for the interplay between Li and Ch'i. Ch'i or Matter

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 7b; Philosophy, p. 399.

requires a minimum perceptivity. Gradation of perceptivity is possible because of Li. Hence, each manifestation of Li is a display of some patterned experience out of the fourfold process of Jen. Strictly speaking, no existent is devoid of some awareness of Jen.[1] But the organic begins when this awareness achieves some distinctiveness. At the human level, this awareness is potentially complete. The following passage expounds this view:

> From the point of view of Ch'i man receives this Li rightly and comprehensively, while other creatures receive it only partially and with impediment. Here is the cause of the necessary gradation with respect to the degree of dignity among creatures. Nevertheless though in Ch'i there is gradation, it is the source of life common to man and other creatures; and though in Li there is universality, yet man, in realizing it for the fulfillment of his nature, is himself different from other creatures. Perceptivity and vibration proceed from Ch'i; the principles of Subjectivity, Action, Solidarity, and Co-ordinated Understanding proceed from Li. Man is capable of perceptivity and vibration, other creatures also are; but though other creatures possess these principles in some degree, they are unable to approximate them comprehensively.[2]

With regard to Chu Hsi's organic concept of the world, Needham has expounded it with documented evidence.[3] As far as the organismic view is concerned, I am in complete agreement with him. But in his account of Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, his concern is the discernment of the scientific insights in the spirit of the post-Newtonian science. One gets the undeniable impression, in reading his account, that Li is now near to the principle of a physical object within the context of the scientific tradition of the West. Li as a metaphysical concept seems now to have been deduced from some theoretical premise. This kind of interpretation is what I attempt to avoid. Li is a patterned experience in an aesthetic-ethic context. Chu Hsi does not consciously delineate it as a theoretic principle implying the evolutionary theory of the universe.

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 21a-21b, 29b-30a; Philosophy, pp. 32, 64-65.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 28a-28b; Philosophy, pp. 62-63.

[3] Needham, op. cit., pp. 458, 498, 505.

So far we have dealt with the empirical aspects of Chu Hsi's Li and Ch'i. As I have said, although Chu Hsi presents no rules for the discovery of Li in things, he never doubts that it is discernible provided it is the kind of Li he intends to look for, and provided that attention is given to immediate and personal experience. But being an ardent Confucianist in contrast, say, to a Taoist, he is not content with just being an empiricist.

Li as the Universal Structure

In Chu Hsi's generalization of the fourfold process of Jen, he presupposes that there is a universal Li in which ideas exist. It has no physical embodiment and is "above shape" or without "instrument";[1] it "lacks volition or plan, and has no creative power"; it "constitutes only a pure, empty, and vast world."[2] The universal structure of ideas is a priori in that, without it, the empirical world of patterns could not have existed. This aspect is seen as follows:

> Answer: It is only because there are principles governing action and governing inaction that Ch'i has gained action and inaction. For if there were no principles of action and inaction, how could Ch'i in itself have such action and inaction?
> Answer: Once there is a principle governing action, there can then exist this action to produce Yang. Once there is a principle governing inaction, there can then exist this inaction to produce Yin. When there is action, there is principle within this action. When there is inaction, there is principle within inaction.
> Question: Action and inaction pertain to Ch'i. Is it then correct to say that it is because there is this principle which is lord over Ch'i, that Ch'i can therefore operate in this manner?
> Answer: It is.[3]

Concerning the a priori aspect of the principle or Li, Chu Hsi makes it clear and definite that it is a mere structure devoid of physical reality. Though

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIX, p. 5b.

[2] Fung Yu-Lan, op. cit., p. 904; Bodde, op. cit., II, 542.

[3] Fung Yu-Lan, op. cit., p. 901; Bodde, op. cit., II, 539-40.

he himself emphatically holds the ontological priority of Li, he warns against a dichotomy between it and the empirical world. Such a dichotomy, for him, is the fallacy of the contemporary Buddhism in his country.[1]

In fact, the character of the universal structure is not independent from the empirical world. There is no way of knowing it without taking one's immediate experience of the world into account. It is through the method of extension from one's immediate awareness of one's perceptual knowledge to a generalization of it into a rational knowledge that one arrives at an understanding of the nature of the universal structure. Thus a more remote concept is abstracted from a concept one step less remote from it, which, in turn, is derived from a concept one step less remote from it, until one arrives at a primitive concept which is rooted in experience. This method of abstraction is seen as follows:

> When you consider principles you must apprehend clearly the fountain-head; in all subsequent states it is still Li which spreads out and is diffused in the infinite variety of the manifold. Confucius in his teaching enunciated each thing according to its principle, but did not point out the one supreme general principle. But if you take all his scattered teachings and gather them and generalize concerning them, you will perceive a general principle. Mencius drew out this principle [i.e., Jen] and taught it to his disciples. Master Chou made it clear what this principle is in his notion of Tai Chi [the Supreme Pole, i.e., Li]. Take, for instance, the feeling of guilt and shame; if from this you trace backward you will arrive at Love which is inherent in experience; but Love is the origin of the power of Heaven, which is the mode of action of the Supreme Pole. Thus by tracing backward [from the near to the far], step by step we arrive at the fountain-head. If now we apprehend the Supreme Pole clearly, we shall certainly be able to understand the numerous structures and principles of the universe as well as all proceeding from it. In every single event, there is a principle, and nothing is without it.[2]

But how does Chu Hsi himself conceive of the nature of the Supreme Pole or Li? This concept is explained in his commentary on Chou Tung-I's

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 18a-18b; Philosophy, pp. 301-02.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 13a-13b; Philosophy, pp. 291-92.

Treatise on the Diagram of Tai Chi.[1] As far as I can see, the ultimate character of Li is described under two correlated concepts, viz. Tai Chi (太極) and Wu-Chi (無極); or being-in-differentiation and being-in-undifferentiation.[2] Being-in-differentiation characterizes the active aspect of Jen or Love in its infinite manifestations in the empirical world. All beings, at different levels, in realizing their respective Li, become patterns of experience. Hence being-in-differentiation is the ground of moral, social, and institutional experience in the world. This positive aspect of Li corresponds to the movement of Yang. This, in my opinion, is Chu Hsi's effort to give an ontological status to the ethics of Confucianism. All actual achievements, or the realized Jen, fulfil, to some extent, their meaning of existence. To be is to actualize some quality of Jen.

Being-in-undifferentiation characterizes the inactive aspect of Jen. It is the completion of a differentiated act and the returning of it to inaction. This function corresponds to Yin, the other pole of Li. But Yin is not a mere completion of an act in the sense of bringing all its components into one harmony; it also brings the achieved act back to the state of undifferentiation wherein the subject and the perceived world are in continuum. This implies that there is no absolute claim for a completed experience; that the uniqueness of an individual experience is conceived as a transitory fact. In union with reality, the achieved experience of the immediate past is therefore subsumed into the state of spontaneity or ineffablity. This is the mystery of immediacy. This description reminds one of the Tao of Taoism. However, because of the alternation of Yin and Yang in Li, both poles are relative:

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[1] Chou Lien-Ch'i Ch'üan Chi (The Collected Writings of Chou Lien-Ch'i), op. cit., pp. 4-26; Needham, op. cit., pp. 460-64.

[2] Chou Lien-Ch'i Ch'üan Chi (The Collected Writings of Chou Lien-Ch'i), op. cit., p. 4.

> The Alternation of action and inaction has no beginning, and the alternation of Yin and Yang has no beginning. When one refers to Yu (有) [that which is differentiated], one is confronted with Wu (無) [that which is undifferentiated]. On the other hand, when one refers to Wu, one is confronted with Yu. Hence Yu and Wu are immanent in the alternative process of activities.[1]

Hence neither a differentiated act or an ethical achievement, nor spontaneity or the intuition of the mystery, is absolute. The ultimate character of the world is process, but it is a cyclical one.

The cyclical process may be spatially conceived as from externalization to internalization, or vice versa. Yang is the organic involvement of the subject for the reception of the felt perceptivities of the environment. Yin is harmonization of them into one pattern of experience and bringing it back to the state of undifferentiated continuum with Nature. But here the notion of being-in-undifferentiation should not be understood as unconditioned freedom. For if it is so, Yin must have dissolved Yang, thus elevating itself, and merely resulting in complete chaos. Nowhere does Chu Hsi say that the pole of Yin can be independent of Yang. The ultimate principle of Yin and Yang in alternation prevents the absolutization of structure on the one hand, or of freedom on the other. It is dualistic, not in dichotomy but in polarity. Yang and Yin, therefore, imply mutual conditioning. The subject in the state of undifferentiation does not entertain an unconditioned freedom, for its previous condition of existence is presupposed. However, in such a state the subject's continuum with reality is dominant; the importance of the preceding act of achievement is relegated to the background. Such an achieved experience is described as "returning to, and is stored" in, the ground of undifferentiation.

Hence, metaphorically speaking, the cyclical-process view of time is

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[1] Ibid., p. 8.

something like a wavy-line, with the top representing Yang and the bottom Yin:



On the wavy-line, the point at the bottom, between the descending and the ascending, is, however, blurred in an undifferentiated continuum. Therefore the individual experience, as a final unit, is not given a unique place in the process of alternation.

I have in this section sketched the abstract character of Li. It is also variously spoken of by Chu Hsi as Tao, Heaven, or the nature of Heaven and Earth. Each of these synonyms contains the irreducible principle of Yin and Yang. Because of this polarity, the Confucian emphasis upon socio-ethical order is fused with aesthetics; likewise, the Taoist discernment of the sensed qualities of Nature is merged with ethical order.[1]

The Relationship between the Universal Structure and Its Specific Structures in the World

Just as the abstract character of the world qua knowledge is deduced from the empirical world, so the a priority of this structure is verifiable by experience. That is to say, insofar as this metaphysical principle is adequate, it must be applicable for the explanation of experience. Therefore there should be a relationship between the general character of the universal structure and the realization of it into specific structures in the world of flux. The relationship is a common factor between them. To my knowledge, such a common factor dies in the kind of experience to which Chu Hsi gives attention in his

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[1] Needham, op. cit., pp. 464-67.

philosophy. Experience in the mind of Chu Hsi has a personal dimension; it refers to things and events that are directly perceived and personally involved by the subject. It may be an entertainment of highly rationalized ideas of the Chinese Classics; but such ideas still imply this personal aspect of truth. In fact, the Chinese view of experience is shot through with subjectivity, viz. the importance of self-experience as an inseparable attribute of knowledge. In this respect, Chu Hsi's philosophy does have an idealistic and pragmatic undertone. By idealistic is meant that one's personal experience, when openly confronted, can be generated into structural meaning having relevance to metaphysical ideas. By pragmatic is meant that the validity of this generated experience is to be verified by submitting it to the test of one's personal life. Because of this aspect of knowledge, Chu Hsi repeatedly says that Li is "substantial," i.e., having direct bearing upon life. The following is an extreme representation of this aspect of his thought:

> The rightness of the statement, "the actualization of an experience is the concrete expression of Tao" may be apprehended with certainty. We need not talk about empty and far away things; only let us turn inward and seek it [Tao or Li] in our own self, and we shall know whether this Li really exists or not. For this reason, I said once before, "If we would know the reality of this Tao, we must seek it in our own experience."[1]

Because of this character of experience, the universal structure or Li is conceived as the ground for the ordering of experience pertaining to this character. It cannot be composed of a hierarchy of ideas which, when realized, is radically different in essence from the nature of experience understood in Chu Hsi's world. Hence the metaphysical reality of Li has predominantly an ethical-aesthetic import; it lures man and Nature to realize ideas expressing the character of Jen.

Chu Hsi speaks metaphorically of the universal structure as "root" and

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 4b-5a; Philosophy, p. 276.

the principles realized in the world as "fruits"; they are inseparable for the explanation of experience.[1] Both the root and its fruits share a distinct character derived from the Confucian-Taoist tradition. In the following paragraph, the common character between the ideational and the empirical is seen:

> Those who follow the Confucian School, on the other hand, 'from the study of the lowly understand higher things'; they advance from the humble accomplishments of 'speaking and sweeping, answering, and replying, advancing and receding.' Whether in food and drink or in the relation between the sexes, they were never lacking in earnestness. For the Tao which man of truth seeks is both manifested and hidden. The manifested refers to one's daily activities; the hidden refers to the universal Li. Since in daily activities the universal Li is present therein--in the relation between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife, senior and junior, or when engaged in the toasting and pledging of social intercourse there is not one sphere of activity which is not related to Li and can be confused; for wherever there is confusion, universal Li is obstructed. . . . Here in Li we have the source of an explanation for the nature of Heaven and Earth; here is the source of the universe. There are not two sources in the universe. Therefore the transformation of Ch'ien [Yang] and K'un [Yin] and the orders of species all proceed from this one source. Thus every creature receives its own Nature from Heaven. This is the reason for the inseparableness of fruits from their roots.[2]

Since there is a continuity of relationship between the ideal and the empirical world, there is a unity between Li and experience. The former actualizes the latter and the latter realizes the former. It is in this respect that Chu Hsi criticizes the concept of Nirvana held by the Chinese Chan Buddhism. In his opinion, his contemporary Buddhists broke this unity; for in Chan Buddhism, as he sees it, the character of Li (Nirvana) is distinctly different from that of the empirical world, each excluding the other.[3] Hence a Buddhist, in following out the logic of his faith, is compelled to "cut off" his thought of the empirical world as the condition necessary for the anticipation of Li. For Chu Hsi, this implies that his opponents hold the belief that

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 7a-8a; Philosophy, pp. 280-82.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 7b-8a; Philosophy, pp. 280-82.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 6a, 7a; Philosophy, pp. 278, 280.

ideas of the empirical world have no metaphysical significance, and that the metaphysical reality, i.e., Nirvana, has no continuity in terms of value with the world of sense-experience.

Following the same argument, Chu Hsi says, analogically, that, although Li is "like a chaotic and disorderly wilderness lacking all signs of a ruler, yet it is filled with innumerable forms like a dense forest."[1] This statement suggests that even though Li in its totality is not prearranged, it possesses infinite ideas of a substantial character capable of realization in the empirical world.

In positing the ontological priority of Li, Chu Hsi is anticipating the steps of a rationalist. But his rationalism is of a special sort, for he does not conceive of reason as being commensurable with speculative thinking; nor does he think of it as pure mentalism. His rationalism is concerned with the immediate experience of the subject. However, in his philosophy, there is an emphasis upon coherence of ideas as unity of experience, and on a rational world-view based upon Li. In this regard, he is a rationalist. It would be fair to call him a rational-empiricist.

The Ordering of Li

I have so far stated the function of Li in two ways: as specific principles in the empirical world, and as an a priori principle for the explanation of the world. In the present section we go a step further, inquiring into the dynamic relationship between Li and experience. In this context, two terms should be introduced: one is Ming (命), and the other, Hsing (性). Ming refers to the ordering of Li into experience, and Hsing to the reception of Li into a patterned experience. This is clearly stated in a metaphorical way as follows:

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[1] Ho Nan Ch'eng Shih I Shu (The Collected Writings of Ch'eng Brothers), ed. Chu Hsi (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), p. 169; Needham, op. cit., p. 466.

> The word, 'Ming,' refers to that which flows forth; the word 'Hsing' to what is individualized. Ming is like water flowing, as in the stream; Hsing is as if you took a bowl and filled it from the stream.[1]

Ming sometimes is also described as the ordering of Heaven (天令). Heaven is the spontaneous function of Li or is that which flows forth and ingresses into experience.[2] Thus the ordering of Heaven is the issuing of some idea through the spontaneous function of Li into Ch'i. Hence the ordering of Heaven, unlike the universal structure, is a dynamic and empirical notion. In Chu Hsi's system, since no immanent function is possible without the presence of Ch'i, the ordering of Heaven evidently involves Ch'i. It is the ordering of Ch'i into a specific Li in the world.

Ch'i in its totality has some necessary or deterministic character:

> The approximation to uniformity of Ch'i is exemplified in our sense of heat and cold and of hunger and repletion, in the love of life and shrinking from death and shunning what will be prejudicial; all this is common to man with other creatures.[3]

> Things in Ch'i which cannot be changed are life and death, longevity and brevity of life, poverty and wealth; these things are within the power of Ch'i.[4]

Whether or not these deterministic elements contain Li or not, Chu Hsi does not indicate. In reading his works, one gets the impression that Ch'i approximates the notion of physical matter in the Western scientific sense, which implies some "law" of Nature. But because of the interrelatedness between Ch'i and Li, the notion of physical things receives a special meaning peculiar to the Chinese.

As has been said, Heaven functions spontaneously. This function is

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 3b; Philosophy, pp. 10-11.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 12; Philosophy, p. 3.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 25b-27a; Philosophy, pp. 57-59.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 3a-3b; Philosophy, p. 10.

called the affective power of Heaven (天德).[1] (The word "power" or T'e can also mean spontaneity in the Chinese experience.)[2] This power elicits self-awareness (德) on the part of man. Because of self-awareness, man as an entity of Ch'i, i.e., a physical being, is brought to the persuasion of Heaven, whereby a certain Li is envisaged by him.[3] Thus self-awareness is an approximation to Li. But in man's nature there is a battle between self-awareness and mere physical existence or the upward and downward tendencies. The task of self-awareness is to "overcome" the "unclear" and "turbid" qualities in Ch'i and transform them into an experience of Li.[4] When and if this is done, self-awareness, together with the physical aspects of man, eventuates in an order of attainment. This is the upwardness of man. But there is a possibility that in his battle the physical pole might take the upper hand and absorb the self-awareness into mere physical existence, thus relegating the ideational possibility. For, in a sense, as Chu Hsi says, Li, relying for its strength upon ideational existence, is "weak"; whereas Ch'i, being the source of physical existence, is "strong."[5]

In the first section we traced Ch'i to the alternative movements of contraction and expansion of Yin and Yang. In the second section we explained Li as the principle of a patterned experience. But the separate discussion of Ch'i and Li is for the purpose of analysis. In fact, it is impossible to speak of Ch'i without presupposing the presence of Li in it. The process of Yin and

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 3b-4a; Philosophy, p. 11.

[2] H. A. Giles, Chinese-English Dictionary (2d ed.; London: Bernard Quaritch, 1912), II, 1346.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 2b-3b; Philosophy, pp. 9-10.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, p. 8a; Philosophy, p. 91.

[5] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, p. 9; Philosophy, p. 90.

Yang is the basic function of Ch'i; but it is also conceived as the realization of Li in the world.

In the third section, the general character of Jen was presented within the context of the fourfold feeling on the level of perceptivity and rationality. This fourfold process is reducible to the phases of Yin and Yang, which are but the alternation of Yu-Wei and Wu-Wei or structure and spontaneity. Then in the fourth section on the universal structure, the cyclical process of being-in-differentiation and being-in-undifferentiation was introduced. In the fifth section we discussed the Meaning of experience in the general and specific sense. This recapitulation reminds us of the importance of the principle of Yin and Yang, which Chu Hsi thinks results in the ultimate good.[1] This notion is derived from a passage from Yi King:

> The alternative movement of the inactive and the active constitutes what is called the course of things. That which ensues as the result of their movement is goodness; that which shows it in its completeness is the nature of men and things.[2]

This brings us to where we left off concerning the realization of an idea in experience, which is the theme of the present section. Apparently, such a realization is the outcome of the movement of Yin and Yang. But, according to the mutual dependence of this polarity, there is no climax when an idea is actualized. There is a point of completion, but it is not a clear and distinct one; for once an idea is actualized, it does not take the role of a final occasion; it is, as it were, taken back to the state of spontaneity. Since the realization of an idea, in the full sense, is the fulfillment of the principle of Yin and Yang, it involves both the actualization of an idea and the return of it to the ground of undifferentiation. This is supported by the

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 25b; Philosophy, p. 56.

[2] The Yi King, trans. J. Legge, Vol. XVI of The Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Muller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1899), pp. 355-56.

analysis of the role of the final phase of the fourfold process--the sense of better or worse. It is said that knowledge of an actual experience has no claim for itself; its function is the perceptual or rational evaluation of the preceding phases of an actual experience. This view is also supported by the absence of an account of the final unit of experience in Chu Hsi's system.

Form in Aristotle and Li in Chu Hsi

Some thinkers have interpreted Chu Hsi's Li, the individuation of Ch'i, in terms of the Aristotelian essence or form.[1] But, because of the distinct character of Li, such an effort faces insurmountable difficulty. In the first place, metaphysically and logically, essence as the form of matter is universal in the sense that it is the theoretical aspect or the cause of a sensible thing or the conception under which the sensible thing is subsumed.[2] Although Chu Hsi articulates the difference between the perceptual and the rational level of experience, he is not aware of the distinction between the particular and the universal, the sensible and the theoretical. In the Aristotelian system, by virtue of the essence in the sensible thing, its species is thereby recognized, hence a classification of knowledge becomes possible.[3] But, the function of Li in Chu Hsi's system takes a different turn. Its function is to recognize the grade of perceptivity in the individual entity, or to discern the ethic-aesthetic quality in it. Hence Li is a perceptual "form" directly knowable to the perceiver. But in the Aristotelian method of science, the form or essence of a thing is separable from the material thing by virtue of

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[1] Fung Yu-Lan, op. cit., p. 901; Bodde, op. cit., II, 542.

[2] R. McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random, 1941), p. 810.

[3] W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. J. H. Tufts (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 142-43.

its theoretical nature. Hence the primary substance is that "which is neither predictable of a subject nor present in a subject."[1] This means that the essence of a sensible thing is not perceptually known; knowledge of it, theoretically speaking, depends on a scientific inference in the form of syllogistic deduction.[2]

It is also apparent that the Aristotelian form refers to the essence of an enduring sensible object. But Li is the character of an event or happening.

Furthermore, the process of Nature, in the Aristotelian sense, constitutes the relationship of matter as potentiality and form as actuality, with the latter standing as higher than the former. Hence the matter is subsumed into the form which is its cause. In the process, the active and dynamic aspect rests upon form, and matter, in contrast to form, is passive. In Chu Hsi's metaphysics, Ch'i or matter implies self-creation, and Li is the individuation of this dynamic matter. In his description, Chu Hsi does attribute the power of individuation or organization to Li; but because of the mutuality between Li and Ch'i, one is not superior to the other.

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[1] R. McKeon, op. cit., p. 9.

[2] Windelband, op. cit., p. 134.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

The Condition of Knowing

The Meaning of Jen

In the foregoing chapter we have, on various occasions, touched upon the meaning of knowing in Chu Hsi's thought. It was said that the character of knowing is socio-ethical, imbued with aesthetic feeling, and that even in the consideration of a sense-object, the tendency is to look at it as an event. It was also mentioned that there are two levels of knowing, the lower one participates in immediacy and the higher one in rationality.

Before one is able to know adequately of the world, there is a prior condition he must fulfil. This condition is the restoration of, or return to, Jen.[1] At the human level, Jen is illustrated in a well-known analogy, originated by Mencius, wherein one's feeling of sympathy is instantaneously aroused while witnessing the fall of a child into a well.[2] This analogy seems to say that knowing is initiated by an instinctive concern for the other. It also means that one's relationship to the world and one's self-identity are correlated though not identical. One is in the state of Jen when he is aware of a continuum of experience where there is no barrier between the internal and the external.

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 4b; Philosophy, p. 317.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, pp. 8a-8b; Philosophy, pp. 323-25.

For Chu Hsi, Jen is at the base of human existence, as real as one's physical body. Just as in a healthy body where blood circulates completely, making the body ever fresh and regulative, so is a man of Jen in whom the quality of Jen floods over the entire self, making it ever receptive to the flows of external events.[1] Chu Hsi then says that once one's self is restored to the state of Jen, his body is also the "body" of Jen (仁體).[2] This is a clear evidence indicating that the physical existence, in a certain mood, is also the aesthetic-ethic existence.

The prerequisite for reaching the state of Jen is variously described as "openness" (廓然大公), "extermination of the desire for things" (私意), "the removal of egoistic thought" (物欲), "the mastering of the self and the returning of it to solidarity" (克己復禮).[3] These are synonyms denoting a certain ontological attitude toward the self and the world. Perhaps this attitude can be understood best by confronting the notion of "externalized percipient" (有外之心).[4] By it is meant that the subject is no longer in the state of continuum with the object. Hence the latter becomes estranged from the former. This is because of "egoistic thought" or "the desire for things." These two phrases, however, must not be understood in the moralistic or even psychological sense. They are closely related to the traditional Chinese epistemological attitude. What causes egoism or the desire for things is due to the absence of a polarity in the subject, which is an essential condition of knowing. This polarity is Emptiness (虛) and Substantiality (實).[5]

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 12b; Philosophy, p. 180. [2] Ibid.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, pp. 29a-29b; Bk. XLIV, pp. 11b, 12a, 24a-24b; Philosophy, pp. 365-66, 177, 180, 202-03.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 12b; Philosophy, p. 180.

[5] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 9b; Philosophy, p. 173.

Emptiness denotes the state wherein the subject has no preconceived or preoccupied knowledge of a particular object in mind; not only is it completely open to the object, but by virtue of its Emptiness it receives the knowledge of the object as its own momentary essence. This is the Substantiality of the subject. But once this act of experience is over, the subject must not keep the experienced essence as a permanent possession.[1] Substantiality, hence, is ever momentary, subject to perpetual perishing. But this perishing is intentionally necessary for the reception of a perceptual essence. In this way, the subject is ever empty and substantial. "Egoistic thought" or "the desire for things" refers to the possession of the essence of an object for keeping. As a result, the subject can no longer function cyclically. From this polarity, we see a fundamental attitude about knowledge in Chu Hsi's thought. Knowing is to respond to the being of the other as fully as it can with personal attachment. But such a state of knowing is momentary. Once it is over, the subject should maintain a complete detachment from the object--not in the scientific but in the ontological sense.

This attitude of attachment to and detachment from the object implies two epistemological presuppositions: (1) It accepts the knowability and realness of perception. By knowability is meant that the instinctive human awareness of the object is the basis of knowing. This awareness communicates perceptual knowledge about the object. By realness is meant that apart from the involvement of the subject in perception, there is no experience. Perception is meaningful because it is grounded in the personal dimension of the knower. Here perception is not identical to sense-perception. It is basically a bodily feeling (體認)--diffused but intimate, pervasive in, and beneath, the five senses. Here is what he says: "The 'body' may here be understood as that of

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 9a; Philosophy, p. 172.

the bodily feeling. 'Bodily feeling' denotes a state of knowing wherein one approximates experience through his own body."[1] Concerning sense-perception, Chu Hsi seems to think that when one's mind is preoccupied with them, one misses a good deal in experience. He quotes one of his predecessors to support this view: "Heng Ch'ü says, 'Do not be restrained by what one sees or hears.' 'When one extends one's perceptual feeling, then can he enter into things in the world of experience.'"[2] Here I have in this context translated "Mind" (心) into perceptual feeling or the percipient, for I believe this conveys the basic meaning of "Mind" in Chu Hsi's thought. I shall state my reasons in the next section. (2) The second presupposition is this: in order to appreciate the world of experience and to attain the freedom of the subject, one should accept the "finiteness" of perception, that is, its transitory quality. It is for encountering but not for keeping. These two epistemological attitudes seem to be contradictory to each other, yet they are related for the account of experience.

The Meaning of Ch'eng as the Key to the Access of Jen

But how can one be certain that what one has now received is the adequate knowledge of an object? This question is dealt with within the general discussion on the notion of Ch'eng (誠). Its general meaning can be stated as follows: Ch'eng is the intuitive awareness of the general character of Li, the universal structure, in the teleological sense.[3] That is, as it were, the key to the door of Jen--hence to knowledge, giving knowing a special char-

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 19b; Philosophy, p. 346.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 13b; Philosophy, pp. 181-82.

[3] The Doctrine of Mean, trans. J. Legge, Vol. I of The Chinese Classics (2d ed. rev. reprinted in China, 1939), pp. 415-16.

acter in Chu Hsi's thought. When one is in the state of Ch'eng, he is instantaneously in Emptiness (誠是虛), ready to respond to the world beyond the self.[2] In this way, the essence of the object enters into the subject. By essence is certainly not meant the conceptual nature of an object. Here it is analogous to the artistic form of an object which the artist attempts to grasp. It requires an attitude of attentiveness to what the object "speaks" to him. Furthermore, essence participates in the general character of Li.

Ch'eng, as a metaphysical notion, appears in the Confucian book, the Doctrine of Mean, written first between the fifth and the third century B.C. and later edited and commented upon by Chu Hsi. This word was translated by Legge as sincerity.[3] But sincerity is a human and psychological concept which does not carry the full meaning of Ch'eng. Needham, on the other hand, attempted to improve Legge's translation by rendering its meaning as integrity, implying the intrinsic "law" of a being governing its own behavior and order.[4] The metaphysical meaning is here preserved in that, when the subject is sincere to its own inherent nature, it is aware, within its given locus, of the integral process of the universe. The subject is the microscopic world in the macroscopic world. But viewing Needham's interpretation of Ch'eng as a whole, one cannot help suspecting that he has projected the biological theory of evolution into it. Thus his interpretation of Ch'eng presumes the integral process in the naturalistic-scientific sense.[5]

The idea of integrity can be maintained if we conceive of it as the organization of aesthetic-ethic values. Both man and nature are internally

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, pp. 23b-24a; Philosophy, p. 429.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 19a; Philosophy, p. 419.

[3] The Doctrine of Mean, op. cit., pp. 413ff.

[4] Needham, op. cit., p. 468.

[5] Ibid., p. 470.

related for the realization of such values. Every entity in realizing its own being at the same time participates in the world-process of integration. Ch'eng as a teleological awareness of the subject elicits motivation for the realization of the universal structure.

Hughes, in his work on the Doctrine of the Mean, by translating Ch'eng as realness, seems to have hit an adequate meaning of Ch'eng in the Chinese experience.[1] It fits into the idea that knowledge is not real without the qualification of Ch'eng; and that once one is in the state of Ch'eng, it is internally related to the realness of beings.

In addition to conveying a teleological attitude, Ch'eng therefore takes on two definite meanings in Chu Hsi's system: Firstly, it is the integral process underlying the alternation between Emptiness and Substantiality in the subject. It is in this sense that Chu Hsi says, "Without Ch'eng one cannot experience a things." (不誠無物)[2] Hence, one is not experiencing the real if he does not follow the process of Emptiness and Substantiality. Secondly, since Ch'eng underlies this alternative process, it is also the actualization of Li into concrete experience. It is in this sense Chu Hsi says, "Ch'eng is the Substantiality of Li," that is to say, in momentary possession and momentary negation of the essence of an object, the subject is at the same time realizing the universal structure, i.e., Li.[3]

In Chu Hsi's system, Emptiness and Substantiality are to be conceived in two senses: They refer to the experience of dipping into the depth of reality, arising out of it with a substantial essence, and the returning of the essence into reality. Hence Emptiness and Substantiality are understood

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[1] E. R. Hughes, The Great Learning and the Mean-in-Action (New York: Dutton, 1943), pp. 127ff.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 24a; Philosophy, p. 249.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, pp. 18b-19a; Philosophy, p. 419.

in the literal sense, one succeeding the other. In the second sense, they are to be understood as polarity in one's structure of experience, generated from the alternative processes in the first sense. In this abstract structure, they are not in succession but in tension with each other, existing simultaneously as a philosophical mode. Thus, insofar as one's general understanding of the world sustains and gives meaning to his existence, it is "substantial." But this substantiality takes on an "as if empty" meaning; one who truly lives up to his structure of experience must act "as if" there were nothing in his mind which might deter him from giving attention to the object which now confronts him. Here we see that the "as if empty" has a positive meaning in one's structure, for it motivates him to be open to the happenings around him.

For our present purpose, we are primarily concerned with the meaning of Emptiness and Substantiality in the first sense, that is, in concrete experience where the principle of Ch'eng is exemplified and the process of knowing begins.

It is apparent that neither Ch'eng nor Jen is a special gift possessed only by the intellectuals. It belongs to every man. It predicates a certain view of man in the Chinese culture. And an inquiry into knowledge presupposes it. Hence from the outset, the problem of knowledge is posed in a direction radically different from its counterpart in the West. As the next section will show, since knowledge presupposes a right understanding of man, the object of knowing therefore is oriented toward an understanding of both the world and man.

A Theory of Knowledge

The Relation between Body and Jen

There are three expressions used interchangeably by Chu Hsi to indicate the relationship between the knower and the known. They are: T'i Wu (體物),

knowing the thing through one's body; Chu Wu (即物), immediate contact with the thing; and Ko Wu (格物), acquaintance with the thing.[1] They are synonymous, describing the nature of immediacy between the subject and the object. In this respect, we are reminded of the correspondence between one's physical body and one's "body" of Jen discussed in the preceding section. It was said that the word T'i, body, can simultaneously mean a physical entity and the state of Jen. This means that a physical body is never a mere material entity; it is fused with the mental, which is Jen in its minimum sense. Thus Jen is both a state of being and a state of knowing. Chu Hsi is also fond of another analogy in illustrating Jen, derived from Ch'eng Ming-Tao, which attributes the numbness of hand or foot to the absence of Jen (不仁).[2] This illustrates that when body is devoid of its sensitivity, Jen is absent. Here sensitivity is identical with sympathy.

The dominance of immediacy, as it is shown in the three synonymous phrases, as well as the correspondence between body and sympathy, in the context of knowing, is an undeniable evidence showing that Chu Hsi is struggling with the problem of knowing at a level lower, or deeper, than sense-perception in its Western meaning. This is also supported by the absence of a discussion on the latter in contrast to the attention given to the former.

The Meaning of Hsin at Its Lower Level

In the correlation between the "body" of Jen and the physical body, we have already had a glimpse of what constitutes the "mental" function of the subject. Usually the word denoting the "mental" is Hsin (心), the metaphys-

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 350; Chou Lien-Ch'i Ch'üan Chi (The Collected Writings of Chou Lien-Ch'i), op. cit., p. 8; Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 12b.

[2] Ho Nan Ch'eng Shih I Shu (The Collected Writings of Ch'eng Brothers), op. cit., p. 8.

ical meaning of which will be explained in the following chapter. Hsin is usually translated as "Mind" by both Western and Chinese writers alike. But "Mind" as understood in the West has a whole galaxy of meanings which is absent in the Chinese intellectual history. For instance, the Cartesian dichotomy between body and mind as a metaphysical problem is not known in China. Again, "Mind" as a faculty conceived strictly in the bio-physiological sense, such as the Tabula Rosa, is also unknown to the Chinese. Furthermore, "Mind" as an a priori rational faculty potentially possessing the universal or necessary laws of the world, such as the Kantian concept of "Pure Reason" is entirely alien to the Chinese. Hence to translate the "mental," Hsin, as "Mind" is both misleading and unfortunate.

In Chu Hsi's description, Hsin is a flow of feeling, but it is also physical.[1] It has the notion of grinding the mental upon the physical. Chu Hsi says that the "substance" of Hsin is "eternal flux."[2] This means that Hsin is basically a function or a process. Although the literal meaning of Hsin is "heart" which would suggest a spatial substance, yet at the time of Chu Hsi, no thinker would identify "heart" with the philosophical meaning of Hsin. At the same time, the non-intellectual connotation of Hsin is preserved through its etymological origination from "heart." The strong evidence supporting the functional view of Hsin is a passage in which Chu Hsi comments on some ideas derived from Mencius:

> The phrases, "exercising Hsin," "preserving Hsin" do not imply that Hsin has to exercise itself in order to preserve itself. The phrases, "letting go of Hsin," "losing Hsin" do not imply that Hsin has to let itself go in order to lose itself. When Hsin functions instantaneously, what is lost is preserved, and whenever the function is called to a halt, ceases to be exercised, then what is preserved is lost.[3]

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 2a; Philosophy, p. 159.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 1a-1b; Philosophy, pp. 157-58.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 8b-9a; Philosophy, p. 211.

This passage shows that Hsin is not a self-designated a priori substance, or mental faculty. It is rather an event whose character proceeds from its function. Here "exercising Hsin" apparently refers to the function of Jen in the subject. Thus the "mental" begins with an outflowing of sympathy toward the other. Or, we may say, the process of knowing, at its base, is inseparable from the ontological meaning of Jen.

In order to preserve the non-intellectual, aesthetic, physical quality of the "mental" on the one hand and immediacy and instinctiveness of it on the other, I have used the term "percipient" to denote Hsin at its lower level of meaning.

The Subject-Object Relation in Immediate Experience

There are three definite meanings underlying the notion of object. First, an object is always something perceptual, the knowledge of which can be immediately intuited without inferring a theory or a universal. No scientific postulation is assumed under the notion of an object; hence there is no "theoretical object" in Chu Hsi's philosophy. Neither is an object subsumed under a universal; for instance, the abstract concept of "man." There is no universal apart from the particular; at least this is the implication of his philosophy. Second, an object is still in process; it is not a fixed thing to be observed or investigated. It enjoys its own subjectivity or immediacy. In terms of Western logic, it is more like a subject. Third, an object is primarily understood as a happening involving a relationship of things rather than a sense-object. This point may be seen in the following passage:

> A principle cannot be perceived; only from activities and conversations can we discern it. The more minutely we perceive the right from the wrong among them [activities and conversations], the more exquisitely fine a principle we may derive from among them. When the ancients speak of "acquaintance with things" and "knowledge is generated," they meant no more than that we should begin our inquiry here.[1]

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, p. 12a; Philosophy, p. 290.

Thus we should begin our inquiry in "activities and conversations" which suggest events of daily experience. These are said to be "objects" for one's acquaintance. They refer to primary activities out of which sense-objects are derived. Strictly, these activities are not objects, i.e., enduring entities, but events or happenings. In contrast to object in the Western sense, an "object" in Chu Hsi's philosophy is an other. "Other" implies that its status is similar to that of the subject.

The subject-other structure is the primary relation in the Chinese experience, which can be explicated by an analysis of the fourfold process of Jen, mentioned in the preceding chapter: (1) Hence the initial response of the subject is an instantaneous, sympathetic feeling toward the other. Meanwhile, the subject is empty. In Chu Hsi's own words, its "body enters into the object." (2) This is followed by a sense of "guilt and shame." This phrase should not be translated literally. Its meaning is: the flowing out of sensitivity as the subject becomes more aware (than the first phase) of a personal relationship to the other. (3) The feeling of sensitivity generates a sense of "obligation" to form a right relationship with the other. Again, "obligation" should not be understood literally. It means a willingness to intimate the perceptual essence or the subjective quality of the other. This involves a yielding to the other. (4) Lastly, the feeling of better or worse is an intuitive grasp of the significance of the other. This feeling, however, is derived from the previous feelings. It corresponds to the perceptual essence of the other. Meanwhile, a certain aesthetic-ethic idea has now been actualized. Thus the subject is said to be "substantial."

In an actual situation, these four stages of experience are not sharply distinguishable; they are in continuum. However, there is a progression of feelings from awareness to an intuited knowledge. They constitute an act of

experience. It is apparent that these four phases of feelings are non-intellectual. And the process requires bodily feelings of an internal sort. Chu Hsi explicitly says that at this level of knowing, the essential thing is a respect for one's subjectivity, as well as that of the other; intellect is negligible. This remark is made in his response to a disciple's question:

> Your statement 'the sympathetic feeling apparently does not proceed from intellect (主覺)' is very good. But as to your further comment, 'the word, intellect, is not necessarily bad' I never meant that it was. I only said that at the level of sympathetic feeling our effort is not intellectual but is of reverent care (主敬).[1]

Further:

> Question: Does not consciousness also have vital impulse?
> Answer: Certainly, but to explain Jen in terms of consciousness is too cold. Consciousness pertains more to intellect, and only in a small degree to Jen.[2]

"Reverent care" here means the respect for one's subjectivity as well as that of the other. This is at the level of sympathetic feeling. As to the distinction between conscious and non-conscious experience, the following passage is very enlightening:

> Question: Is there any connection between bodily movements and the percipient?
> Answer: How can it be otherwise? It is the percipient which causes the bodily movements.
> Question: Before there is any stirring of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the body exercises its functions; for example, the eye sees and the ear hears. Is this before or after the conscious experience (知覺) of the percipient?
> Answer: Before the stirring of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy, there are already seeing, hearing, and bodily movements implicated in the percipient. If the percipient is ignorant of its bodily movements, then the percipient is not present in these activities and is unaware of their significance; in which case what is the use of talking about 'before consciousness'? 'Before consciousness' does not mean the percipient is completely unaware of its own activities; it is aware, though it appears to be asleep.[3]

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 32a; Philosophy, pp. 369-70.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 8b; Philosophy, p. 325.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 3a-3b; Philosophy, pp. 161-62.

In this interesting passage, Chu Hsi is apparently struggling for an explanation of the distinction between the two levels of knowing. For he is actually aware that before the "stirring of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy" i.e., conscious experience, there is another type of experience, i.e., "the eye sees and the ear hears" or the "bodily movements" which are underneath the higher level of experience. And the fourfold process, discussed above, is the non-conscious (not unconscious) experience between the percipient and its felt event.

Knowing at the lower level is taken for granted by Chu Hsi. It dominates his writings. As a matter of fact, in his time, he never has to face any alternative view of knowing. For knowing in terms of sense-perception as the starting point is a unique Western way of thinking.

Thus in Chu Hsi's system, what is properly considered as knowledge, i.e., whatever conforms to the general character of Li, starts with this non-conscious experience. When and if this way of knowing is missing in the subject, it is considered as an "externalized percipient," for the subject no longer holds an intimate relationship with the world.[1]

The Second Level of Knowing

But how does Chu Hsi treat conscious experience or intellect? In this respect, one is confronted with some difficulty, since he does not give sufficient attention to the methodological or epistemological aspect of this level of knowledge in the way that he does to non-conscious experience. Hence in reading Chu Hsi's portion dealing with rational elucidation, one is not certain whether Chu Hsi is still at the level of immediate experience or conscious thought, even though such a distinction is recognized by him. I think this difficulty, in part, cannot be avoided since all Chu Hsi's categories, whether

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 13a; Philosophy, p. 181.

referring to concrete experience or thought, are words of ideographical and denotative character. This means that these categories appeal to perceptual and immediate experience. Unlike the "concepts" of Western philosophy, generally logically constructed and grounded in a scientific theorem which explain but do not necessarily depend on immediate experience, Chu Hsi's categories are grounded in immediate experience, independent of a scientific theorem. Thus their objectivity rests upon the direct test of experience itself, giving the latter a particular cultural meaning. Largely because of the inherent character of Chu Hsi's philosophy, it seems impossible and unnecessary to separate thought from perceptual experience. The Platonic dichotomy between sensations of the world and thoughts of ideas does not apply here.

In regard to experience of a larger sort, Chu Hsi's concern is not sense-object but the generalization of experience derived from non-conscious experience. This is perhaps the reason for Hocking's criticism of Chu Hsi, i.e., that the latter deals with immediate experience and ultimate principles but not with the rules for discovering the principles. Hence, Hocking says, "His intermediate structure of classified knowledge is very sketchy."[1] This is certainly true. Because of the absence of intermediate concepts the process of transmission from the lower to the higher level of knowledge is not explained in detail or with precision. On the other hand, one must bear in mind that since both levels are perceptual in nature, the problem concerning how to translate perceptual into conceptual knowledge, which is the key-problem in Western epistemology, is absent in Chu Hsi's cultural tradition.

Despite the absence of intermediate concepts, one can discern an implicit principle guiding Chu Hsi's treatment of conscious experience. This

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[1] W. E. Hocking, "Chu Hsi's Theory of Knowledge," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, I (April, 1936), 112-13.

may be called the principle of "participational generalization" which means the raising of the experience of the lower level to rational thought--an elaboration of the different facets of the meaning of the fourfold feeling. "Generalization" here refers to an implicit method employed, whereby there is an elucidation of non-conscious perceptions derived from the matrix of experience. In this procedure, a generalized thought must be supported by a more specific one which can, in turn, be traced back to immediate experience.[1] Here the empirical spirit of Chu Hsi is evident. This is what he means by "through the perceptual vehicle, one seeks the imperceptible principle."[2] "Participational" refers to the subjectivity involved even in "objective" generalization. To be sure, the "objective" generalization corresponds to the external world, but the knowledge of the "object" at the same time enhances a self-realization of the subject, because the essential character of knowledge takes the form of Love, Rightness, Social Sensibility, and the Co-ordinated Understanding between the object and the subject. All these principles imply an understanding of the self. Hence knowledge of the world and self-understanding are inseparable.

Hsin as the Structure of Experience

The second level knowing--consciousness or thought--may be called "Mind." But in order to avoid its Western connotation, the term "structure of experience" is substituted for "Mind," which suggests both generality and concreteness, thus corresponding well to the meaning of Hsin at the level of intellect. At this level, the structure takes on the character of Emptiness and Substantiality. This character, as a philosophical mode, is described by the Neo-Confucianists as "at-homeness in the world without being overcome by

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, pp. 13a-13b; Philosophy, pp. 291-92.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLV, p. 13a; Philosophy, p. 291.

temptation" (寂然不動), which suggests an inner certitude, a coherence of thought, and an anchorage in existence.[1] In such a state, there should be no disturbance of a particular sensation or thought from within. Unlike Nirvana which is a state of enjoying the being of "Nothingness" by transcending the world of perceptual experience, the state of Emptiness implies an attitude of readiness to respond to an external event (物來順應).[2] In responsiveness, mind as the percipient is acted upon by the other, whereby the former penetrates into the latter (感而遂通).[3] Here, we are again at the concrete, alternative process of Substantiality and Emptiness.

Although this state of Emptiness assumes a perceptual character, yet it does contain an idealistic element. This is seen in the following dictum: "The prevailing quality of a sage lies in the fact that he has no possession of a feeling of his own in order that he may respond to each and everything else."[4] It means something like this: one should empty one's self of one's own feeling, i.e., be in complete detachment, even from his own feeling, so that he may feel "identical" to the feeling of the other to which he is now in response. In this way, the feeling of the other becomes that of the self for the moment. Here, the other's joy or sorrow becomes one's own. Such a state of mind is most passive, yet most active; most exclusive, yet most inclusive; most subjective, yet most objective. This is the ideal vision of the "perfect man"--only a sage can attain it. However, Chu Hsi thinks that scholars can use such an Ideal as a model for their existence.[5] In this context, Chu Hsi, like other Neo-Confucianists, employs the metaphor of the mirror to depict the

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 6b. [2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLV, p. 1a.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 6a.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLV, p. 13b; Philosophy, p. 252.

[5] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLV, p. 12b; Philosophy, p. 251.

mind of a sage.[1] Like a mirror, the mind is completely without a trace of sensation or thought in the particular sense; but it can receive each thing unto itself in a direct encounter; and the trace of the thing is gone when the encountering is over.

This state of Emptiness, as the structure of mind, is also the state of Substantiality. This means that in order to achieve the former, though imperfectly, one must have a basic understanding of the structure of the world, derived and generated from immediate experiences. The following passage states the dialectical nature of the polarity in the mind:

> Anxiety arising from external things can find no entrance into the mind because in it there is the structure which is substantial. Evil arising from external things can find no entrance into the mind because the latter has a structure which is empty. When structure is given the mastery in the mind and nothing else has any existence in it, where is it possible for evil to enter? How otherwise can it be described than as empty? Hence when one says that the structure is empty, he also implies that it is substantial.[2]

Because of this polarity, the mind has no absolute or monistic character either as sheer mentality whose work it is to construct a "theoretical world," or as a state of being which transcends the sensible world. Hsin as a "substance" is derived from the exercising of itself in the concrete process of alternation.[3] Hence the abstract thought must be grounded in experience. Thus the mind as a structure or unity of thought is meaningless in Chu Hsi's system apart from its continual function in concrete experience. This means even the abstract structure should constantly be submerged in non-conscious perceptions.

In view of what has been said, it is apparent that Chu Hsi's description of Hsin in the intellectual sense is not a state of union with the objective

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 15a, 25a; Philosophy, pp. 165, 173.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 9b; Philosophy, p. 173.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 26b; Philosophy, p. 206.

world, or of identity between the subject and the object, whether the object is the totality of experience or an ideal being which transcends the world of transitoriness. Professor Hocking seems to have ascribed this state of union to Chu Hsi.[1] This is because Hocking conceives of Chu Hsi's epistemology primarily in terms of an idealist's understanding of mind though he takes account of Chu Hsi's empiricism. As I said, there is an element of idealism in Chu Hsi's view of mind, in that he entertains Emptiness as a real possibility. But even this aspect must be related to his concern for immediate experience. The polarity within the structure saves him from the trap of identity.

Conclusion

If the above presentation adequately interprets Chu Hsi's epistemology, then terms like "thinking," "thought," "reason" must be understood in a context different from the dominant trend of the Western philosophy. They should be understood within the context of terms such as "non-conscious experience," "the concrete and perceptual," "subjectivity," "participational generalization." Chu Hsi is not a rationalist, as he has been generally depicted by both Western and Chinese scholars.

I venture to say that the end of knowing for Chu Hsi is the attainment of a co-ordinated understanding between the self and the world, each being perceptual and concrete. Such an understanding enables the knower to attain a closeness to the world, using the word world in its Chinese meaning. The ultimate end is the participation in immediate experience.

If this is the end of knowing, then Chu Hsi has in the back of his mind a concern for the aesthetic nature of experience as well as the participation of life in it. This is "freedom" for Chu Hsi. If the general tenet of

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[1] W. E. Hocking, op. cit., pp. 109-11, 119-20.

this chapter is accepted, then, we cannot agree with the view of Professor Hughes on Chu Hsi when he says that our philosopher, in transforming the Confucian tradition, has changed the emphasis "from fidelity to Nature to fidelity to Reason, from finding the truth mainly by right living to finding the truth primarily by right thinking."[1] This rationalistic understanding of Chu Hsi by Hughes is probably due to his interpretation of Li as the rational principle of a thing, viewed in the Western sense.[2] This means that the Li of a thing can be obtained by a process of observation, whereby the sense-data are organized into a rational concept under which the thing is understood. Furthermore, Hughes, for some reason, does not attempt to conceive the nature of Li in terms of the metaphysical principle of Yang and Yin, thus the relational and the aesthetic character of Li in the empirical world becomes inaccessible to him. This probably accounts for Hughes' association of Li with the Western logic of substance, even though he, as a thinker, is unsympathetic with this mode of thinking.[3]

When Li is understood as a concept of intuition referring to the aesthetic-ethic nature of the other or the self, when the empirical reality of Li is located within the alternation of Yang and Yin, and when the four rational principles are conceived as referring to the concrete process of relatedness in an experience, we have a picture of the world radically different from the one depicted by Hughes. Chu Hsi's world is thus opposed to "reason" in the rationalistic sense, and to "thinking" as rationally reasoning with detachment about the world. It is an open reality evoking aesthetic-ethic sensibility, and making man realize his essential relatedness to all beings. In this world,

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[1] E. R. Hughes, The Great Learning and the Mean-in-Action (New York: Dutton, 1943), p. 49.

[2] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[3] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

man still prefers "fidelity to Nature to fidelity to Reason," and he finds "truth mainly by right living" rather than by "right thinking."

CHAPTER III

HSIN AND HSING

Hsin

The Physical and the Mental Poles of Ch'i

We have in the preceding chapter dealt with the epistemological aspect of Hsin. In the present chapter, our purpose is in part to investigate the metaphysical implication of Hsin.

In Chapter I, we stated that Ch'i--the physical basis of the world--consists of the polarity of the mental (the imperceptible) and the physical (the perceptible). Then, it was pointed out that it is due to the alternative movement of Yin and Yang that things are created and generated.

When this process of experience is seen as an individual unit, the mental refers to its condition of Emptiness. This means that there is in the physical the dynamic and flexible energy of Ch'i, which is its mentality. The function of mentality or Emptiness in Ch'i is its power to transform the physical into a new creation--an individualized Li in Ch'i. The physical aspect of Ch'i, in the initial situation, refers to its material basis, but it also refers to the completion of an experience when a certain Li is embodied.[1]

When the process of experience is at work, the physical refers to the feeling (感) of Ch'i aroused by the attraction of an object. This feeling elicits the mental from the physical pole. The mental, so elicited, is able

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[1] T'ang Chün-i, op. cit., p. 163. [I am indebted to the author for my interpretation of Ch'i.]

to transcend the physical and enters into the physical feeling of the subject.[1] The notion of Emptiness signifies the imperceptible quality of Ch'i, by virtue of which the latter is able to transcend by entering into the physical feeling of the object. The entertainment of such a physical feeling is the appropriation of the material aspects of the object by the mental pole of Ch'i in question. This encounter between the mental pole of Ch'i and the material of the object, from the perspective of the subject, is called "extension" (神).[2] In this state there is a synthesis of feelings, which is described as "the immanence of the object in the subject" (感通).[3] In immanence, the physical feeling of the object, through the reception of the subject's mental feeling, is transferred to the subject's physical pole. In this way, an internal adjustment occurs between the mental and the physical of Ch'i. This process is called "transformation" (化).[4] When this happens, there is a harmonization of feelings in the subject, which is the actualization of an experience.

It can be seen from the above description that the physical or Yin refers to the givenness of Matter, and the mental or Yang to the potentiality of Matter. The former seems to suggest passivity, non-intelligibility; whereas the latter activity, intelligibility. But such an impression is the result of analysis with regard to the distinct function of each pole. Ch'i, as a process of experience, seems to reflect the domination of the mental, although in each phase of the process, as it operates in the empirical world, the mental is fed by the physical and the former, in return, feeds the latter. At no stage of the process is one separated from the other.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 103-04.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

The Identity of Hsin with the Alternation of Yin and Yang

The inseparability of the mental and the physical of Ch'i in the world is characterized by Chu Hsi's elaboration of the notion of Hsin (心). Here is what he said: "Hsin is that which correlates Yin and Yang, and resides in Ch'i; it is where the mental (神) emerges and where the physical (白鬼) is ruled."[1] We see, in this passage, that Hsin as the immanent reality is both mental and physical. In fact, Hsin and the alternation of Yin and Yang are identical. However, in the description of the alternation, the distinctions between the mental and the physical are emphasized, thus there is a tendency in our mind to conceive of them as being separable; whereas in the discussion on Hsin, the inextricability of the mental and the physical is the dominating feature. As such, Hsin is self-causing, self-moving, and self-directing. For Plato, the principle of cause or motion is the soul. For Chu Hsi, it is Hsin which is, unlike the Platonic soul, both mental and physical.

There is another point of difference: The alternation of Yin and Yang is a physical-quantitative notion--cosmological. But Hsin is a qualitative-valuational notion--aesthetic.

In Chapter II, in the analysis of Hsin as the percipient in the epistemological context, we saw how human feeling and feelings of the cosmos are fused in the act of knowing. Thus, Jen as the generic human feeling conditions man's knowledge of the world. The assertion that man's feeling is homogeneous with feelings of the world is based on the metaphysical assumption that Ch'i, which constitutes man, is also that which constitutes the world: "The substance of Heaven and Earth is the same as that of my body; the organizing principle which governs Heaven and Earth is the same as that which governs my

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 21a; Philosophy, p. 196.

nature."[1] Chu Hsi commented on this statement, originated by Chang Tsai, one of his predecessors, by saying that the substance of Heaven and Earth is Ch'i. But he was not content with a mere physical interpretation of Ch'i. Therefore he identified Ch'i with the Hsin of the world--the latter being the "Heart of Heaven and Earth" (天地之心). Hence the Hsin of the world and the alternative movement of Yin and Yang are blended as the passage of experience.

Hsin as the Locus of Jen or Experience

Chu Hsi also attempted to locate Hsin as the locus of Jen or life. Hence:

> That which begets the myriad living things is the Hsin of the world.[2]
>
> Concerning the meaning of Hsin, the Philosopher says, 'One word will cover it, namely, Life.' 'The highest attribute of Heaven and Earth is the production of Life.'[3] It is by receiving Ch'i of Heaven and Earth that man is born. Because he receives his life from the life of Heaven and Earth his mind is impregnated with Jen. When he is in the state of Jen whatever he possesses is life.[4]
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> The Hsin of Heaven and Earth which gives birth to all things is Jen. Man by this endowment receives this Hsin of Heaven and Earth and thereby his life. Hence the sympathetic feeling of man (i.e., the initial stage of Jen) is also the principle of life.[5]

These three passages indicate that the Hsin of the world is the depth of life. The alternation of Yin and Yang is therefore also the generation of Jen or life. In this study the "Hsin of Heaven and Earth" is translated as the "percipient world," implying that concreteness, immanence, and the correlation of the mental and the physical are the elementary notions embodied in the genetic process

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[1] Chang Tze Ch'üan Shu (The Collected Writings of Master Chang) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), p. 2; Needham, op. cit., p. 471.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 33a; Philosophy, p. 217.

[3] Yi King, op. cit., p. 381.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 2a-2b; Philosophy, pp. 159-60.

[5] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 13b-14a; Philosophy, pp. 182-83.

of the world. By attributing the location of Jen to the percipient world, the empirical basis of an aesthetic-ethic metaphysics is laid down. Thus the percipient world exemplifies the alternative movement of Yin and Yang, and it also is the fourfold process of Jen in action.

Thus, the percipient world is no other than the world of becoming. By virtue of becoming, all creatures are in interaction, each realizing its experience as a percipient event. At this level, feeling, knowing, and being are identical. This seemingly confused and entangled world, however, is exemplifying the basic cosmological principle; that is, each thing, in a given moment of the alternation, is involved in some phase of the fourfold process.

From the notion of the percipient world Chu Hsi therefore generated four cosmological ideas in which every act of experience participates. They are: Origin (元), Growth (亨), Enlargement (利), and Fruition (貞).[1] Origin refers to the emergence of the subject in the act of experience; Growth to the mutual immanence between the subject and the object; Enlargement to the phase of transformation in the subject; and Fruition to the completion of an experience returning to the phase of Origin. But these four ideas are just an extension of the fourfold process of Jen, that is, Jen (the feeling of sympathy, self-relatedness, or the principle of subjectivity), "I" (the sense of guilt and shame, sensitivity, or the principle of action), "Li" (the feeling of social obligation, solidarity, or the principle of togetherness), and Chih (the sense of better or worse, worth, or the principle of co-ordinated understanding). Of the three levels of the percipient world, viewed from the human perspective, sympathy, guilt and shame, social obligation, and the sense of better or worse, are the most intimate to the world. Self-relatedness, sensitivity, solidarity, and the sense of worth are each a step abstracted

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 7a-7b; Philosophy, pp. 169-70.

from the first level. And Origin, Growth, Enlargement, and Fruition are each a step further from the second level. But even these four principles, for Chu Hsi, are internally felt by the world, for they are no other than the common-sense view of the four seasons of the year:

> The flowing forth of the percipient world runs according to the principles of Yüan, Heng, "Li," and Cheng. Yüan [Origin] is the season when the young sprouts begin to shoot up; Heng [Growth] is the season of growing foliage; "Li" [Enlargement] is the fruit-bearing season; and Cheng [Fruition] is the season when fruit returns to the place of rest. If in the end there were no such return to rest, there would be no Origin. But because there is the return to rest, Origin springs forth from it. When Origin has completed its course, Fruition returns, and when Fruition has completed its course, Origin returns. Thus the world moves on in cyclical movements without end.[1]

The Hsin of Man

In the world of flux there is existentially no separation between man and the world. But this continuity between them does not mean that man is completely conditioned by Nature. For the Hsin of man is most empty, that is, it has a greater degree of imperceptibility; hence a greater power of penetration into the physical feelings of non-human entities. Because this is so man also has a greater intensity in transformation. In this context, Chu Hsi developed the "spiritual" nature of man. He said that the "coarse matter" (濁氣) in man has a degree of "opacity," "thickness," and "turbidness."[2] The "coarse matter" apparently refers to the animal nature in man. But because of the greater power of "extension" and "transformation" man is capable of arising out of his animal nature into some degree of "clarity, clearness, and purity."[3] This capacity for transformation is the "self-transcendence" () of man. In the preceding chapter on the problem of knowledge, we have dealt with this aspect of man.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 25b-27b; Philosophy, pp. 157-61.

[3] Ibid.

Hsing

Hsing as the Meeting of the Actual and the Ideal in Experience

In the foregoing section, we were discussing the genetic nature of Ch'i characterized by mutual immanence and self-transcendence. This reality is what I called the matrix of experience or the source of creation. Here we have a glimpse, as it were, of the "inside" of the creative advance of the world.

In the present section, we shall discuss how Hsin becomes a definite or actualized experience. Such a notion is called Hsing (性). Whereas Hsin emphasizes the internality of Ch'i, Hsing gives attention to the externality of Ch'i. Hsin is dominated by the sense of derivation from the ground of experience; it is entirely an empirical concept. But Hsing has to be viewed within the context of the actual and the ideal. From the point-view of the actual, it is called the "materialized Hsing" (氣質之性) which is a derivation from the immediate, preceding experience.[1] Hence he says that the materialized Hsing is rooted in Hsin.[2] But Hsing from the perspective of the ideal is the reception of Li which, when realized by Ch'i, is called the "Hsing as ordered by Heaven" (天命之性).[3] But both refer to the same entity, i.e., an actualized experience. Thus in Hsing the ideal and the actual meet to constitute an order or a pattern of experience. Whereas Hsin, the percipient world, is moving toward some end, Hsing as an established fact is the approximate realization of this end. Thus order or structure becomes invariably associated

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, pp. 3a-4a; Philosophy, pp. 83-84.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 7b; Philosophy, p. 19.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, pp. 3a-4a; Philosophy, pp. 83-84.

with the meaning of Hsing. This is especially so since Hsing involves the reception of Li. Hence Hsing is tinged with rationality. Therefore, Chu Hsi says that Hsing apart from Ch'i would be without existence and Ch'i apart from Hsing would be without intelligence.[1] Here "intelligence" must be understood in the non-cognitive sense as being a unity of experience.

Hsing, translated into English as Nature, usually refers to the nature of man. Although Hsing is inescapably associated with human nature, it is nevertheless a metaphysical concept. For instance, its universal application is stated in this passage:

> We shall realize that there is not a single thing in the universe which does not possess Hsing, and that it is only when the thing itself is non-existent that Hsing is non-existent. If anything could exist without Hsing, it would be, as you say in your letter, the ashes of burnt wood, or the dust which man becomes when he dies. But the ashes and the dust possess the Hsing of ashes and dust. How then can dry and withered things be said not to possess Hsing?[2]

But Hsing must be conditioned by the meaning of Hsin since the latter constitutes the basis of the world. Therefore, the process of Yin and Yang or the fourfold feeling is the qualitative basis for any actualized experience. Hence Hsing as Nature in Chu Hsi's system must be viewed in the aesthetic-ethic context. This means an actualized experience retains the sense of immediacy or worth.

The Problem of Evil

An act of experience discloses the alternative process of Yin and Yang. This is the fact of self-creation. In this context, Chu Hsi located the potentiality of evil. Although the alternation of Yin and Yang is considered as a principle of the ultimate good, the realization of it, resulting in self-

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, pp. 6a-6b; Philosophy, pp. 88-89.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 33b-34a; Philosophy, pp. 71-72.

creation, often involves evil. Chu Hsi, in contrast to Buddhism, did not consider evil as a separate principle in contradistinction to good. Rather, he viewed good and evil as basically evolving from one principle which is the alternation of Yin and Yang. But in the act of self-creation, by virtue of the freedom of the percipient, and because of the very meaning of "self-creation," a real risk of evil is involved.[1] He openly admitted that a materialized Hsing, being the resultant of the alternative movement, does in many instances contain actual evil.

How did Chu Hsi discern the factor of evil in the actualized experience? A perfect act of experience is a harmony (中) of the fourfold feeling into a unity of experience.[2] Chu Hsi defined the harmonization of feelings as follows: "Chung [harmony] is the name for what is without deflection or inclination, which neither exceeds nor comes short."[3] Hence harmonization means a balance among these four feelings. In other words, there should be a coherence between the extensive feelings and the transformed feelings of the percipient. And a lack of such a balance or a unity of feelings is an evil.[4] Ideally speaking, there should be a harmonization of the feeling of sympathy, of "guilt and shame," of social obligation, and the feeling of better or worse, in the final phase of the percipient-process. This means that an actualized experience must take account of: (1) the locus of the subject in relation to the "other"; (2) the existence of the "other" as a "subjective" being; (3) the existential relationship between the subject and the "other" in a continuum of feelings; and (4) the integration of these feelings into one pattern of experience. Evil results when one or more of the different phases of feelings

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 15a-15b; Philosophy, pp. 36-37.

[2] The Doctrine of Mean, op. cit., p. 382. [3] Philosophy, p. 92, f.n. 3.

[4] Fung Yu Lan, op. cit., p. 826; Bodde, op. cit., II, 446.

is upset by the domination of the other. For instance, the domination of the subjective feeling, which is (1), has the tendency to minimize the feeling for the "other," which is (2). And the domination of the continuum of feelings, which is (3), would minimize the distinction between (1) and (2). And if the final phase, the sense of better or worse, i.e., self-valuation, dominates, there is the risk of sacrificing concrete feelings of the immediate past for the sake of abstraction. Likewise, in the unity of experience, if the extensive feelings dominate, then the integral feelings would be minimized. On the other hand, integral feelings out of balance with the extensive feelings would result in an enfeebled actualization of an experience.

Whether an experience is one of harmony or not, when it is retained as a self-possession by the subject, it becomes an evil. For in retaining it, the subject cannot function properly for the reception of a new experience. The Emptiness in him becomes obstructed. The method whereby this kind of evil may be eradicated constitutes the central problem for "epistemology" discussed in Chapter II.

The Function of the Ideal Ground of Hsing in the World

Thus far we have discussed the physical aspect of Hsing as being derived from Hsin. Now we shall analyze the ideal aspect of Hsing. As has been said, Li is the a priori ideal structure of the world. Our chief concern here is, however, the functional aspect of Li, that is, the way in which Li is embodied in Ch'i for the constitution of a patterned experience.

A pertinent question should be raised here: Is Li a logical construct in the sense of having an analytical basis or is it functional in the sense of being necessary for the explanation of the structural character of the world? The answer must lie in the latter. An analytical description would have to

rely upon some conceptually devised idea derived from some theoretical science. This, as I said before, was not accessible to the twelfth-century China. Li is the general character of Jen, "I," "Li," and Chih. And individual ideas all participate in this aesthetic-ethic structure.

Chu Hsi never worked out analytically the logic for the gradation of ideas, yet the notion of gradation was envisaged by him:

> Li is infinite. Although it is present in all spaces and directions, yet the myriad threads [i.e., ideas] of Li are all interconnected. Drawing circles with his finger, the Philosopher says, 'See, there is a circle within a circle. Horizontally, it is so, perpenticularly, it is so; backward and forward it is all so.'[1]

In conceiving a small circle within a larger one, Chu Hsi seemed to entertain the notion of the qualitative difference among ideas. And an idea at a higher point on the scale of value supercedes or encircles one at a lower point on the scale. In the passage just quoted, Chu Hsi seemed to identify ideas with pattern. Since ideas or possibilities are conceived valuationally, they are fundamentally good. But their goodness lies in an aesthetic-ethic persuasion, not in a theoretical or intellectual lure as in the case of Platonic ideas.

The Ordering of Heaven

Although the gradation of ideas is implied in Li, in the ordering (命) of ideas into an experience, no connotation of organization is involved in the order among ideas. For the ordering of an idea is a spontaneous act by the persuasive power of T'ien or Heaven. Hence: "T'ien [Heaven] refers to its spontaneity, and Ming [ordering] has reference to the immanence of Li into actuality."[2] Also: "What is called Ming [ordering] refers to the spontaneous function of T'ien [Heaven]."[3] The dynamic aspect of an idea rests upon the

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVI, p. 14a; Philosophy, p. 293.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 1a; Philosophy, p. 1.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 13a; Philosophy, p. 31.

persuasiveness of Heaven whose ordering of Li is an act of spontaneity. The meaning of spontaneity is said to be "can't help doing it" (不能自已).[1] Hence the ordering of Li is elicited by instantaneousness on the part of Heaven rather than by a selection prompted by the relevance among ideas. But instantaneousness does not mean arbitrariness, for it implies effortlessness.

The Cyclical-View of Time

A further question may now be raised: If the spontaneous ordering does not involve relevance, that is, the relation of "before" and "after" among ideas, how is one ordering related to another? The answer is: There is no relation between them--each is completely of its own. This is due to the cyclical character of time conceived within the abstract notion of Yin and Yang, or Wu-Wei (being-in-undifferentiation) and Yu-Wei (being-in-differentiation).[2] This view of time is characterized by an alternation between action and inaction, extension and intension, becoming and perishing. Although there is the relatedness of feelings within each alternation, there is no connection from one alternation to another. Each cycle of experience is viewed as a self-creation de novo. When an idea is embodied in an experience, the enjoyment of it by the experient is short-lived. It should be relegated to undifferentiation in order to enjoy another alternation. This conforms to the statement, made in Chapter I, that Ch'i as a final unit of experience has no absolute claim over itself. For the real "finality" is not the actualization of an experience but the passing of it into the ground of undifferentiation which is timelessness. Hence, from the perspective of Li, every ordering of an idea is an independent act, having no relevance to its antecedent or subsequent ordering.

From the analysis of the notion of ordering as well as the cyclical-view

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Supra, pp. 30-33.

of time, we see that time is an alternation between time (differentiation) and timelessness (undifferentiation). Of course, "between" here stands for an internal relation, that is, time and timelessness are a dynamic continuity in which there is no externality. Such a view of time implies that each experience emerges directly from the ground of timelessness rather than from an empirical past.[1] Likewise, the completion of an experience is directed toward the ground of timelessness rather than the future. Thus "transcendence"--the process from Hsin to Hsing--is directed toward the timelessness, not toward the future. In this way, creatures have direct access to the mystery of timelessness in the empirical world. It is evident that this view of time differs widely from the forward-thrusting, linear view of time in which future, present, and past are in continuity. Since future and past, in the cyclical view, have no metaphysical significance, present alone takes on a different meaning.

Hsing in Contrast to the Goodness of Li

In the empirical world Hsing is significantly important in that it supplies structures or orders of existence. Hence Chu Hsi said that it is by virtue of Hsing that Tao is realized (率性之謂道). Also, said he, "Li is the idea in the possession of Hsing, and Hsing is the locus in which Li enters."[2] Thus, he reiterated the saying, which has its origin in the Yi King, "the function of Hsing is to complete [the Yin-Yang process]," meaning that in the reception of Li the process of Hsin is completed.[3] Hence, for the living creature, each realized experience is ontologically meaningful.

In connection with the discussion of the goodness of Li and the problem

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[1] Northrop, op. cit., pp. 342-43.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 15b; Philosophy, p. 36.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 25b; Philosophy, p. 56; The Yi King, op. cit., pp. 355-56.

of evil, Chu Hsi clearly claimed that all ideas are good. But he also said that it is not uncommon for a materialized Hsing to be involved in evil. In fact, he was of the opinion that, in many instances, an actualized experience does not come out as an act of harmony, that is, there is an upset in the balance of the fourfold feeling. Hence the realized Li is somewhat distorted or twisted. As we said before, the problem of evil, in Chu Hsi's system, is intrinsically related to the problem of self-creation. Hence the possibility or the actuality of evil must be accepted as a real risk so long as self-creation is inherent in and valuable for the world. On the other hand, ideas are not possibilities in the logical, but in the aesthetic-ethic sense; they are ontologically a priori too, though empirically verifiable by the world. They are good in essence. We see that in the relation between ideas and the empirical world, or between Li and Hsing, there is a dichotomy between the unmixed good of Li and the qualified good or the mixed evil of Hsing. A sort of Platonic dualism is here discernible. Chu Hsi struggled hard to overcome it by establishing an internal relationship between the ideal structure and the empirical world. But such a dualism nevertheless remained so long as he posited the unqualified good of Li.

The Insecurity of Hsing

In our discussion on the cyclical-view of time, the insecure status of Hsing is implied. For the process of experience does not end at Hsing. The alternation of Yin and Yang is the becoming of an experience and the passing of it into the ground of undifferentiation. Thus Hsing as an achieved act does not have an absolute claim over itself. The enjoyment of it is no more significant than the relegation of it. Thus an experience in its entirety consists of its positive and its negative aspects--both achievement and relinquishment are essential.

The insecurity of Hsing also accounts for the absence of the concept of individuality as a final entity in experience as mentioned in Chapter I. For such a notion, if brought to use, would be incompatible with the alternation of Yin and Yang as the completion of an experience.

Because of the insecure status of Hsing, the relation between Hsin and Hsing are not co-equal. Metaphysically speaking, the former enjoys a more prominent role than the latter. However, no empirical pattern or order is possible without Hsing. Furthermore, the negative function of Hsing, i.e., its dissolution, has a positive effect upon the ensuing alternation of experience through the feeling of undifferentiation whereby the beginning of a new experience is evoked.[1] Thus every new alternation is conditioned by the feeling of undifferentiation, which is an ontological mood for the reception of an event. Since such feeling is evoked by the negation of a preceding experience, there is nevertheless a negative relation between the Hsing of the preceding experience and the ensuing experience in question.

The Metaphysical Status of Ideas

A pertinent question may be raised here concerning the metaphysical status of an idea. Since Hsing is insecure, does this mean that the idea which is to be embodied in an experience also suffers from ontological insecurity? The answer is: yes and no. Insofar as an individual idea is a priori in the ground of experience, it shares with the ground the character of Jen. To that extent, every realizable idea has an objective status. But it also shares the ultimate fate of the alternation of Yin and Yang. As such, an idea does seem to "anticipate" an ontological insecurity in the ultimate sense. This means: When it is embodied in Hsing, it returns to the ground of undifferentiation.

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLV, p. 8b; Philosophy, p. 242.

Thus an idea qua idea is secure, but an idea via experience participates in the general insecurity of the empirical world.

From the foregoing discussion, we can discern two levels of reality in Chu Hsi's metaphysics. One is Hsin or the percipient world; the other is Hsing or the structure in experience. Although they are mutually conditioning, as we said, the negative function of Hsing is to provide the feeling of undifferentiation required for the initiation of a new experience; yet Hsin is deeper, richer, and more internally related to reality than Hsing. A major function of philosophy for Chu Hsi was the elucidation of the different aspects of Hsin in the context of feeling, knowing, and being.

A perusal of modern literature on Chinese philosophy will show that the concept of Hsing, translated as Nature, is generally interpreted as the rational-ethical structures in man and that the concept of Hsin is primarily understood as the mentality of man. Consequently, the aesthetic-perceptual quality, as described in the present chapter, is relegated to the background. When Hsing is dissociated from its aesthetic source and when Hsin is conceived primarily as "mind," the essence of the Chinese philosophy is obscured. The elements of freedom, spontaneity, and mystery are intrinsically associated with the aesthetic-perceptual meaning in the Chinese experience. It is the attempt of the present writer to restore this prevailing aspect of Chinese thought as presented in Neo-Confucianism, to its proper place.

Thus Hsin or the percipient world, in Chu Hsi's metaphysics, should be taken to mean "reality" or the genesis of experience. Herein lies flux, change, becoming. Hsing as the derivation of Hsin is a step removed from the basis of experience. Thus Hsing may be viewed as "appearance" which suggests rationality. But "reality" and "appearance" in Neo-Confucianism are related by virtue of the alternations in experience.

We have in this chapter sketched the connection between Hsin and Hsing within a larger context of Li and Ch'i. These concepts are metaphysical in the sense that without them we would be unable to see the Neo-Confucian world-view. The absence of one of them would render the explanation of the others unintelligible. The fourfold process of Jen may be conceived in two ways: Jen as process is genetic--aesthetic-ethic valuation in flux; and Jen as structure is "morphological"--an aesthetic-ethic pattern of experience. The combination of the two constitutes a cyclical-view of experience. Then, underlying the metaphysical concepts is the ultimate principle of the alternation of Yin and Yang.

The Place of "God" in Chu Hsi's Metaphysics

Li as the Metaphysical Ruler

Here at the conclusion of the present chapter dealing with ultimate concepts, it is appropriate to ask whether or not there is a notion corresponding to the reality of God in Chu Hsi's metaphysics; and, if there is, what its nature and function are. The following passage may serve as a guide:

> Question: When we consider the inequalities of ordering of Heaven, does it not seem as if there is not really a Being who imparts them to the world, but rather that the two modes [i.e., Yin and Yang] of Ch'i in their intricate complexity and differentiation function in accordance with their intrinsic process, and, knowing that the inequalities of ordering do not proceed from man's own power, do people not speak of them as being ordered by T'ien [Heaven]?
> Answer: They [the inequalities of ordering] simply flow from the Great Source [i.e., Li]. This can be ascertained by our experience. It is not that there is a Being who bestows upon the world these inequalities, acting as if there were a personal Being above the world by whose command these inequalities come to pass. However, such a notion seems to be entertained by the Odes and the Book of History--in such passage, for example, as the one which speaks of the wrath of the Supreme Ruler. But still, this Ruler is none other than Li. In the universe there is nothing higher than Li and hence the term Ruler. In the passage which says, 'The great God has conferred on the people below a goodness,' the very word, 'confer' conveys the idea of one who exercises authority.[1]

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[1] Shoo King, Vol. III of The Chinese Classics, trans. J. Legge (London: Clarendon, 1865), p. 185.

> Question: 'Great is Yüan (元) the principle of Origin, indicated by Ch'ien [i.e., the male principle]. All things are dependent on it for their beginnings';[1] 'The way of Ch'ien is to change and transform so that everything obtains its right nature as ordered by Heaven';[2] 'All things fill the universe in the alternative process of production and desolution. In cyclical movements things are endlessly created'; 'The cold goes and the heat comes';[3]--in the phenomena referred to in these passages and in the course at work in the rushing wind, the sound of thunder, and the flows of rivers from mountains, is it that the Old Sky really possesses the power which controls the creative and transforming processes; or is it simply that the Supreme Pole is the Pivot (樞紐) on which all transformations turn, and the myriad things are created by the spontaneous process?
> Answer: This is the same question as the one already answered.[4]

Here Li was viewed as the "Ruler," a position comparable to that of God in Western metaphysics. But Chu Hsi does not conceive of it as the God of theism, who orders the world in terms of its own valuation or will. This is supported by the evidence that ideas are spontaneously ordered into the world without being originated from the will or valuation of Li. Thus, Li, as the metaphysical principle, is abstract; it has no regard for the world. It does not correspond to the God of Western theism.

The Universal Mind

However, there is another term, the Mind of Heaven or the universal Mind, which suggests the dynamic character of Li. It is characterized by a polarity--"mindness" (有心) and "mindlessness" (無心).[5] "Mindlessness" means that the universal Mind does not have a mind external to the percipient-minds of the world. By its Emptiness the universal Mind is most intimate with the needs and interests of each and every creature. It takes the world into its own. Because of its mindlessness, the creatural minds can act upon it by influencing it. It is mindless so that it can be most mindful. This is the

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[1] Yi King., op. cit., p. 213. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 389.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIII, pp. 34b-35a; Philosophy, pp. 146-47.

[5] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIX, pp. 23a-23b.

"God" who adjusts itself to the world. In this sense, the universal Mind is the most inclusive, and passive, Being. "Mindness" means that the function of the universal Mind derives its spontaneous ordering from its "Mindlessness." This is tantamount to saying that it is due to the correspondence between the physical world and the "mindlessness" of Heaven that the "mindness" of the universal Mind is generated, whereby a certain idea is spontaneously ordered. Thus "the ordering of Heaven," "the universal Mind," "spontaneity," or "Heaven" are functionally identical--referring to the transcendence-immanence of the universal Mind. At times Chu Hsi also identified Li with the universal Mind, because the ordering of Li into the world is the function of the latter. We may therefore say that "mindlessness" refers to the immanence and "mindness" to the transcendence of the universal Mind. This polarity is described in the following passage:

> Question: What could Master Ch'eng mean when he says, "The universe through its mindlessness creates and transforms the world, and the mind of the sage functions with effortlessness [無為]?"
> Answer: This statement refers to the character of mindlessness of the universe. For instance, the four seasons of the universe are in cyclical movement, and the myriad things are thereby produced; then, why should the universe worry over having a Mind to preside over the world? As to the sage, what he does is in harmony with the ordering of Li; therefore, he needs exercise no special judgment over his conducts. Hence, Ming Tao [Master Ch'eng] says, "It is the regulative principle of the universe by means of its Mind to be minds of all things; in this way, it acquires mindlessness. It is the regulative principle of the sage by means of his own feelings to be identical to the feelings of things; in this way he attains feelinglessness." This is an excellent statement.
> Question: Concerning the phrase, "to be minds of all things" does it mean that the universal Mind is unselfishly related to all things?
> Answer: The universal Mind fills in all things, so that when man receives it, it becomes man's mind; a thing receives it, it becomes its mind. There is but one universal mind. We must take account of both its mindlessness and mindness.[1]

The interesting point to be noted in this passage is the analogy between the universal Mind and the feeling of the sage. The sage is so much in tune

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIX, pp. 23a-24b [translation entirely mine].

with the world that at no time or place is his own feeling not the feeling of the thing which he encounters. He is completely passive in order to be completely active; most self-exclusive in order to be most inclusive. Also, the sage is said to "exercise no special judgment over his conducts"; this means that his function does not call for a special consciousness other than that which enables him to be internally related to the world.

Now the character and function of the universal Mind are like those of the sage, though at a superior level. The polar functions of Heaven do not require a special mind or will, nor are they based on a principle which is scientifically constructed. Heaven has a mind only in the sense that it is related to each and every creature. To put it differently, its mind is equivalent to the intrinsic function of the world. Thus Heaven, or the universal Mind, is the "pivot" wherein Li and Ch'i conjoin. It enables the endless alternation of Yin and Yang to rotate. But this function is spontaneous and does not imply a transcendental selection or consciousness. It functions in accordance with the polarity of "mindlessness" and "mindness."

Whereas Li is a priori in that it is the ideal ground of the world whereby the world is metaphysically explainable, the same cannot be said of the universal Mind. For the latter must function through and within a physical context--Ch'i. The mental persuasion of Heaven would be a meaningless notion unless it were conceived as invariably operating upon Hsin and Hsing. Thus the "mindlessness" of heaven is related to the process of Hsin wherein the subject, in confronting an objective event, is aware of the persuasive power of Heaven. This subjective awareness is elsewhere described as Ch'eng or teleological awareness.[1] And the "mindness" of heaven is related to the self-creation of the subject within the context of Hsing wherein, under the domina-

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[1] Supra, pp. 45-47.

tion of Li, an idea is now realized in the subject. Thus, Heaven is an empirical notion in Chu Hsi's metaphysics.

The Universal Mind as the Temporal "God"

The universal Mind is therefore the transcendent-immanent reality in the world--the temporal "God," ever surging forth at the "fringe" of a process reaching toward the creation of an experience of Jen. It is the "exemplification" of the principle of the alternation of Yin and Yang in the world. But strictly speaking, the function of this temporal "God" is the unfolding of the "ever-lasting present." By its persuasion "God" brings an experience into being; and by its transcendence, "God" gathers the being into the ground of undifferentiation. In this way, he moves between immanence and transcendence. "God" is ever-lasting because he is ever-present. His ever-presentness lies in his alternation between creation and dissolution. Neither creation nor dissolution is ultimate. The ultimate function of "God" is the ever-lastingness of the present. Whereas, what is created perishes and what has perished is in the ground of non-being, the present, i.e., the creative passage or becoming, is ever present.

Man's experience with 'God' lies chiefly in his confrontation with 'God's" ever-presentness which coincides with the passage of man in the process of experience. Here the livingness of 'God' is experienced in immediacy; man's intimate feelings are taken into the "mindlessness" of 'God."

CHAPTER IV

JEN

We have in the foregoing chapter discussed in different contexts the various meanings of Jen. Inasmuch as this word has many different meanings as well as being the most dominant notion in Chu Hsi's metaphysics, a more attentive and systematic treatment of it in the light of Chu Hsi's entire scheme seems to be necessary. Such is the aim of the present chapter.

The Physical Aspect of Jen

The central meaning of Jen is life.[1] However, life in this sense is not analogous to the Platonic Eros which strives toward some intellectual or rational fulfillment; nor does it suggest the Nietzschean "will-to-power," whose meaning cannot be understood apart from the idea of struggle or anxiety. Neither dynamics in the intellectual sense nor dynamics in the valuational sense suggest the characteristic of life in Chu Hsi's context. In fact, the association of life with dynamics, which is characteristic of the Western thinking, is not applicable to the Neo-Confucian thought. The meaning of life conveyed by Jen is analogous to the spring climate which is gentle and mild;[2] it is like the softness of water which has a soothing quality;[3] it is spontaneous, natural, uncalculating, and has "nothing in view."[4] "Nothing in view"

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[1] Supra, pp. 24-25; Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 2a-2b; Philosophy, pp. 159-60.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, pp. 1b, 312.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 37a; Philosophy, p. 379.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, pp. 6a-6b; Philosophy, p. 320.

seems to suggest that Jen, in one respect, is the feeling of undifferentiation or the least differentiated.

Chu Hsi's fondness for using physical phenomena for illustrating Jen was motivated by the conviction that they express the characteristic of life in Nature. Natural phenomena were not conceived by him as a dynamic struggle but as an exemplification of effortlessness or spontaneity. Thus creation, or an act of experience, is a spontaneous act. The idea of struggle or tension is hardly mentioned in Chu Hsi's thought. Whenever it is mentioned, it usually appears as effortfulness or exertion which was considered by Chu Hsi as extraneous, or opposite, to the essence of Nature.[1] Here lies a basic reason for his opposition to Buddhism. For Buddhism, according to him, conceives of Nature or life as a theatre of struggle or friction. The way to overcome it is by a strenuous procedure in an effort to anticipate Nirvana--a state of being wherein struggle or effort is absent. This, for Chu Hsi, amounts to the overcoming of struggle by struggle, which is analogous to "the mouth gnawing mouth or the eye gazing at itself."[2] Struggle or drive tends to estrange men from Nature or life. Hence the condition of man's fulfillment is not a laborous scheme toward some state of being over and beyond his essential nature but a "return" to Jen which is his essence.

Jen, described as life, in its physical context is the qualitative or valuational aspect of Ch'i.[3] Since Ch'i and Jen both refer to the self-creation of the physical world, his physical concept, Ch'i, and his valuational concept, Jen, are inseparable in Chu Hsi's system. Thus, in the Chinese philosophy, Nature or the universe is never conceived as an objectified or theoretic structure

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, pp. 29b-30a; Philosophy, pp. 212-13.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 30a; Philosophy, p. 213.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 1b; Philosophy, p. 312.

apart from its subjective or perceptual qualities. Valuation or Jen is conceived as inherent in Nature without which Nature would be meaningless.[1] This also means that the perceptual recognition of the world generates subjective feelings at the same time as it generates objective feelings. Participation in, or the immediacy of, Jen is a predominant Chinese philosophical mode.

Since valuation, in the Neo-Confucian sense, refers basically to creations in terms of spontaneity or effortlessness, its locus must be one where such a phenomenon occurs. This locus, in Chu Hsi's metaphysics, is Hsin or the matrix of experience,[2] for it is here that the process of Yin and Yang alternates, or an experience is generated. At the outset, there is the teleological awareness, or Ch'eng,[3] on the part of the percipient, whereby openness exists between the percipient and the universal Mind, and between the percipient and its object. The percipient's universe is open; that is, there is a continuum of feelings between it, its world, and Heaven. The process of Yin and Yang is the derivation of the unified feeling of the percipient as it encounters its object under the persuasion of Heaven, and the submersion of this distinct feeling into the ground of undifferentiation. Throughout this process there is a continual intimacy between this triadic relationship. The fourfold process of Jen is an ontological description of this relationship viewed as an event. This percipient event, because of its feelings of derivation and by virtue of its feeling of immediacy with its world, is called Jen or life. It is therefore the locus of self-creation, the source of valuation or rationality.

In a real sense, the alternation of Yin and Yang, or the fourfold process of an experience, is a structural description of the creativity of Jen. Although the creativity of Jen is basically at the level of non-conceptual

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 22b; Philosophy, p. 352.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 13a; Philosophy, p. 334. [3] Supra, pp. 45-48.

experience, yet its character and function can be described in a structural and coherent fashion. To the extent that Jen is characterized by Yu-Wei, or being-in-differentiation, it participates and sustains each and every experience. On the other hand, its structure or function must be grounded in Wu-Wei or effortlessness or spontaneity. This means Jen as an act of experience is characterized by the polarity of Emptiness and Substantiality.[1] Emptiness corresponds to the mentality of "Mindlessness" whereby the percipient, in effortlessness, approximates Jen of its object. Substantiality corresponds to the "Mindness" of the percipient, whereby Jen or the object is embodied in, or synthesized with, the percipient event. From the state of Emptiness to that of Substantiality a creation is spontaneously born, whose actualization is without calculation or without a barrier between the percipient and its world.

But a spontaneous experience is incomplete, or is estranged, when it becomes restive at the actualization of an experience. Such a realized experience is called Hsing.[2] But the very notion of Hsing implies that there is a definiteness of experience or an individualized Li in it. This means that at the moment such an experience is realized, there is an instance of exclusion on the part of the experient for the entertainment of the distinctiveness of this experience. At this moment, some degree of externality between the experient and its world is inevitable. Thus the feeling of continuum between the inner and the outer, which is the characteristic of Jen, is then at its low ebb. As has been said, the opposite of Jen is egoism, which is the possession of the realized experience by the self at the expense of self-relatedness. Hence self-relatedness is under threat. This means that the realized experience, if kept longer than it should be, may hinder the self from responding to a new object. At the same time, in retaining the realized experience

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[1] Supra, p. 44.

[2] Supra, pp. 75-76.

possessively, the self loses its spontaneity; thereby its Jen is obstructed. This is the reason why Hsing is not conceived in the final or decisive sense. The termination of an experience is not at its realization but at its perishing. So long as the complete process--origination, creation, and perishing--is based on self-relatedness and is sustained by direct perception, it reiterates Jen or life.

Although Jen as an essential quality of existence refers to both spontaneous creation and perishing, the continuum of which constitutes an act of experience, yet its ultimate meaning transcends, though it includes, this. Jen, in the final analysis, is neither the creation nor the dissolution of an experience, but the perpetual alternation between them. Every creation, though aesthetically and ethically valuable, must perish; and every dissolution, though mystically meaningful, is entertained but transitorily. But the alternation between them is ever-present and ever-lasting. Things exist by virtue of this continual alternation, and life is possible because of it. The ultimate function of the Mind of Heaven, i.e., the temporal God, is neither creation nor dissolution, but the perpetual generation of the present.[1] Thus the ultimate purpose of man, and other creatures, is to respond to this function of the universal Mind by participating in the ever-presentness of the world. Through this metaphysical existence, man conquers life (creation) and death (dissolution), thereby living in the immediacy of the present.

The Ideal Aspect of Jen

In the foregoing section we have discussed the meaning of Jen in the empirical sense, that is, within the context of Ch'i. Now we shall relate this aspect of Jen to its ideal aspect. Chu Hsi said that Jen is the Mind of

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[1] *Supra*, p. 82.

the universe (仁者天地生物之心) and all creatural minds (or percipients) owe their existence, in the structural sense, to it.[1] The universal Mind is Heaven, or the function of Heaven, whose function is the exemplification of the principle of "Mindlessness" and "Mindness," or immanence and transcendence. Through this function there is the ordering of an idea from the ideal structure of the world, Li, into the empirical world.

The ideal structure of the world, Li, is the most general principle of Yin and Yang,[2] or the fourfold meaning of Jen, i.e., self-relatedness, sensitivity, solidarity, and worth.[3] This means that ideas cannot be entertained apart from this general character. And the actualization of an idea is an embodiment of Yin and Yang, which is identical with the realization of the fourfold meaning of Jen in an experience.

Thus Jen in the ideational sense has two distinct meanings; (1) It is the universal Mind through whose function an idea is spontaneously ordered into the world. (2) It is the most general character of Li which is the objective ground for experience. The universal Mind, however, is an empirical concept in that through its ordering the ideal structure and the empirical world are conjoined in an experiential process. Thus in the function of the universal Mind "there is no gap between Heaven and man."[4] Furthermore, through its alternation of "Mindlessness" and "Mindness"--its response to the world and its transcendence over the world--the universal Mind alternates between creation (actuality) and dissolution (potentiality). Thus, Chu Hsi said, "In the conjunction of Jen, i.e., the initiation of an experience, and Chih, i.e.,

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, pp. 30b, 39a; Philosophy, pp. 367, 382.

[2] Supra, pp. 30-33.

[3] Supra, pp. 24-27.

[4] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 30b; Philosophy, p. 367.

the conclusion of an experience, is the very pivot of the myriad transformations."[1] The pivot is the universal Mind.

The meaning of Jen, seen from both its ideational and empirical aspect, can therefore be reduced to its essential characters; they are: spontaneity (effortlessness), immediacy (subjectivity), and perceptivity (feeling). The combination of these three characteristics constitutes the notion of life or experience in the Neo-Confucian sense. All Neo-Confucian philosophical categories are conditioned by, and cannot be understood apart from, these characteristics. In fact, Chu Hsi's metaphysics, in the final analysis, is a rational description of the meaning and value of these characteristics in all aspects of human enterprise.

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVIII, p. 9a; Philosophy, p. 402.

PART II

THE METAPHYSICS OF WHITEHEAD

CHAPTER V

ACTUAL ENTITIES AND ETERNAL OBJECTS

Actual Entities

Primary Feelings

In Whitehead's metaphysics, actual entities stand for the final realities in the physical world. An actual entity owes its being to prehensions or feelings. There are two primary feelings: (1) Simple physical feeling--it is the subject's prehension of a datum which is an antecedent actual entity. (2) Conceptual feeling--it is the subject's prehension of a datum which is an ideal possibility or eternal object. A conceptual feeling is an "appetition" or valuation of the concrescent subject. The simple physical feeling and the conceptual feeling are the most primary feelings possessed by all actual entities. They are "pure" in the sense that the datum of each is not to be confused with that of the other. They constitute the two poles of an actuality. But in concrescence these two "pure" feelings are fused. Whereas the physical feeling receives the datum into the subject, the conceptual feeling adjusts the datum into a subjective form with the subject determining its own valuation. The integration of the physical feeling with the conceptual feeling results in a determinate self-valuation in a form of purposiveness. This purposiveness or "physical purpose" is universal among all actualities.[1]

The physical prehension receives an antecedent feeling into the subject.

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[1]Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 380. [Hereafter abbreviated as PR.]

Thus a simple physical feeling "re-enacts" the feeling of an objectified entity. This phenomenon of "re-enacting" or transference of feeling, is an example of the transference of energy or the vector character of the physical world.[1] There is, however, another aspect of simple physical feeling, i.e., hybrid physical feeling. The datum of such a physical feeling is an actual entity objectified through its conceptual feeling. This means the subject in prehending an objectified entity also prehends the latter's mental pole.[2] A hybrid physical feeling is "impure" since its datum involves both the mental and the physical aspects of the antecedent entity. A simple physical feeling shows the transference of energy in the world. But a hybrid feeling is "an example of the origination and direction of energy in the physical world";[3] that is, in prehending the conceptual feeling of the actual entity, the concrescent subject elicits conceptual valuation derived from its pure physical feeling. This means conceptual valuation is enhanced because of the hybrid feeling whose datum is nonetheless an actual entity. Thus in the objective world the mental and the physical are inseparable. The doctrine of hybrid feeling implies a rejection of the theory of separation of body and mind found in the philosophical systems derived from Cartesianism.[4]

According to Whitehead, "conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physical feelings, and secondarily from each other."[5] "Furthermore," said he, "a simple physical feeling is the most primitive type of an act of perception, devoid of consciousness."[6] Again, the description of simple physical feelings "lays the foundation of the treatment of cosmology in the philosophy of organism."[7] Although the physical and conceptual feeling are the two poles of an actual entity, the basis of an actual entity is nevertheless

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[1] Ibid., p. 375. [2] Ibid., p. 376. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p. 378. [6] Ibid., p. 361. [7] Ibid., p. 365.

grounded in its simple physical feeling. The conceptual feeling is derived from the physical feeling, and is integrated with the latter. This integration may give rise to another conceptual feeling of a complex type, which, in turn, is integrated with the original physical feeling. In this way, the empirical basis of Nature is established.

So far we have discussed two types of simple physical feelings and one type of conceptual feeling. A simple physical feeling exemplifies the vector character of feeling. A hybrid physical feeling displays the autonomy of mentality as it is illustrated in the derivation of conceptual feeling in the prehended actual entity. A conceptual feeling integrates the physical feeling of an actual entity in the form of self-creation and self-valuation. These are the elementary activities shared by all actualities. These feelings are explanatory of reproduction and valuation in the physical world. They are intrinsically emotional, purposive, and self-directive at the non-conscious level.

Secondary Feelings

We must now introduce two more types of feeling, in subsequent integrations, to account for the emergence of novelty in an actual entity: (1) Conceptual reversion--the datum, being an eternal object, of a conceptual reversion is partially identical and partially diverse from the eternal object of the primary phase of the conceptual feeling.[1] Hence conceptual reversion is a secondary origination of conceptual feeling in that its datum is partially derived from the early mental prehension. However, novelty occurs when this secondary mental feeling entertains an eternal object which is partially diverse from the eternal object of the primary mental pole.[2] This sense of

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[1] Ibid., p. 380.

[2] Ibid., p. 381.

contrast enhances the intensity or depth of feeling by virtue of a reversion from an early phase of the synthesis of feeling. Thus an adequate novelty of feeling in the secondary synthesis must involve a ground of identity with and an aim of contrast to the eternal object of the primary conceptual feeling.[1]

(2) Transmutation--the datum of the transmutation of feeling is a nexus of actual entities. Since a nexus involves an analogous simple physical feeling of actual entities, the subject, in the intial phase, responds to the analogous physical feelings as a community. The process of transmutation begins when the subject gathers these analogous physical feelings into one unity of feelings, whereby the multiple physical feelings, through simplifications and eliminations, are transmuted into a conceptual feeling. In this transmutation, there is involved an impartial relevance between the nexus of multiple physical feelings and the eternal object of the final, synthetic, conceptual feeling.[2] This transmutation undergoes a complex integration of the multiple simple physical feelings of some of the entities in the nexus. In the integration of conceptual feelings of these multiple physical feelings, the conceptual reversion of some of its conceptual feelings in the nexus may be involved.[3] Furthermore, in the final synthesis of the transmuted feeling, a conceptual reversion may occur. In such a case the eternal object of the final feeling is only indirectly derived from the members of the original nexus, though the impartial relevance between the original nexus and the final eternal object should still be maintained. Novelty occurs when there is conceptual reversion in the transmuted feeling.[4] The following passage is a clear expression of the transmuted feeling:

> The one physical feeling in the final subject is derived by transmutation from the various analogous physical feelings entertained by the various members of the nexus, together with their various analogous conceptual

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 383. [3] Ibid., pp. 385-86. [4] Ibid., p. 383.

> feelings (with these various members as subject) originated from these physical feelings, either directly according to Category IV [conceptual valuation] or indirectly according to Category V [conceptual reversion]. The analogy of the physical feelings consists in the fact that their definite character exhibits the same ingredient eternal object. The analogy of the conceptual feelings consists in the fact that this one eternal object, or one reversion from the eternal object, is the datum for the various relevant conceptual feelings entertained respectively by members of the nexus. The final prehending subject prehends the members of the nexus, (i) by "pure" physical feelings in which the members are severally objectified by these analogous physical feelings, and (ii) by hybrid physical feelings in which the members are severally objectified by these analogous conceptual feelings.[1]

Transmuted feelings, by virtue of their process of simplifications and eliminations, are prevalent only among the high-grade organisms.[2] Even when there may not be novelty in transmutation, this type of feeling nevertheless borders upon conscious perception.[3] Hence, transmuted feelings "constitute the first step toward intellectual mentality, though in themselves they do not amount to consciousness.[4] On the other hand, consciousness is an integration of feelings subsequent to the feelings of transmutation.

The category of transmutation, or the sixth Categorical condition, shows that the way toward intellectuality depends on the power of abstraction whereby the trivial and the irrelevant are eliminated from among the multiplicities of physical feelings in order for the subject to achieve a final unity of feelings. Thus the depth of feelings requires the power of abstraction. This task necessitates eliminations. "The right co-ordination of the negative prehensions is one secret of mental progress."[5] This category is also important in that it implies that in the physical world there is "order" in the prehended nexus. And this "order" can be derived from the prehended nexus by eliminating the irrelevant and by integrating the relevant in the nexus.[6]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 384-85. [The brackets are mine.]

[2] Ibid., p. 388. [3] Ibid., p. 387. [4] Ibid., p. 388.

[5] Ibid., p. 389. [6] Ibid., p. 383.

Thus from the character of a nexus we arrive at the generalization that the physical world consists of nexūs of relatedness involving structures and orders. Through the category of transmutation the prehending subject can penetrate the systematic relatedness of things in the physical world.

We have thus far analyzed the elements of feelings constituting an actual entity at both the level of reproduction and novelty. Thus an analysis of an actual entity is a disclosure of a concrescence of prehensions or feelings. The particularity of each of these feelings is the "how" of its feeling. And the "how" discloses a distinct mode of feeling. This mode may be one of emotion, valuation, purpose, adversion, aversion, consciousness, etc.[1] The "how" of a feeling is called its "subjective form."[2] This means the disclosure of the concrescent subject is in fact an analysis of the diversity as well as the adjustment of subjective forms into one final and distinct entity. Whitehead's principle of becoming, namely, "that <u>how</u> an actual entity <u>becomes</u> constitutes <u>what</u> that actuality is,"[3] implies that the fusions and integrations of subjective forms constitute the being of the actual entity.

The Reformed Subjectivist Principle, Universal Relativity, and the Ontological Principle

The fusions and integrations of feelings in the concrescent subject demonstrate a dynamic process. This process involves the reception of experience from antecedent entities and the synthesis of these experiences into one's final unity. Based on the principle of becoming, which is another way of stating the becoming of an actual entity, Whitehead repudiates the metaphysical implication of the subject-predicate logic in philosophy. This implication holds that subjective feelings are not essential for the predication of the subject. What are essential are the permanent qualities, abstracted from subjective

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[1] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 35. [2] <u>Ibid</u>. [3] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 34. [Underlinings mine.]

feelings, whereby the subject is predicated. This means that a subject is predicated by the universals rather than by the particulars. In this way the subject is alienated from its own feelings, and is merely qualified by some external agency, i.e., the universals.[1] Thus the subject-predicate mode of thinking is a high abstraction. In contrast to the subject-predicate relation, Whitehead stresses the subject-superject relation with regard to the actual entity. "Subject" refers to the self-enjoyment of feelings originated from different phases of prehensions. "Superject" refers to these feelings that aim at the subject as the feeler. Thus superject has reference to the subject as the final cause, i.e., self-creation:

> The subject-superject is the purpose of the process originating the feelings. The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim; and this end is the feeler. The feelings are what they are in order that their subject may be what it is. Then transcendently, since the subject is what it is in virtue of its feelings, it is only by means of its feelings that the subject objectively conditions the creativity transcendent beyond itself.[2]

The concept of subject-superject of the actual entity, by implication repudiates the notion of the enduring substance in traditional metaphysics. This notion holds that the substance changes only with respect to its accidental qualities and relations; but it is numerically self-identical as a permanent entity throughout its accidental changes.[3] However, according to the third Category of Explanation, all phases of feelings as well as subjective forms in the concrescent subject are involved in the becoming of an actual entity.[4] This category, along with the principle of becoming, "that how an actuality becomes constitutes what that actual entity is," confirms the notion of process: in the becoming of an actual entity, there is nothing in it that does not become.

Whitehead's repudiation of the subject-predicate logic and the concept

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[1] Ibid., p. 339. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., pp. 120-23. [4] Ibid., p. 33.

of the unchanging substance is based on his arguments for the "reformed subjectivist principle" in opposition to the traditional subjectivist principle in modern philosophy.[1] The reformed subjectivist principle holds that the immediate experience of the subject should be the primary metaphysical situation for philosophical analysis.[2] This immediate experience for Whitehead is the physical feeling of the subject, whose datum is another actual entity.[3] This is the vector feeling--the primary causation in the world. It is both the feeling of the cause (the datum) and the feeling of the effect (the felt). Whitehead rejects the subjectivist principle of Hume and Kant on the ground that though both men recognize the importance of subjectivist experience, they conceive of the datum of this experience as a universal, i.e., the grayness of the stone.[4] This universal quality corresponds roughly to Whitehead's primary conceptual feeling of the subject whose datum is an eternal object. This means that for the traditional subjectivist, the primary metaphysical situation lies in the prehension of the universal in the object; whereas for Whitehead it is the physical feeling of a particular happening. Therefore, for the former, the immediate experience is an abstraction from the particular; for the latter it is a conformal feeling of the particular. In the abstraction by the universal, the vector feeling is missed or unnoticed by the subject. Hence the subject is conceived primarily as a substance, and not a relational being. For the reformed subjectivist, this vector feeling is rigorously affirmed; hence the subject is primarily a relational being.

Based on the primary of the immediate experience of the subject, the revised subjectivist principle repudiates the sensationalist principle in philosophy. This principle holds: "The primary activity in the act of experience is the bare subjective entertainment of the datum devoid of any subjective form

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[1] Ibid., p. 239f.
[2] Ibid., p. 243.
[3] Ibid., pp. 236-48.
[4] Ibid., pp. 239-42.

of reception."[1] This means: for the sensationalist, the immediate act of prehension does not involve feeling or emotion, but the prehension of "mere sensation." The assumption held by the sensationalist is that the notion of the enduring substance is the ontological principle which qualifies both the subject and the object.[2] Since the substance is unchanging--only undergoing accidental changes of qualities and relations, these changes and relations are viewed as metaphysically unimportant. The implication, derived from the substance principle, is: there is an independence among substances. Hence there is no direct relation, in the metaphysical sense, between the object and the subject. They are only accidentally related. Therefore, in the act of experience, the subject merely entertains the sense-datum of the object, which is but a quality of the substance.

The traditional subjectivist principle fails to take account of the immediate subjective experience, i.e., the vector feeling, as the primary metaphysical situation. The sensationalist principle fails to recognize the essential relatedness of things in the world. As long as philosophy is bound to the categories employed by the subject-predicate logic and by the substance-quality ontology, it is unable to explain the concrete relatedness in the world.[3]

In correcting the biases of these two principles, the revised subjectivist principle aims at an analysis of the physical feeling of the subject, the character of which is the vector feeling of the world. Hence the basis of causation is rooted in the immediate feeling. A broad meaning of the revised subjectivist principle, however, includes an analysis of the becoming of an actual entity. This means that the principle must take into account the different phases of feelings and the succession of integrations involved

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[1] Ibid., p. 239. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 239.

in the creation of any final entity. The disclosure of the experiences of the actual entity is at the same time an unfolding of the common element of the universe. "The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experience of subjects."[1] Thus the subjectivist principle, in the last analysis, is a disclosure of experience to be understood in terms of actual entities.

The revised subjectivist principle is an alternative statement of Whitehead's principle of relativity, specified in the fourth Category of Explanation: "It belongs to the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every becoming."[2] For an actual entity must be located in relation to other actual entities which enter into its being as an element contributing to the becoming of its final actuality. Hence the essence of an actual entity cannot be specified without reference to other actualities which enter into its nature by being experienced. Thus every actual entity is a potential for the becoming of another actuality. This means: no actuality is unrelated to other actualities.

On the basis of the revised subjectivist principle and the principle of relativity, Whitehead establishes his ontological principle which is clearly stated in the eighteenth Category of Explanation:

> That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of the concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence.[3]

The cause of reason lies either in the actualities which are the potentials for some other actuality--efficient causation, or in the actuality which is the subject of concrescence--final causation. Hence "to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities."[4] The ontological principle implies therefore the notion of relativity, for to look for actualities is to discover

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., pp. 238-43. [3] Ibid., p. 36. [4] Ibid., p. 37.

their relatedness. But the relatedness of actual entities in the concrescent world is only another way of demonstrating the revised subjectivist principle; for the way to locate the relatedness of things is to analyze the becoming of an actual entity. Thus, "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness."[1]

Eternal Objects

The General Relatedness of Eternal Objects

In the most general sense, eternal objects are mere possibilities or abstract ideas in contrast to actualities which are realizations of definite possibilities.

An actual entity not only is related to other actualities, but also to alternative possibilities. By its selection of a definite possibility, the actual entity excludes other alternative ones from being positively experienced. Thus every realization, or the given, involves alternative possibilities, or the not-given. Hence potentiality and givenness are correlated.

Since the final determination of an actuality is an expression of a selection from multiple possibilities, these possibilities are also "given," i.e., as a necessary element for the explanation of the world. This "givenness" is explainable by an examination of the relevance of gradations of possibilities for realization. This relevance begins with those possibilities which are now exemplified in the actual occasion, and passes through those possibilities which are closely or remotely relevant to the actual occasions, and to those possibilities which are contrary to the one exemplified in the actual occasion.[2] In this way, a whole realm of relevant possibilities are either

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[1] Ibid., p. 254.

[2] Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 243-44. [Hereafter referred to as SMW.]

positively or negatively entertained with respect to the actual entity. Hence without eternal objects, the physical world cannot realize a novelty, neither can it have a form of definiteness.

From what has been said, possibilities are an essential element in the world. For this reason an understanding of them is necessary: (1) Each eternal object is what it is by its individual essence.[1] By reason of the individual essence, an actual entity receives its form of definiteness. An eternal object is always self-identical. What makes one occasion different from another with respect to this eternal object, is due to its mode of ingression. (2) Each eternal object is related to other such objects by reason of its status in the realm of eternal objects. This status is the relatum to which other such objects are related. Such a relatum, which is demonstrable by an analysis of the gradation of possibilities, implies the internal relatedness of all eternal objects as a realm of possibilities. The actual entity, in its realization of eternal object A, also discloses A as a relatum among such objects. The nature of relatum shows the relational essence of an eternal object.[2] The relational essence of such an object illustrates that there is a systematic relatedness in the realm of possibilities. This relatedness is internally determinate, which Whitehead calls the eternal relatedness. But, A's ingression into an actual occasion is indeterminate, for the decision as to the selection of A rests upon the actual entity. A's indeterminateness characterizes A's "patience" for realization.

The internal relatedness of the realm of possibilities as a general metaphysical truth is therefore expressible by the recognition of the relational essence of an eternal object. Thus an actual occasion presupposes the general scheme of relatedness. But, according to Whitehead, the relational

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[1] Ibid., p. 229.

[2] Ibid., p. 230.

essence of an object is not unique to that object in that it merely shares A's relationships to other possibilities which are bare relata.[1] Hence, "To understand A is to understand the how of a general scheme of relationships."[2] And a description of the "how" of the relatedness in the general scheme does not involve an analysis of their individual essences.

But among the infinite relationships of eternal objects, it is possible to select a definite and limited relationship of possibilities. This definite relationship involving a definite set of eternal objects is itself an eternal object. And an analysis of it discloses its individual essence. Such an object is "complex" in that it is composed of different relata which are also eternal objects. They may be complex in that a component may be composed of several relata; or simple if a component is not analyzable into a relationship of further relata.[3] For Whitehead, a sensum such as a definite shade of green, is a simple eternal object.[4]

In view of the ontological priority of the scheme of relationship among possibilities, the relativity of eternal objects is therefore a metaphysical condition whereby an analysis of a definite set of relationships, i.e., the individual essence of an eternal object, is possible. This means that a finite truth is possible by reason of a selection of a definite set of relationships from among the infinite relatedness of eternal objects.[5]

Eternal Objects and Extensive Continuum

The abstract character of eternal objects has nevertheless an empirical basis. This basis is seen in Whitehead's discussion on the notion of the extensive continuum. The extensive continuum is a reality describing the most general character of the relatedness of the physical world:

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[1] Ibid., p. 238. [2] Ibid., pp. 238-39. [Underlining mine.]
[3] Ibid., pp. 239-40. [4] Ibid., p. 240. [5] Ibid., pp. 238-40.

> An extensive continuum is a complex of entities united by the various allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping so as to possess common parts, and of contact, and of other relationships derived from these primary relationships. The notion of a 'continuum' involves both the property of indefinite divisibility and the property of unbound extension. There are always entities beyond entities, because nonentity is no boundary. This extensive continuum expresses the solidarity of all possible standpoints throughout the whole world. It is the first determination of order --that is, of real potentiality--arising out of the general character of the world.[1]

The primary relationships of the extensive continuum are those of "whole to part, and of overlapping so as to possess common part, and of contact." These are the most general descriptions of the relational character of an actual entity and of the physical world of nexūs. Thus the relatedness of eternal objects, as a character, is exemplified in the relational character of the extensive continuum.

The extensive continuum not only describes the primary relationships between actual entities, but also describes the morphological character of actual entities, which is an analysis of an actual entity into prehensions constituting the internal relation of an actualized entity. Hence:

> The 'extensive scheme' is nothing else than the generic morphology of the internal relations which bind the actual occasion into a nexus, and which bind the prehensions of any one actual occasion into a unity, co-ordinately divisible.[2]

The morphological character of an actual entity, described in an extensive continuum, exemplifies the individual essence of an eternal object. We see, therefore, that the relational essences of eternal objects have their reference to the physical world illustrated by the general relatedness of the extensive continuum; and that the individual essences of eternal objects find their counterpart in the morphological character of an actual entity analyzed in the extensive continuum. Furthermore, according to the principle of relativity, a potentiality is to be a determinant in the becoming of an actuality.[3] An

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 103. [2] Ibid., p. 441. [3] Ibid., p. 392.

eternal object as a member of the general potentiality, when it is embodied, is an element in the concrescence of an actual entity. Since all actualities must conform to the general character of the extensive continuum, eternal objects, as potentiality for actuality, must do likewise.

Besides being the general relatedness of the world, the extensive continuum includes the objectifications of the physical world as data for becoming. As such, the extensive continuum is called the real potentiality.[1] As the real potentiality, the extensive continuum is the community of all actualized occasions in one solidary world. This world is the matrix wherein the primary phase of an actual entity is initiated and wherein its final phase, as objectification, is completed. Hence eternal objects of future ingressions will each find its place in this real potentiality. The real potentiality is the world "in which all potential objectifications find their niche."[2] Hence the extensive continuum underlies the whole world--past, present, future. This is clearly stated as follows:

> Extensive continuum is 'real,' because it expresses a fact derived from the actual world and concerning the contemporary actual world. All actual entities are related according to the determinations of this continuum; and all possible actual entities in the future must exemplify these determinations in their relations with the already actual world. The reality of the future is bound up with the reality of the continuum.[3]

Since all actualities--past, present, future--conform to the determinateness of this extensive continuum, eternal objects must do likewise.

The ingressions of eternal objects not only conform to the general character of extensiveness of the physical world, they are also limited by the particular character of the extensiveness of the present epoch, which are, for instance, the three dimensions of space and the four dimensions of the spatio-temporal relationship.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 102. [2] Ibid., p. 103. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid. Whitehead, SMW, op. cit., p. 232.

Eternal Objects and God's Primordial Nature

We have stated that eternal objects as possibilities are internally related. This internal relatedness is possible because of God's conceptual valuation of possibilities into a gradation of order in his mind. Through God's conceptual feeling, possibilities are graded into relevance for realization into the actual world. God's conceptual valuation is his primordial nature. Without this, the internal relatedness of possibilities would then be disjunct. If so, then a concrescent process cannot envisage a relevant possibility for realization. For, in order for a possibility to be relevant to the concrescent world, there must be a prior relevance of possibilities as a determinate order. Hence the existence of God's primordial nature is a necessary fact in order to explain the internal relatedness of possibilities and how each possibility has a definite relevance to each concrescence.[1] The necessary existence of God's primordial nature makes him a non-temporal "actual entity." His primordial nature is an actual entity in that it is a "somewhere" wherein there is the internal relatedness of possibilities. The "somewhere" of God's primordial nature therefore explains the "somewhere" of eternal objects,[2] for eternal objects are so related by being conceptually prehended in God's mind. According to the ontological principle, everything must be traceable to "somewhere." Every explanatory fact is referable to some actual entity.[3] The "somewhere" of eternal objects is in the primordial nature of God; and the "somewhere" of God is his conceptual valuation of all the eternal objects toward order.

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 64.

[2] Ibid., p. 73.

[3] Ibid.

Eternal Objects and Actual Entities

As has been said, the relevance of an eternal object to the concrescent process is possible because of the conceptual valuation of God. This means the subject, in prehending the actual entity, also prehends the conceptual feelings of God, through whose function the prehended actual entity achieves its final integration. Although an actual entity in concrescence derives its being from the transmutation of feelings, yet such transmutation is possible because of the conceptual feelings whose data are grounded in the conceptual valuation of God. Thus every actual entity involves a relation to the conceptual valuation of God. This also means every physical prehension implies a hybrid physical feeling of God: "Thus the primary phase is a hybrid physical feeling of God, in respect to God's conceptual feeling which is immediately relevant to the universe 'given' for that concrescence."[1] This makes the primordial nature of God a metaphysical fact in the primary phase of the concrescent subject.

The hybrid physical feeling of God, implied in the physical feeling of the subject, quickens conceptual valuation derived from the physical feeling of the subject. Thus this phase of physical feeling is a motivation for mental origination in the subject. However, the occurrence of this feeling is nonetheless simultaneous with the primary physical feeling.

Since the hybrid physical feeling refers to the conceptual valuation of God, the subject, in the primary metaphysical situation, derives its aim of concrescence from God's conceptual valuation by virtue of which the immediate datum is given to the subject. This means in the prehension of the datum, the subject is simultaneously given a relevant order of possibilities grounded in the primordial nature of God. Since these possibilities are data

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[1] Ibid., p. 343.

for conceptual feelings, the subject, in entertaining them, originates conceptual feelings from its physical feelings. Hence, the subjective aim of God, which is his valuation of eternal objects, is the ground for the intial concrescence. This also means the subject derives its subjective aim through its prehension of another actual entity. The subjective forms, which are different phases of conceptual valuations of the concrescence, adjust and integrate themselves into one unity of experience by virtue of the subjective aim of the entity. The relationship between God and actual entities in terms of subjective aim is clearly stated as follows:

> But the initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God. The immediacy of the concrescent subject is constituted by its living aim at its own self-constitution. Thus the intial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject. . . . What is inexorable in God is valuation as an aim toward "order"; and "order" means "society" permissive of activities with patterned intensity of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts. In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts.[1]

From the above discussion, the inevitable relationship between the primordial nature of God and actual entities is established by analysis of (1) physical feeling, and (2) conceptual feeling of an actual entity. This analysis discloses the function of eternal objects in the actual world. We shall now proceed to differentiate their modes of ingression in actual entities. There are three primary modes: (1) An eternal object can be an element in the definiteness of some objectified entity. This mode of ingression belongs to eternal objects of the objective species.[2] A member of this species is an agent for objectification. It also is a definite element in the datum of the primary physical feeling of a prehending subject. Thus a member of this species functions as a "medium" in the world, that is, as an objectified potentiality

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[1] Ibid., pp. 373-74.

[2] Ibid., p. 445.

for becoming.[1] (2) An eternal object can be an element in the definiteness of some subjective form. As such, the ingression takes the distinctive form of an emotion or valuation.[2] This mode of ingression belongs to eternal objects of the subjective species. A member of this species enjoys a privacy of feeling by being an element in the subjective form. But it is nevertheless causally related to the eternal object of the objective species. For the subjective form is derived from the prehension of another actual entity, which becomes a datum by virtue of the embodiment of the eternal object in it. Thus there is a physical transference of emotion from the object to the subject. This subjective form is then adjusted into the subjective form of conceptual valuation for the entertaining of an eternal object. The emotional tone of the subject is traceable to the emotional tone of the received datum. The "medium" function of a member of the objective species shows the relational character of an eternal object, which also illustrates the vector feeling of the world. Thus the "intensity of physical energy belongs to the subjective species of eternal objects, but the peculiar form of the flux of energy belongs to the objective species."[3] (3) An eternal object can be an element in the datum of a conceptual feeling. This mode of ingression merely states the conceptual valuation of some possibility which becomes actualized in the mode of one of the two species. Whereas the other two modes are forms of definiteness in an actual entity, this mode is a potential lure for actuality. These are the primary modes of ingression, describing the function of eternal objects in the relatedness of the world. Other modes of ingressions are derived from integrations of these primary modes.

In describing the causal relation of an eternal object, one does not hold that the fact of relatedness in the empirical world is solely due to the

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[1] Ibid., p. 446. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 447.

ingressions of these objects. Eternal objects are pure potentialities. Their ingressions are possible because of the transference of feelings in the actual entities. Besides eternal objects, there are other elements in the transference of feelings, which are also important for the explanation of the relatedness of the actual entities.

Eternal objects and actual entities correspond roughly to the universal and the particular.[1] Because of the principle of relativity, the function of the universal and the particular under the quality-substance logic is not applicable here. The universal refers generally to a quality which describes the particular. In other words, the particular is described by some "abstract essence." The particular refers generally to that which is described by the universals but which does not enter into the description of another particular.[2] But, according to the universal relativity, a particular, or an actual entity, is described by particulars, that is, other actual entities, which enter into its being as aspects of its real essence. On the other hand, an actual entity, from its primary physical feeling to its final satisfaction, is like a "universal" with its own distinct feelings and subjective unity which is possible because of its integral feelings. To this extent, it is a "universal" of its own. According to the revised subjectivist principle, the reason for an actual entity lies within the actual feelings of that entity. In summary:

> Thus every so-called "universal" is particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called "particular" is universal in the sense of entering into the constitutions of other actual entities.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 76. [2] Ibid., p. 92. [3] Ibid., p. 76.

CHAPTER VI

A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Perception in the Mode of Causal Efficacy

We have said in the preceding chapter that the immediate subjective feeling is the feeling of another actuality. The datum of this feeling is always antecedent to the subject. It is an objectified occasion in the immediate past of the subject, as well as an immediate past of the concrescent subject. The physical feeling is causal in that the datum acts upon the concrescent subject by being felt; and the effect is the subjective feeling of this datum. Such a physical feeling involves a direct relation of cause and effect in a single act of experience. Such an experience discloses the primary causation in the world. This causation is another way of stating the vector character of the world, that is, the transference of physical energy or emotion from an antecedent occasion to the concrescent occasion.[1] Whitehead called this causal feeling the mode of causal efficacy in that there is the presence of empathy between the cause and the effect in an act of experience.[2] This mode is perception in its most elementary sense.

Perception in the mode of causal efficacy is the feeling of derivation from the immediate past of the percipient or of the external world. What is derived is the efficient cause upon the percipient, but it enters into the latter as a constituent in the formal constitution of the subject.

This mode of perception takes a vague persistent character.[3] The

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[1] Ibid., p. 184. [2] Ibid., pp. 362-63. [3] Ibid., p. 262.

reception of the causal datum occurs in a physiological or visceral awareness. This means the agency of perception is the percipient body. This body may function generally as an immediate awareness of the influence of the external world upon the subject; or specifically as, for instance, the eyes feel the sight, the hand feels the touch, the palate feels the taste, etc.[1] Such a feeling is vague because it is primitive, not clearly defined or sharply presented; yet it is persistent because it is intimate to the percipient body. The best illustration of causal perception is one's memory of the immediate past: what has happened is gone, yet it is felt in the present.

It is by means of perception in the causal mode that past, present, and future are defined. Past is the datum objectified, as a definite element, in the constitution of the present. Present is the conformal feeling of the datum objectified from the past. Future is the immediate potentiality which derives its datum by re-enacting the determination of the present. Thus, these three aspects of time are internally related in the act of experience.

Perception in the Mode of Presentational Immediacy

One of the central notions in Whitehead's metaphysics is his doctrine of contemporary occasions. Contemporary occasions are contemporaneous with the percipient occasion in that they are neither in its past nor in its future.[2] In our discussion of causal efficacy, it has been said that the datum of the cause necessarily lies in the immediate past of the percipient. This means causation depends on the objectification of actualities. But contemporary occasions are causally independent from each other in that none is in the past or the future of the other. Hence, the contemporary subject cannot perceive a contemporaneous occasion in the causal mode directly. The way in which the subject perceives a contemporary entity may be described as follows: there is

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[1] Ibid., p. 258.

[2] Ibid., p. 96.

first of all the prehension of the past nexus of the physical feelings of the contemporary object, for instance, the chair. The datum of this prehension is the analogous physical feelings of the nexus, i.e., the shape and the color of the chair. Then through the inheritance of this datum in the historical routes of the bodily organs, the physical feelings of the shape and color were transmitted from the optical nerves to the central nerves in the brain. In the meantime, the inherited physical feelings were transmuted into a mental feeling of sensa which are now projected into the contemporary chair as the chair-image.[1] Thus contemporary entity is perceived through sensa, i.e., color, sound, taste, smell, bodily feeling, extensive relations.[2] These sensa are produced through the historical routes of the different bodily organs subsequent to the prehension of the primary datum which lies in the past of the contemporary entity.[3] The percipient, therefore, perceives the contemporary region through the projected sensa. Hence the chair-image illustrates the real chair. This mode of perception is called presentational immediacy.[4]

Perception in this mode depends upon a common past shared by both the past occasions of the contemporary entity and the past occasions of the contemporary subject. This common past is indirectly perceived in presentational immediacy.[5] This means presentational perception depends chiefly upon the inheritance of occasions in the historical routes in the bodily organs of the percipient. It is through the succession of occasions that the primary datum is transmitted, and transmuted, into conceptual sensa which now illustrate the contemporary region.

The relational character of the eternal objects of the objective species, which accounts for the derivation of sensa from the physical feelings

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[1] Ibid., p. 98. [2] Ibid., p. 96. [3] Ibid., p. 97.
[4] Ibid., pp. 95-101. [5] Ibid., pp. 256-57.

of the subject, can be illustrated by a description of a relation between causal objectification and presentational objectification in reference to the subject.[1] The object, i.e., chair, is causally objectified in the physical feelings of the subject, which involve the re-enacting of the shape and color (eternal objects) of the chair. These data are then physically transmuted, through the temporal routes of the bodily organs, into the distinct sensa which are now projected into the contemporary chair as its image. The contemporary chair-image is objectified by the sensa as a contemporary object for the subject. This is the meaning of presentational objectification. These two modes of objectification imply the transference of the original eternal object into a datum for reproduction, and the derivation of the sensa as the eternal object of the presented object. Hence there is a causal relation, through the percipient body, between the eternal object presentationally perceived and the one causally received.[2]

The doctrine of inheritance as the prerequisite for the perception of the contemporary entity shows that causal efficacy is the ab-original mode of perception from which the presentational mode arises. Hence:

> The conclusion is that the contemporary world is not perceived in virtue of its own proper activity, but in virtue of activities from the past, the past which conditions it and which also conditions the contemporary percipient.[3]

The immediate presentation of sensa in the contemporary entity does not invalidate the fact of causal independence among contemporary actualities. The sensa illustrate the contemporary entity as an object. But, in reality, the contemporary entity is in concrescence; its subjective forms are not disclosed

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[1] Ibid., p. 91.

[2] Ibid., pp. 96-98, 259-60.

[3] Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 281. [Hereafter cited as AI.]

by the presented sensa.[1] The sensa are given by a common inheritance which lies both in the antecedence of the contemporary object and that of the contemporary subject. The character of being unable to disclose itself in contemporary entities is due to the fact of mutual independence among them. This causal independence makes them "divisible yet not divided."[2] This means that the contemporary world is in extensive continuum, that is, a real potentiality for division into atomic actualities. And once the "contemporary world" is actualized into past, it is a datum for causal prehension. However, the contemporary world is in the state of concrescence; hence it is not divided into atomic actualities. Therefore it is not the datum for causal prehension.

Two related notions should now be presented in connection with presentational immediacy: (1) Presented locus--contemporary entities are viewed from the standpoint of a particular percipient, for instance, M.[3] Occasions which are contemporaneous with M and can be perceived through M's presentational immediacy are viewed as being in M's presented locus. The characteristics of the locus are the systematic, geometric relations extensive in the contemporary regions, which are immediately presented to M through M's human body. For Whitehead, there are "geometric strains" in the human body.[4] These strains are bodily feelings by virtue of which the primary datum is transmitted through the historical routes of occasions in various bodily organs. These bodily feelings are then transmuted into sensa illustrating the extensive and geometric relations in the contemporary world:

> The geometrical details of the projected sense-perception depends on the geometrical strains in the body, the qualitative sensa depend on the physiological excitements of the requisite cells in the body.[5]

Thus the immediate presentation of the locus of M is dependent upon M's body.

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 188. [2] Ibid., p. 96.

[3] Ibid., pp. 193-95. [4] Ibid., p. 193. [5] Ibid.

But what is presented, i.e., the extensive relations, are independent from the contemporary entities which in fact constitute the actual entities in the locus.[1] In this way, the contemporary world is perceived through sensa, yet its causal independence is maintained. (2) Unison of becoming--this term means that in M's presented locus, all actualities share a common immediacy, that is, they are in "unison of becoming" actualized entities.[2] Whereas the causal independence of contemporary entities is defined negatively, unison of becoming is defined positively, in terms of the relatedness of contemporary occasions by virtue of their unison in immediate becoming. This fact explains why entities in M's presented locus are in a common world of concrescence. Whereas the presented locus explains the presentation of the common world by sensa in the human body, unison of becoming explains the togetherness of actualities in the contemporary world. As actualities, the contemporary world is independent from the sensa. In terms of sense-perception the contemporary entities are unequally perceived, i.e., some are more distinctly perceived than others due to spatial distances. But the principle of unison of becoming includes those entities in M's locus which are beyond the bound of human perception.

Symbolic Reference

We have thus far described the two modes of perception in Whitehead's theory of knowledge. Each mode by itself is "pure" in that it is not mixed with the other. Each mode as such is incapable of error.[3] For causal efficacy, being the reception of a physical datum, is the feeling of the cause being felt as effect. This feeling, being direct and unmediated, is a "brute fact."[4] As such, it can not have error. Likewise, the pure mode of presentational immediacy whereby the external world is illustrated to us is an "ultimate physical

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., pp. 189-90. [3] Ibid., p. 255. [4] Ibid., p. 67.

fact." As such, it has no error. In other words, neither of these modes involves interpretation or inference. For instance, the projection of a sense-image behind the mirror does not involve error. However, error occurs when such projection is interpreted as representing a real object behind the mirror.

Perception in the mode of causal efficacy is possessed by all grades of organisms. At the lowest degree, this mode of perception functions in the organisms as the process of reproduction, which is the appropriation of the past into the present. Presentational immediacy, which requires the originative power of the mental pole of the organism, is possessed only by high-grade organisms.

Among human beings, the prevalent mode of perception is the mixed mode between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy, which is called symbolic reference.[1] In our discussion of presentational immediacy, symbolic reference is indirectly described since the former is originated from causal efficacy. We shall here very briefly describe this mixed mode: As has been said, causal perception is the prehension of the immediate past of an entity. This immediate past, as the datum, is a nexus of analogous physical feelings, which is vaguely but aboriginally prehended by the subject. At the same time, different bodily organs, such as eyes or hand, transmit the aboriginal physical feelings from occasion to occasion through inheritance in the body till they reach the brain. In this process, the category of transmutation is also at work by virtue of which the prehended analogical physical feelings are subject to integrations under the mental pole of the subject. Thus the originative phase begins in the subject when the prehended feelings are organized under a perspective. Thus there is a transmuted mental feeling originating from the antecedent physical

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[1] Ibid., p. 255.

feelings. This transmutation is characterized by the ingression of an eternal object which defines the transmuted feeling. This feeling is objectified by the eternal object into a clear, distinct, and relevant sense-perception which is now projected into the contemporary entity. This whole process from the causal feeling to the presentational feeling, involving the integrations of feelings, may result in error; for it involves interpretation.[1]

It should be pointed out that the datum of causal feeling and that of the presentational feeling, in symbolic reference, are identical.[2] They are the immediate past of the contemporary entity. This fact shows that there are elements of a common ground between these two modes of perception: (1) The presented locus, i.e., the contemporary world viewed from the standpoint of the subject, is not only a prerequisite in presentational immediacy, but is also indirectly present in causal efficacy.[3] Since presentational immediacy presupposes a common past in the presented locus, the contemporary world is a derivation from this common past which is prehended through the mode of causal efficacy. This is tantamount to saying that the presented locus is indirectly presented in causal efficacy in that even in the causal feeling of the immediate past, the percipient body has a vague feeling of the general extensiveness of the contemporary. (2) There is an identical element between the eternal object in the causal objectification and the eternal object in presentational objectification. This identical factor is explanatory of the relational character of eternal objects, concerning which descriptions have already been made.[4]

In the theory of perception, Whitehead's unique contribution is his concept of the presentation of causal efficacy as the basis, as well as the cause, of perception. In pointing out how and why presentational perception

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[1] Ibid., pp. 255-56.

[2] Ibid., p. 262.

[3] Ibid., p. 256.

[4] Supra, pp. 109, 113-14.

is derivate from causal perception, he shows the error of the sensationalist theory of perception, represented by Hume, according to which sense-perception, or presentational immediacy in Whitehead's sense, is the basis of perception. Causal efficacy is non-sensuous in the sense of being prior to sense-perception. But presentational immediacy is sensuous.

The first mode is the response to brute given, and the second mode is the adjustment of this given to the contemporary world. Hence, "We are subject to our percepta in the mode of efficacy; we adjust our percepta in the mode of immediacy."[1]

Neither the two pure modes nor symbolic reference in general involve consciousness.[2] Consciousness is a subjective form in which intensity of feeling is generated through contrast evolving from feelings of identity and diversity between the physical pole and the mental pole of the prehending subject. This means conscious experience is a later phase of experience as a result of originations, wherein the mental pole dominates.

Propositional Feeling and Conscious Experience

In Whitehead's system Consciousness presupposes propositional feeling. Hence it is necessary to describe the latter in brief: A propositional feeling is the feeling of the prehending subject who feels the proposition as its datum. A proposition is neither an eternal object nor a feeling.[3] It is not an eternal object in that an eternal object by itself has reference to entities generally in the sense of "any," whereas a proposition must refer to actual entities in particular. An eternal object by itself is completely indeterminate as to its actual realization, whereas a proposition is less indeterminate in that it refers to determinate actualities as its reason for existence.[4] A

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 271.
[2] Ibid., pp. 269-70.
[3] Ibid., p. 392.
[4] Ibid., p. 393.

proposition is not a feeling in that it shares with eternal objects in being a datum for feeling, whereas a feeling must be a determinant component in an actual entity. According to the ontological principle, the locus of a reason is to be found in actual entities. An eternal object by itself has no reference to particular actualities; hence it is neither true nor false. But a proposition, being referable to actualities, involves truth or falsehood. Thus a proposition is qualified by actualities which give datum to the physical feeling of the propositional subject and which restrict the indeterminate character of the proposition. It is in this sense that Whitehead said that the truth or falsity of a proposition "is no business of a proposition";[1] which means its truth or falsity is dependent on the facts, the meaning of which the proposition predicates. Thus, a proposition, in the philosophy of organism, is not a mere logical analysis of abstract ideas.

The general constituents of a propositional feeling may be depicted as follows: (1) There are in the first place the objectified actualities functioning as a datum for the physical feeling of the prehending subject. These actualities are called the logical subjects in a proposition. To the extent that these logical subjects limit the possibility of the proposition, they are called indicative feeling. (2) There is a secondary physical feeling by virtue of which the irrelevant elements of the logical subjects are eliminated and the relevant elements are organized into a nexus of feelings constituting the objective datum of the propositional feeling. This secondary physical feeling is called physical recognition or predicative feeling. (3) There is the emergence of an eternal object originated from the physical nexus of (2), which is the datum of the conceptual feeling of the prehending subject. This eternal object is the predicative pattern of the physical nexus of (2) in that it gives

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[1] Ibid., p. 395.

determinateness to the physical nexus. (4) There may be another eternal object as the datum of a second conceptual feeling, partly identical with and partly diverse from the eternal object in the antecedent conceptual feeling, according to the category of conceptual reversion. This eternal object, in the final integration, is the predicative pattern of the proposition, which qualifies the original logical subject.[1]

These four phases of integration--two physical and two conceptual--constitute a propositional feeling in the most general sense. But a propositional feeling may not involve the fourth phase, and in a propositional feeling of the non-conscious sort the first and the second physical feelings are practically identifical. The difference between a non-conscious and a conscious propositional feeling is not clear-cut, even though Whitehad said that it depends on whether or not there is the feeling of contrast in the prehending subject.[2] Contrast generates a degree of emotional intensity. Consciousness occurs in the feeling when the prehending subject senses a contrast between two related feelings: one being a physical feeling and the other a conceptual feeling. On one side there is the affirmation of the objective fact in the physical feeling. On the other side there is the negation-feeling of what the physical feeling might be, i.e., its potentiality for becoming. This contrasted feeling is called the "affirmation-negation contrast." The subjective form of this contrast is consciousness.[3]

As has been said, there is a practical identity between the first and second physical feeling in a non-conscious propositional feeling.[4] In such a case, origination is negligible in physical recognition. This also means that there is very slight derivation from the indicative feeling to the predicative

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[1] Ibid., pp. 395-403.

[2] Ibid., p. 399.

[3] Ibid., p. 407.

[4] Ibid., pp. 399-400.

feeling. Hence in the concrescent process, there is no feeling of contrast. A propositional feeling of this sort, which does not involve consciousness, is called perceptive feeling.[1]

Consciousness arises in a propositional feeling when there is a diversity between the indicative feeling and physical recognition.[2] This means there is originative feeling derived from the indicative feeling. Hence there is a generic contrast between the physical feeling in the logical subjects and the physical recognition from which predicative feeling arises. This contrast enhances intensity in the subject. A propositional feeling of this sort is called imaginative feeling.[3] An imaginative feeling usually elicits consciousness. It may also undergo a secondary conceptual feeling by means of conceptual reversion, in which case there is a negative prehension of the eternal object which is the datum of the first conceptual feeling. This reverted conceptual feeling finally becomes the predicative pattern of the proposition.[4] In the originative process, from the first to the second conceptual feelings, there is a difference between the earlier contrast and the final phase of predication. This means there is a greater intensity in the final objectification of the propositional feeling. Consciousness occurs only in higher phases of experience. It elicits an illuminating effect upon the antecedent feelings in the subject. Because of this effect, causal feelings in the subject are illuminated.

Whitehead said, "it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true."[5] For the function of truth is "that it adds to interest."[6] This means that the importance of truth should be qualified by

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[1] Ibid., p. 400. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 425.

[5] Ibid., p. 396; Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 313.

[6] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 396.

interest. Here interest refers primarily to the intensity of feeling. "For the energy of operation of a proposition in an occasion of experience is its interest, and its importance."[1] Conscious experience, which is generated from propositional feelings, is called by Whitehad an intellectual feeling; intellectual feelings are concerned with truth and falsity. But, a proposition in the Whiteheadean system does not mean an object of "theoretical consideration by a logician, exclusively."[2] It finds its locus in the subjective forms of the percipient who feels it as a lure for feeling. And the logical subjects of the proposition are always a nexus of objectified actualities in the actual world. This means truth has a pragmatic reference to concrete experience.

Reality and Appearance

Perception in the mode of causal efficacy is the prehension of "reality." For Reality refers specifically to the primary phase of the subject in its process of self-formation. Hence: "The objective content of the initial phase of reception is the real antecedent world, as given for that occasion. This is the 'reality' from which that creative advance starts."[3] This means reality is the objectified actualities antecedent to the percipient as a datum for causal perception. As such, reality "is just itself"; it is irrelevant as to whether it is true or false. Strictly speaking, reality is not the object of truth.[4]

Appearance refers to the objectification of the subjective process of self-formation. Hence it is an abstraction from reality:

> This difference between the objective content of the initial phase of the physical pole and the objective content of the final phase, after the integration of physical and mental poles, constitutes 'appearance' for that

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[1] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 313.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 269.

[4] Ibid., p. 309.

> occasion. In other words, 'appearance' is the effect of the activity of the mental pole, whereby the qualities and co-ordinations of the given physical world undergo transformation.[1]

Appearance, therefore, necessarily implies the interpretation of reality. Hence symbolic reference, propositional feeling, and conscious experience all involve different degrees of appearance. As "the effect of activity of the mental pole," appearance refers primarily to conceptual valuations, as well as to the objectification of the physical experience by eternal objects. Thus, the experience of the sensa or geometrical relations illustrating a contemporary region is an appearance. Hence the contemporary world "appears" to us. Also, appearance is dominant in conscious experience as the latter illuminates the vague causal feelings in the contemporary subject.[2]

However, appearance as the process of abstraction and simplification also merges into reality. Each concrescent process attains its height of mentality through the integration of feelings at the termination of its process. Thus the ingression of the eternal object corresponds to the "appearance" of the actual entity. But this "appearance" is merged into reality insofar as it is being objectified in the physical feeling of the emergent occasion. Thus in the successive occasions of the enduring object, there is the transmission of "appearance" from the antecedent to its successor by means of objectification. Hence, when the antecedent occasion enters into the succeeding one, it brings the "antecedent appearance" in reality. For this reason, "the objective reality of the past, as it now functions in the present, in its day was appearance."[3] Therefore, in the concrete world, appearance and reality are inextricably fused.

Truth is concerned with appearance since the latter involves mentality. Appearance refers to reality as its ground; hence truth "is the conformation

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[1] Ibid., p. 270. [2] Ibid., p. 271. [3] Ibid., p. 272.

of Appearance to Reality."[1] Thus the relation of appearance to reality is a truth-relation concerning whether or not appearance has a basis in reality. Hence the truth-relation of sensa in the contemporary region requires an examination of the inheritance of sense-perception in the antecedent occasions in the body. Likewise, the truth-relation of a proposition demands an inquiry into the logical subjects which exemplify the predicative pattern of the said proposition. Hence the truth-relation is the relation between reality and appearance.

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[1] Ibid., p. 309.

CHAPTER VII

ORDER

Actual Occasions

In Whitehead's metaphysics, an actual occasion is understood in two senses: (1) as a process, and (2) as a "satisfaction."

An actual occasion is a process or concrescence in which a new subject is being created by virtue of the integration of feelings. The subject aims at its own feeling which is its formal constitution or individual essence. This process begins with a causal feeling whose datum is an objectified experience, otherwise known as the efficient cause of the occasion, and terminates in the integration of feelings through the realization of the complex eternal object which defines the initial subjective aim. This aspect of self-realization aiming at the determination of an experience is the final cause of the occasion. In concrescence, the subject is "internally determined and externally free."[1] This means that in the primary phase of experience there is a relevance or compatibility between the received datum and the many real potentialities of the subject. An experience is possible because in the initial situation there is the determinateness of physical feelings involving determinate real potentialities. Furthermore, because of the initial physical feelings, there is at the same time the presence of determinate subjective forms (the "hows" of feelings) which qualify the conceptual feelings of the later phase of concrescence.

In the conceptual valuations of the concrescence, due to the function

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 41.

of subjective aim, a creative passage between the immediate past and the immediate future is involved. The feelings of the immediate past, whether physical or conceptual, are internally determined. But with respect to the immediate future, there is a scope of possibilities open for choice. Because of this openness for choice the subjective aim is enabled to adjust the subjective forms directed toward the immediate future. Choice implies freedom. "Externally free" also refers to the final decision made by the subject, which constitutes the "satisfaction" of the subject. The final decision is the final cause of the occasion in that it is the subject's total reaction toward its own determinate feelings. "This reaction is the final modification of emotion, appreciation, and purpose."[1] In the progressive integrations of feelings, there is a corresponding progressive intensity of feelings. This intensity reaches a heightened degree at the moment of "satisfaction." The agency of this intensity is the subject, and the outcome of this intensity is the superject. Thus the concrescence is the relation of subject-superject which illustrates the fact of internal determinateness and external indeterminateness. This subject-superject relation also explains the reason why an occasion is causa sui.

An actual occasion is also understood in terms of "satisfaction." "Satisfaction" is a generic term in the Whiteheadean philosophy. The degree of "satisfaction" depends on the specific grade of order in which an actual occasion occurs. Hence, "satisfaction is the attainment of something individual to the entity in question."[2] An actual occasion enjoying its satisfaction is the creature of its own process of becoming. "Such a unit is an 'actual occasion'; it is the ultimate creature derivative from the creative process."[3] Satisfaction is a decision responsible for the determinate feelings

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 192. [3] Ibid., p. 124.

of the concrescence. By implication, nothing more can be added to satisfaction for the occasion in question. It is in this sense Whitehead said that, "No actual entity can be conscious of its own satisfaction; for such knowledge would be a component in the process, and would thereby alter the satisfaction."[1] A conscious experience of a satisfaction is therefore only entertained as a datum by a subsequent concrescent occasion.

Satisfaction as an objectified experience is abstracted from the concrescent process from which it derives:

> The notion of 'satisfaction' is the notion of the 'entity as concrete' abstracted from the 'process of concrescence'; it is the outcome separated from the process, thereby losing the activity of the atomic entity, which is both process and outcome. . . . The 'formal' reality of the actuality in question belongs to its process of concrescence and not to its 'satisfaction.'[2]

This means, as satisfaction, the actual entity is completely determined with respect to its component feelings. Being a determinate entity, it transcends its concrescence and creates a definite expression to the world. Hence, strictly speaking, the satisfaction of the subject should be called a superject. As a superject, the actualized occasion qualifies and contributes to the general character of creativity within the social order of which it is a member and also transcends the concrescent process from which it is derived. Thus the satisfaction of an actual occasion should be interpreted in terms of its "objective immortality." "Objective immortality" means that the "object" is experienced as a component in the formal constituents of a concrescent subject. Because of "objective immortality" the satisfaction of the occasion in question is a datum which the succeeding occasion receives. Thus in a given order of contiguous occasions there is an inheritance of the past in the present throughout the successive occasions. In this manner the present occasion, which is the person now, inherits the past experiences. The past is objectified in the

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[1] Ibid., p. 130.

[2] Ibid., p. 129.

present occasion in two ways: immediate and mediate. An occasion is objectified immediately when it is the datum of its succeeding occasion. But even direct objectification involves abstraction, for the present occasion receives its predecessor from its own perspective. This means an elimination of the fullness of the datum is inevitable for its reception into the perspective of the present occasion. Whatever lies in the past of the contiguous antecedent occasion is objectified mediately or indirectly through its immediate objectification. This means the mediate objectification is qualified by the perspective of the immediate preceding occasion. Thus mediate objectification involves a further abstraction.

We have in this section described briefly the two meanings of an actual occasion. As concrescence, the actual occasion is extensive, divisible but not divided into co-ordinate divisions; it is a subject aiming at its feeling and enjoying its immediacy; it is a process, but not in physical time.[1] As satisfaction the actual occasion is not extensive, but atomic and unchanging; it can be divided into co-ordinate division for analysis; it has lost its immediacy and is in the status of "objective immortality"; it is an object as a real potentiality for becoming.

In the Whiteheadean metaphysics, "satisfaction" characterizes the atomism of an occasion. This is the real potentiality for becoming. Atomic occasions therefore characterize the determinateness of the actual world in which new concrescence arises. From the determinate actual occasion in enduring objects (i.e., societies of occasions) physical laws of the universe are drawn. Whitehead associates the scientific notion of quantum with the atomic occasion. The quantum in the objectified occasion is the physical field where the primary phase of concrescence takes place.[2] Thus satisfaction and con-

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[1] Ibid., p. 434.

[2] Ibid., p. 124.

crescence respectively characterize the notion of individuality and continuity in physical science. A physical energy is an "individuality" in the form of an atomic occasion. But a physical energy is also a "continuity" in the form of concrescence. This "continuity" nevertheless conforms to the antecedent atomic occasion as the basis for the inheritance of energy. Because of "continuity" the flux of energy is explanatory through the fact of the inheritance from occasion to occasion. Thus in the discussion on the analogy between physical science and human experience Whitehead says:

> The physical flux corresponds to the conformal inheritance at the base of each occasion of experience. This inheritance, in spite of its continuity of subjective form, is nevertheless an inheritance from definite individual occasions. Thus, if the analogy is to hold, in the account of the general system of relations binding the past to the present, we should expect a doctrine of quanta, where the individualities of the occasions are relevant, and a doctrine of continuity where the conformal transference of subjective form is the dominating fact.[1]

But in Whitehead's metaphysics the concept of atomic occasion is the ultimate notion which implies continuity or concrescence:

> Thus the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism. The creatures are atomic. In the present cosmic epoch there is a creation of continuity. Perhaps such creation is an ultimate metaphysical truth holding of all cosmic epochs; but this does not seem to be a necessary conclusion. The more likely opinion is that extensive continuity is a special condition arising from the society of creatures which constitute our immediate epoch. But atomism does not exclude complexity, and universal relativity. Each atom is a system of all things.[2]

Actual entities and actual occasions are identical in Whitehead's metaphysics. Thus the two aspects of an occasion also apply to an actual entity. However, Whitehead uses "actual occasion" in contexts where the character of extensiveness of things is stressed.

Nexus, Society, Personal Society, and Life

Nexus is a generic notion. The genus of nexus is the mutual immanence of actual occasions.[3] By virtue of mutual immanence the occasions are held

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[1] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 239. [2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 53.

[3] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 258.

together in a temporal or spatial or temporal-spatial order. However, a contemporary nexus does not enjoy mutual immanence by reason of the causal independence of contemporary occasions. But it enjoys mutual immanence indirectly through a common past which the contemporary members inherit. The mutual immanence of occasions in a temporal nexus functions, however, asymetrically; that is, inheritance passes from the antecedent member to its succeeding member. Let A, B, C be members of a temporal nexūs. B inherits components from C, thus there is the immanence of C in B. Then A inherits from B; but in inheriting B, A also inherits B's inheritance of C, though with qualifications. In this way there is the continuity of inheritance in a temporal sequence. What we generally understand as things are "objects" which are contemporary nexūs. They are presented to us through the temporal inheritance of occasions in these nexūs and through the inheritance of sensa from occasion to occasion in the historical routes in our bodies. This means there is a common past between these contemporary nexūs and our bodies.

In Whitehead's metaphysics, the "actual world" corresponds to a nexus of actual occasions, which is the datum for the concrescent subject. Thus in the initial situation, the subject prehends a nexus of analogous physical feelings under the category of transmutation. Hence the particular analogous feelings are transmuted into an objective datum of the subject. Although the objective datum involves an eternal object, hence a universal, yet it is derived from the analogous physical feelings which are particular. This shows that the prehension of a nexūs still involves particular and perceptual feelings in the primary phase. Thus the prehension of a nexus or an object is not the prehension of the universals or the enduring qualities, such as the seventeenth-eighteenth century philosophers generally entertain, but of particular physical feelings of the nexus.

A society has the same thing as a nexus, except a society is generally understood as a specific type of nexus.[1] In other words, whereas a nexus is a generic notion, a society requires a description of the specific features of a nexus, which are generally omitted in the discussion of a nexus. A society has a common form which is illustrated in the "satisfaction" of each of the occasions in it. Each "satisfaction" in an actualized occasion imposes its conditions through objectification upon other occasions in the nexus. These conditions are reproduced in the satisfactions of these other occasions. In this way there is a reproduction of analogous satisfactions in the temporal order. These analogous satisfactions sustain the common form of the nexus. Hence there is a mutual enhancement in the order between the common form and the analogous satisfactions of the occasions. This common form is called the "defining characteristic" of the society or nexus.[2]

It is apparent, from the above description, that the defining characteristic of a society is possible by virtue of the genetic propagation of actual occasions in the society. This character of propagation is called "endurance." Thus a peculiar quality of a society is its endurance. The empirical ground of a society lies in the mutual immanence of occasions by means of genetic propagation. It is in this sense Whitehead said that a society is "self-sustaining; in other words, that it is its own reason."[3]

When the genetic propagation dominates a society, such a society is called a personal order or an enduring object.[4] Here a "person" is not equivalent to a "man." A "person" means a society or linear sequence of occasions; it refers to the temporal dimension of a nexus, whereas a "man" is a much more complex spatial nexus in which there are many "personal societies" co-ordinated

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[1] Ibid., p. 260.
[2] Ibid., pp. 260-61.
[3] Ibid., p. 261.
[4] Ibid., pp. 263-64.

under the domination of the unified experience which is the present occasion of the man now. In the Whiteheadean metaphysics, any nexus dominated by genetic propagation is a "person."

A major difference between an actual occasion and a personal society composed of actual occasions can be discerned by way of the concept of change. Change refers to the differences between two contiguous occasions in a personal society.[1] A personal society changes because of the diversities among the atomic occasions in it. But an atomic occasion does not change. It perishes as a subject only to be survived as an object for the becoming of a new concrescence.

Also the meaning of change qualifies the notion of time in the Whiteheadean metaphysics. As has been said, the concrescence of an occasion is not in physical time.[2] Physical time refers to the temporal sequence from an antecedent to a succeeding occasion. Due to the "objective immortality" of the actual occasion, its satisfaction is the efficient cause of the succeeding occasion. This means continuity of occasions is possible by virtue of the conformal feeling of the succeeding occasion to its antecedent one. The conformation of the immediate future to the immediate past is the characteristic of time in the philosophy of an organism. "Thus the self-enjoyment of an occasion of experience is initiated by an enjoyment of the past as alive in itself and is terminated by an enjoyment of itself as alive in the future."[3]

The concepts of change and time, within the context of the genetic propagation of occasions, give an empirical understanding to the notion of creativity in the organismic philosophy. Creativity, as a general character, refers to the successive inheritance of occasions on the one hand, whereby the

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 124-25.

[2] Supra, p. 129.

[3] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 249.

essential character of an enduring object is re-enacted in each occasion, and to the self-formation of each occasion on the other hand, whereby the intensity in terms of novelty of an occasion contributes to the essential character of an enduring object. Hence creativity varies in accordance with the type of order in question. But the degree of creativity certainly depends on the degree of "satisfactions" of the successive occasions constituting the personal order of that society.

In view of the function of the actual occasion in an enduring object, Whitehead thinks that the scientific materialism of the seventeenth-eighteenth century philosophers was wholly inadequate. Men like Descartes and Hume were primarily concerned with societies of occasions or enduring objects. Hence they conceived of an atom as "enduring substance" having its identical existence with accidental changes of relations and qualities. Since they were preoccupied with presentational immediacy as the primary mode of perception, presented sensa, qualities, and extensive relations of an enduring object were the dominant features which they considered. Inasmuch as perception in the mode of causal efficacy, which communicates to us activities or occasions of an enduring object, is not entertained by these philosophers, the ultimate reality of things, i.e., actual occasions, is denied to them. Instead, the enduring qualities of an object are viewed as having ultimate metaphysical importance, whereas changes in it, which disclose the actual happenings among occasions, are considered merely as "accidental" to the object. The philosophy of organism reverses this metaphysical situation through the introduction of the doctrine of actual occasions, whereby changes are viewed not as accidental but as the disclosure of the genetic propagation of actual occasions and the permanent qualities are viewed as the defining characteristics of an enduring object composed of actual entities.

It should be recalled that a personal society is one dimensional. It is one type of society in a body composed of multiple societies, some of which are "personal" and others are not. The co-ordination of the multiple societies under a dominant society is called a structured society. Usually this dominant society, however, is a personal society. In speaking of a society, "membership" refers, in general, to actual occasions and not to enduring objects.[1] Thus an electron is a society composed of electronic occasions.

Life occurs in an occasion by virtue of its novelty of feeling.[2] This means conceptual reversion is a categoreal condition for the occurrence of life. Life issues into an occasion when that occasion through its mental origination, breaks through a mere reproduction of conformal feelings of its preceding occasions for the realization of an eternal object which is in contrast, yet germane to, its physical datum.[3] Thus life depends on the conceptual prehensions of occasions in personal society. Life means the domination of final cause in conformation to efficient cause.

Conceptual prehensions of an actual occasion are initiated by its subjective aim whereby its subjective forms are adjusted under the objective lure of an eternal object. Novelty is derived from an integration of a secondary conceptual feeling with the primary conceptual feeling. Such an integration results from the ingression of the "reverted" eternal object in consequence of the negation of the eternal object of the primary phase. There is greater intensity in "satisfaction" because of the derivation of novel feelings. The genetic propagation of satisfactions eliciting novelty is the life of the personal society. The accumulated subjective aims of these contiguous occasions determine the "ideal" or the "importance" of this society with respect to its

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 141. [2] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 266.

[3] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 155-56.

survival and in relation to societies constituting its environment. It is evident that the grade of a society is dependent on the grade of life which it enjoys and reproduces; the grade of life is dependent on the grade of mentality of the society; and the grade of mentality is dependent on the degree of novelty generated through the propagation of satisfactions.

But mentality, or life, is nevertheless derived from primary physical and conceptual feelings which are shared by all actual occasions. Also the essence of mentality, in the Whiteheadean metaphysics, is not "intellect" but "valuation" or "purpose."[1] For mentality is conditioned by subjective aim which is concerned with the "purpose" or the "valuation" of the occasion in question. It is in this sense that Whitehead said that the essence of life is "conformation of purpose."[2] This would mean that the origination of novel feelings enables the society to adjust its "ideal" or "importance" as it advances at a level beyond a mere conformation to its past.

"Importance" is a generic term referring to the degree of satisfaction derived from the genetic propagation of the occasions and having to do with the final causes of the occasions in the society. Its meaning may be understood in connection with "interest" and "perspective."[3] The importance of an occasion is relative to the intensity derived from the integrations of feelings in the occasion. "Interest" refers to the degree of intensity having to do with details of feelings arising from the receptive phase of the concrescence. The importance of an occasion is also relative to the perspective of the occasion derived from the genetic propagation of satisfactions in the society. "Perspective" refers to the standpoints of the successive occasions; it re-

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[1] Ibid., p. 130. [2] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 264.

[3] Alfred N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 11, 13. [Hereafter abbreviated as MT.]

iterates or adjusts the defining characteristic of the society. Thus the degree of importance is relative to both the defining characteristic of the society and the intensity of satisfaction in the actual occasion in question. The "ideal" of the society or order thus corresponds to the importance of the society. A society is "unimportant" when the intensity of the successive occasions dwindles, thus its defining characteristic can no longer be reproduced. In such a case, "disorder" gradually replaces "order." The decrease of intensity is due to an incompatibility of feelings in their integration. Hence there is mutual cancellation of feelings in the objective diversity of the occasion. To this extent, the satisfaction of the occasion is enfeebled. Its objectification therefore contributes to the weakening of the defining characteristic of the society.

The laws of nature, viewed according to the organismic philosophy, are derived from the reproductive process of actual occasions.[1] This means these laws are contingent upon the changing aspects of the reproductive process. Order may end in disorder. Hence societies affected by disorder will gradually pass into oblivion, only to be replaced by societies of emerging but dominant defining characteristics. Hence, Whitehead said that there are arbitrary elements in the laws of nature to which all entities must conform. These elements determine the character of the laws of nature in a cosmic epoch. The arbitrary elements dominating the present cosmic epoch are the electromagnetic laws of actual occasions, the four dimensions of spatio-temporal continuum, and the geometric axioms.[2]

The Consequent Nature of God

In the previous two sections we have described the general features of order under the notions of actual occasions and societies. In the present

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 139. [2] Ibid., pp. 140, 150.

section, we shall enlarge the notion of order to include the consequent nature of God.

God's primordial nature is a metaphysical principle in that without it the world cannot be explained.[1] As has been said in Chapter V, this nature is God's subjective aim whereby eternal objects are conceptually prehended in an order of relevance for actualization:

> He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this primordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation.[2]

Being fully conceptual, God's primordial nature has no particular concern for a particular actuality other than the fact that his subjective aim constitutes the "lure for feeling" in the initial subjective aim of an actual occasion. Here God's conceptual ordering of eternal objects into the world is "analogous to the remorseless working of things in Greek and in Buddhist thought."[3] There is an inexorableness in God's nature. His ultimate concern is for the creative advance of the world in the general sense. His primordial nature "is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass."[4] Moreover, God's subjective forms, which are his conceptual valuations, apart from integration with the physical feelings of the world, are without consciousness.

The consequent nature of God is his prehension of the world into his conceptual valuations; it is God's physical feelings whose datum is the world. The outcome of this nature of God is dependent upon the doctrine, with its radicalization, of "objective immortality" in the temporal world. Objectification involves abstraction. An experience objectified means that its attainment is a resultant, in part, of elimination of the irrelevant and of the incompatible elements in the primary phase of its prehensions. Furthermore, an

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[1] Supra, pp. 106-08.

[2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 522.

[3] Ibid., p. 373.

[4] Ibid., p. 522.

experience objectified into a new concrescence results in the loss of its immediacy. Being a constituent in a new concrescence means that "satisfaction" is now abstracted through the perspective of the new concrescence. Hence "objective immortality" in the temporal world is relative. Whitehead is fully aware of this fact:

> Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past fact with it in any full immediacy. The process of time veils the past below distinctive feelings. There is a unison of becoming among things in the present. Why should there not be novelty without loss of this direct unison of immediacy among things? In the temporal world, it is the empirical fact that process entails loss; the past is present under an abstraction. But there is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why this should be the whole story.[1]

The consequent nature of God is Whitehead's attempt to "remedy" the evil of loss in the world. Whereas the objectification of the past in the present occasion, which is the living person, involves abstraction as well as the loss of immediacy, the objectification of the actual occasions into the conceptual valuations of God does not result in abstraction. The immediacy of "satisfactions" are conceptually sustained in God. This radicalization of "objective immortality" is clearly stated in the following:

> Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature. The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality into a living ever-present fact. An enduring personality in the temporal world is a route of occasions in which the successors with some peculiar completeness sum up their predecessors. The correlate fact in God's nature is an even more complete unity of life in a chain of elements for which succession does not mean the loss of immediate unison. This element in God's nature inherits from the temporal counterpart according to the same principle as in the temporal world the future inherits from the past. Thus in the sense in which the present occasion is the person now, and yet with his own past, so the counterpart in God is that person in God.[2]

From the temporal point of view, each objectification means the perishing of the livingness of an experience. But from the viewpoint of God, the livingness of an experience is permanently sustained in his primordial nature.

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[1] Ibid., p. 517.

[2] Ibid., pp. 531-32.

Moreover, what is objectified in God's subjective aim is also "transmuted," which means it is "adjusted" into the harmony of God's conceptual feelings according to his subjective aim.[1] Thus from God's viewpoint, every objectification has a "worth" beyond itself through his primordial valuations.[2] "It is in this way that the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into an element of triumph."[3]

The function of God's consequent nature is the religious God who cares, saves, and judges the world with his long-suffering, infinite tenderness, and patience. This is the aspect of God's all-inclusiveness--his love for the world. Such an understanding of God, for Whitehead, approximates the "Galilean origin of Christianity."

Metaphysically speaking, Whitehead's consequent nature of God is specifically supported, as has been said, by the doctrine of objective immortality which involves abstraction and the loss of immediacy. But these two deficiencies are said to be overcome when this doctrine is applied to the consequent nature of God. However, as to the way they are overcome in God, there is no categorical support in Whitehead's system. Furthermore, our objectified experience is said to be "transmuted" in God's primordial harmony.[4] If it is so, then the original "satisfaction" of this experience is somewhat altered. But according to Whitehead, the "satisfaction" of an actual occasion is its final act. It is not subject to alteration.[5] If each "satisfaction" needs to be adjusted in God's valuation, it is not a "satisfaction" from the temporal point of view. Thus, there are unsolved problems concerning the consequent nature of God in Whitehead's system.

On the other hand, the consequent nature of God is not an additive

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[1] Ibid., pp. 530-32. [2] Ibid., p. 531. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 531. [5] Ibid., p. 130.

concept in Whitehead's system, for he believed that the permanence of the world is as important as the permanence of God. The permanence of God enters into the flux of the world and the flux of the world enters into the permanence of God. This is another way of saying that the fulfillment of God requires a physical derivation from the flux of the world and the fulfillment of the world requires a conceptual derivation from the permanence of God. Because of this mutual dependence the consequent nature of God, whereby the permanence of the world is possible, is metaphysically demanded.

> The problem of the fluency of God and of the everlastingness of passing experience are solved by the same factor in the universe. This factor is the temporal world perfected by its reception and its reformation, as a fulfillment of the primordial appetation which is the basis of all order. In this way God is completed by the individual, fluent satisfactions of finite fact, and the temporal occasions are completed by their everlasting union with their transformed selves, purged into conformation with the eternal order which is the final absolute 'wisdom.'[1]

The interplay between God and the world makes neither of them static, thus fulfilling the final metaphysical ground which is the creative advance of the universe into novelty.

It is apparent that the consequent nature is inseparable from the primordial nature of God; one enhances the function of the other. Their mutuality explains the complete function of God. God is primordial through his conceptual urge for the realization of possibilities, but he is also consequent by his tender acceptance of the actual occasions of the world into his conceptual valuation, whereby they are transformed into potentialities for novel occurrences. "The consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts."[2] Inasmuch as both natures of God are required for an adequate explanation of the relativity, as well as the creative advance, of the world, they are both metaphysically necessary. Furthermore, Whitehead said that a doctrine of God should not be treated as an

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[1] Ibid., p. 527.

[2] Ibid., p. 524.

exception to, but the exemplification of, the metaphysical principles.[1] Hence the categories which are applied to experience should also be applied to God. This is what he has done in his metaphysics. (However, conceptual reversion and negative prehension are not applicable to God.) Thus an explanation of experience, i.e., actual entities, necessarily discloses God both as the ground of order and the transformer of the world. Thus the "reason" for the existence of God is found in "actual entities." This means the two natures of God are justified by his ontological principle.

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[1] Ibid., p. 521.

CHAPTER VIII

CREATIVITY

Actualities Characterizing Creativity

We have in the preceding three chapters described the meanings and functions of actual entities. In the present chapter an effort will be made to recapitulate what has been said under the notion of creativity.

Creativity is the ultimate concept in that all other categories illustrate or presuppose it. This does not mean that it is a transcendent principle from which other categories are derived; it means that each of the other categories express some characteristic qualifying the general notion of creativity. Thus, apart from an understanding of these categories, creativity does not convey a specific meaning:

> Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian 'matter' is without a character of its own. It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are more specific than itself. But creativity is always found under conditions, and described as conditioned.[1]

The fact that creativity has no character of its own, and yet is the ultimate notion at the base of actualities, shows that it, as a metaphysical notion, is "self-evident," i.e., not subject to proof. The final appeal of what is self-evident is intuition. According to Whitehead all ultimate notions of a philosophy are derived from one's immediate experience.[2] But the self-evident character of a concept should be implied in the less ultimate

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 47. [2] Whitehead, MT, op. cit., pp. 66-69.

philosophical categories. That is to say, the self-evident character of an ultimate notion, such as creativity, is demonstrable through the explications of the less ultimate categories.

Perhaps an adequate way to describe the self-evidence of creativity is by an examination of the becoming of an actual entity. An actuality begins with the conformal feeling of the determinate actual world. This actual world may be a nexus of actualities in the external world or may lie in the past of the percipient subject. In either case, it is the "brute fact" to which the subject conforms. The actual world cannot be completely chaotic because it is objectified by its embodied eternal object. This means it is a unity of experience conceptually realized. By virtue of the doctrine of causal efficacy, which is the epistemological counterpart of the ontological conformation of things, there is a togetherness of experience out of which the subject arises. Thus the notion of the actual world implies that there is a community of actualities involving a common past between the nexus of the objectified entities as the datum and the antecedent occasions of the subject. This common past in which the actual world is located is the minimum meaning of real potentiality for the subject. And the real potentiality of the subject is located in the extensive continuum.[1] Thus the actual world involves a mutual immanence of occasions via a common past. This means that the settled world is basically of a social nature--a nexus of inherited feelings derived from various societies of occasions. The conformation of the subject to this datum illustrates the immanence of the object in the subject, whereby objective immortality is possible.

It may be recalled that the subject in prehending an actual entity also prehends the hybrid physical feeling of God. That is to say, the datum

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[1]Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 119, 123-24.

objectified in the subject is relevant to the conceptual valuation of God by virtue of which the eternal object is embodied in the subject. This means in prehending the actual world, the subject also prehends the eternal object of the said entity, whose ingression is possible because of the conceptual valuation of God. Thus the physical prehension of the actual world involves a hybrid physical feeling of God. And such a feeling is traceable to the conceptual valuation of God. In this sense, one may say that God is the creator in that every creature arises out of the actual world involving God's subjective aim:

> In this sense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actuality. But the phrase is apt to be misleading by its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition. The true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. It is the function of activity to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character.[1]

Thus God as the creator of the new subject is understood only in terms of final causation by virtue of being the aboriginal condition of creativity. As to the specific character of creativity, it is ascribed to the self-creation of the subject.

The second phase of the becoming of an actual entity involves the predominance of the subjective form. In most instances of experience at the level of high organisms the datum is a nexus of analogous physical feelings. Thus the initial datum is subject to a process of elimination, i.e., negative prehension, whereby it is made into a relevant and coherent objective datum which is the perspective for the subject. Now, the prehension of this datum is the "how" of feeling, which is the subjective form of the concrescence. The "how" of a feeling involves an emotional and valuational reaction to the datum. In fact, the datum and the "how" of a feeling are inseparable in the becoming of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 343-44.

an experience. They form one feeling which is the subject aiming at its own process.

The subjective form is under the lure of eternal objects of alternative possibilities as it entertains conceptual valuations. Since conceptual valuations of the temporal world presuppose the subjective aim of God, whereby the relevant ordering of eternal objects into the world is possible, the subjective form necessarily involves the subjective aim derived from God,[1] whereby the subject adjusts its progressive feelings into a coherent end.

It is evident that the subjective form is not limited to the original reaction to the objective datum in the case of high organisms; it also refers to the originated feeling derived from the integration of feelings in the later phase of concrescence. Each of these feelings is the "how" of a feeling. The "how" a feeling becomes constitutes "what" that feeling is. "That" feeling is internally determinate in the subject. This means these subjective forms are the components in the formal constituent of the subject. Each subjective form is a qualitative and quantitative pattern of feeling involving a degree of intensity. The progressive integration of one pattern with another evokes increasing intensity resulting in the production of novelty.[2]

The third phase of the concrescent actuality is the final decision whereby it becomes an atomic occasion. It is an expression of definiteness, an achievement of its own importance, a creature causa sui. The strength of this satisfaction is relative to the degree of intensity derived from the tension between the unity and the diversity of the component feelings in the final determination. The diverse feelings are the individual strengths in the background, and the unity of feelings exhibits the compatibility among the diverse elements.

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[1] Ibid., p. 343.

[2] Ibid., p. 356.

Although the satisfaction of the entity refers to its integration of the physical and conceptual feelings, hence the relevance of the mental to the physical, it is dominated by the mental in view of the ingression of the eternal object. And this ingression owes its source to the conceptual valuation of God. This means a new creation, i.e., the superject, owes its final cause to the primordial nature of God, though, in terms of decision-making, it is a self-causation.

The three phases of the becoming of an actuality are a description of what a creature or an organism means. The first and the second phases refer to the "microscopic" meaning of an organism, which is concerned with the formal constitution of an actual occasion; and the third phase refers to the "macroscopic" meaning of an organism, which is concerned with the givenness of the "actual world."[1] These three phases of an organism as a becoming or process, explicate the ultimate meaning of creativity; that is, how "many" become "one" and how "one" conjoins "many" for the production of a novel experience. There are the diverse feelings in togetherness for the production of an occasion, and there is the inclusion of this occasion into diverse feelings for the production of another occasion. Likewise, there is the subject which arises from the actual world composed of many feelings, and there is the origination of many feelings producing the one superject. Then there is the objectification of this superject as one component among other components constituting the formal elements of a concrescent subject. The dynamic relation between "one" and "many" underlying all actualities illustrates the most general meaning of creativity--the togetherness of experience for the production of novelty.

According to the ontological principle, the "reason" for things is to be found either in some component of the actual world of the concrescence or

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[1] Ibid., pp. 196-97.

in some aspect of the subject in the process of concrescence.[1] This means the explanation of things cannot go beyond the description of the way in which the diverse feelings are conjoined into one actuality and the way that actuality becomes one feeling among diverse feelings. Thus, in the last analysis, the explanation of things is to be found in the relationship of prehensions or feelings. The implication of the ontological principle demands a rejection of the Aristotelian notion of "primary substance" as the enduring thing underlying the relatedness of beings. For the philosophy of organism, the base of things is "creativity," which is the disclosure of the dynamic relatedness of "many" into "one" and "one" into "many" for the production of novelty. Thus, the ultimate metaphysical category is relatedness, not substance. It is in this sense Whitehead said in referring to creativity that "This Category of the Ultimate replaces Aristotle's category of 'primary substance.'"[2] But, as has been said, creativity has no character of its own apart from what is characterized by the actual entities in question. Hence an actual entity characterizes its own creativity through its concrescent process, and also transcends its character of creativity through its satisfaction. Since there are different levels of actual entities, there is a difference of gradations in creativity characterized by actual entities. Through the creativity of the successive occasions the defining characteristic of a personal society is therefore propagated.

Two Meanings of Novelty

In Whitehead's metaphysics, there are two meanings attached to the notion of novelty. Novelty in the first sense means that the unity of the one synthetic feeling is a novel production resulting from the diverse feelings in

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[1] Ibid., pp. 36-37.

[2] Ibid., p. 32.

togetherness.[1] Novelty in this sense has no particular association with conceptual feeling other than the fact that the termination of the concrescence corresponds to the ingression of the eternal object which is the datum of conceptual feeling. Novelty here refers to the metaphysical fact that the production of an experience out of the diverse feelings is in every instance a new creation. Thus novelty in this sense is generic--referring to "one" in contrast to "many." Even a mere conceptual reproduction of physical feeling, which involves minimum conceptual valuation, terminates in a new situation. When novelty is understood in this generic sense, creativity is the principle of novelty.[2]

The second meaning of novelty has a special association with conceptual valuation. It refers to the function of the mental pole in directing the "ideal" of the actual entity away from a mere conformation to its physical pole toward a new type of "perfection" superseding the "perfection" entertained by the past occasions of that personal society which is the actual occasion now. Novelty in this sense is "creative advance"--the attainment of a greater satisfaction. Creativity in terms of novelty in this sense is entertained by high organisms. But this meaning of novelty presupposes its generic meaning. Organisms which are members of a personal society possessing life, i.e., capable of conceptual reversion,[3] are expected to characterize creativity with novelty.

In Whitehead's metaphysics, the notion of finitude is implied in his doctrine of objective immortality. Finitude means perishing or death. Every actuality is finite in that it perishes. It is only saved, as an objective fact, in the immediacy of some other actual entity. The objectified entity enjoys its "immortality" through its being inherited by the successive occasions

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[1] Ibid., pp. 31-32. [2] Ibid., p. 31. [3] Supra, p. 135.

in a personal society. Thus objective immortality is the compensation for the finitude of actual entities. It is another way of describing how the past successive occasions are now embodied in the present occasion. In this way, there is a re-iteration of the character, purpose, and emotion of the past in the present. Thus occasions enjoying novelty in the generic sense are dominated by conformal feeling. Origination is lacking. There is only a very limited selection of possibilities enjoyed by the conceptual valuation of the successive occasions.

An occasion endowed with life is capable of originating conceptual feelings from its objective datum for the entertainment of a large range of alternative possibilities. This means the essence of life is the realization of ideas hitherto excluded by the past occasions immanent in the present occasion. For occasions endowed with life, creativity in terms of the second meaning of novelty is necessary. They may, however, adhere to a mere conformal feeling for sometime, but this cannot last long. A prolongation of a mere propagation of the same ideas and purposes on the part of the actual occasions would eventually destroy the personal society through boredom and anaesthesia. Such a mode of existence is against the essence of life. Life demands ideal adventure for new levels of "perfection."

In the origination of conceptual feelings from, and not fully conformal to, the objective datum, there is in the subjective form a tension arising from an adjustment between the feelings pertaining to the datum and feelings diverse from the datum. This results in a destruction of some positive feelings due to the realization of an idea in contradistinction to the idea embodied in the objective datum. It means the final realization of the ideas is preceded by the "discordant feeling" due to the "aesthetic destruction."[1] Such a discordant

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[1] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 330.

feeling is evil in the most general sense, "namely physical pain or mental evil, such as sorrow, horror, dislike."[1] This means conceptual reversion or a shifting of aim for creative advance necessarily involves evil. Hence life cannot be entertained without evil. But evil is compensated by the attainment of a new aim. A new level of "perfection," accompanied by a "discordant feeling" in the subjective experience, due to conflict or destruction among feelings, is imperfect in that there is a lack of a perfect harmony in its final pattern of feelings. But an imperfect "perfection" for the realization of a high aim is more interesting and valuable than a "perfection" of a lower type.

For occasions of higher organisms, finitude means not only perishing but also physical pain and mental suffering. To avoid evil of this sort would mean a privation of life. The only way finitude is compensated for in a high organism in the temporal world is by means of a conceptual origination for the realization of ideas hitherto unattained. This means a degree of "discontinuity" in the subjective form is inevitable in relation to past occasions immanent in the present. The bearing of this discontinuity results in pain and suffering. But there is the compensation which is the creative life.

As has been said, creativity is universal. The actual entities of lower organisms illustrate creativity mainly through objective immortality. But actualities of high organisms characterize it not only through objective immortality but also through conceptual originations. Both functions require conceptual valuations which are possible in lieu of the subjective aim of God. Hence creativity, God, and the temporal world are inextricably related for the creative advance of the universe:

> It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character. But of course there is no meaning

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[1] Ibid.

to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'[1]

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[1]Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 344.

PART III

AFFINITIES AND DIFFERENCES

CHAPTER IX

EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

Experience

Subjective Immediacy

It is evident that both Chu Hsi and Whitehead gave attention to the importance of subjective immediacy as the disclosure of experience. This aspect of Whitehead's philosophy is implied in the reformed subjectivist principle, the principle of universal relativity, and the ontological principle.[1] It is also contained in his more specific categories--categories of explanations and of obligations. An explication of them would entail the meaning of the following notions each dependent upon the immediacy of subjective experience: subjective aim, subjective form, valuation, concrescence, subject-superject, satisfaction. In Chu Hsi's system, we may say, no idea can really be understood apart from an association with subjective experience.[2] Chu Hsi would have gone as far as to say, with Whitehead, that the immediacy of the subject exhibits an initial relation between the world and the subject. This is the basic meaning of Jen, i.e., the feeling of sympathy or self-relatedness --the first phase of the fourfold process of Jen.[3] Jen, in the generic sense, is somewhat analogous to the simple physical feeling of Whitehead. It displays the ontological structure of the subject-"other." It is the way in which the feeling of the "other" enters into the subject in a single instance of experi-

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 96-101. [2] *Supra*, pp. 42-45. [3] *Supra*, p. 52.

ence. This, for Whitehead, is the transition from the object to the subject. Chu Hsi would have gone further; he would have said with Whitehead that the immediacy of the subject is a disclosure of the togetherness of feelings for the production of an experience. Such is his description of the fourfold feeling of Jen (sympathy, guilt and shame, obligation, and the sense of worse or better.)[1] This is the process of self-creation. It corresponds to Whitehead's concrescence.

Thus at the outset Whitehead and Chu Hsi share two things in common: (1) Immediate experience discloses the primary metaphysical situation involving the transference of feeling from the world to the subject. Whitehead explained this phenomenon in terms of transition or of the object-subject structure. Chu Hsi described it in terms of the generic meaning of Jen or the spontaneous encountering between the "other" and the subject. (2) Immediate experience also discloses the way in which the many feelings are synthesized for the production of an experience. This is explained by Whitehead's concrescence and by Chu Hsi's fourfold feeling of Jen.

But a more attentive analysis of subjective immediacy shows that there are fundamental differences between Whitehead's physical feeling and Chu Hsi's generic meaning of Jen. Although the latter involves an "object" which is directly intuited, it is not perceived as an occurrence antecedent to the subject.[2] The intuited entity is not experienced according to Whitehead's meaning of objectification. The relation between subject and "other" is not one of the immediate present to the immediate past, but one of simultaneity. Being in the immediate past of the subject implies that the object is now "unchanging" with respect to its objective identity, thus no longer in fluency. It is a

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[1] Supra, pp. 23-27, 42-45, 52, 91-96, 126-27.

[2] Supra, pp. 44-47, 49-54, 65-66, 69-71.

"given," efficaciously received by the subject. Being simultaneous with the subject, the "object" in Chu Hsi's sense is still in fluency. It is not an object in the Whiteheadean sense. It is not even a datum for prehension, for a datum is something settled for reception. The immediate experience of Whitehead, with its stress upon the causal relationship between the datum and the subject, involves a basic distinction in character between the two. But Chu Hsi's generic meaning of Jen involves almost an identical character between "object" and subject, for fluency or livingness is shared by both. Thus, strictly speaking, the initial ontological situation is not a subject-object relation. Since an "object" possesses the characteristics of a subject, it is its subjectivity which is stressed in the ontological sense. What the subject intuits is not the fixed but the process aspect of the "object." The subject enjoys the full concreteness of the "object" prior to its being abstracted.

A question may be raised concerning the ontological status of the "settled past" in Chu Hsi's metaphysics. Since an "object" cannot be a settled thing in the past of the subject, the settled past, be it the subject's personal memories or an historical fact, is still viewed as the "other," that is, an event in flux. It is to be entertained as a living and immediate experience simultaneous with the subject.

Relatedness

In the becoming of an experience, there is no feeling in the subject or Jen which does not become. Thus the notion of a substance unchanging amidst fluxes is absent in Chu Hsi. Since the alternation of Yin and Yang involves the inclusion of particular feelings from the world as well as the integration of them into an experience, every component in the process is particular and mutually qualifying for the self-creation of the subject. Thus the notion of the subject as a passive entity predicated by "universals," i.e., conceptual

qualities, is also absent in his thinking. The underlying principle of relatedness would enable Chu Hsi to appreciate Whitehead's universal relativity. But universal relativity as a metaphysical principle, in Whitehead's system, is not only conformed by human experience but is also buttressed by the principle of relativity in physical science. On the other hand, relatedness in Chu Hsi's philosophy is basically a derivation from human experience. As far as internal relatedness in process within an experience is concerned, there is a basic affinity between these two men. But relatedness in Whitehead is also explained in terms of an actual occasion as a potentiality for the becoming of the ensuing occasion. Thus actualities are "real potentiality" for becoming, and objectified experiences are metaphysically significant. In Chu Hsi's system, since an actualized experience, Hsing (性), returns to the ground of undifferentiation,[1] it is metaphysically not a potentiality for becoming. What is "potential" is the "other," i.e., the flux which the subject confronts. This means that only that which still retains its immediacy is potential for becoming.

When the meaning of relatedness and of subjective experience in Chu Hsi's thought is understood within the context of Ch'i, we have, according to him, a naturalist metaphysics. To search for reason is therefore to discover the relatedness in experience. Such an idea is close to Whitehead's ontological principle; the cause of reason is in the actual entities; hence to search for reason is to search for actualities.

The Ideal

There is an apparent similarity between the realm of eternal objects and Li(s). Both notions are ontologically a priori in that the physical world

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[1] Supra, pp. 31-33, 73-77.

receives its structural character because of the ideation of eternal objects or Li(s).[1] In Whitehead's scheme, the process would not attain the definiteness of an experience apart from the reception of an eternal object. In Chu Hsi's metaphysics, the flux would not exhibit its aesthetic-ethic meaning apart from the spontaneous ingression of Li. The a priori character of eternal objects or Li(s) rests upon its form of rationality, which is verifiable through a description of the empirical world. This rationality of eternal objects or Li(s) reflects the idealistic bent of both men. However, eternal objects or Li(s) are ideal possibilities; and as such, they are devoid of perception or consciousness.

Both Chu Hsi and Whitehead provided for an empirical verification of the realm of ideas. Whitehead did it by showing that eternal objects, with respect to their general character, are analogous to the extensive continuum which is the most general character of relatedness in the empirical world.[2] Since eternal objects when actualized will have to conform to the characteristics of the extensive continuum, they are therefore in part conditioned by the extensive continuum with respect to their actualization. Thus there is a relationship in character between eternal objects as "mere potentiality" and extensive continuum as "real potentiality." They both reflect the abstract character of experience, or the ultimate rationality in the Whiteheadean metaphysics.

As for Chu Hsi, the empirical justification of the universal Li is seen through its participation in the character of the fourfold process of Jen, i.e., Subjectivity (Jen), Action ("I"), Togetherness ("Li"), and Co-ordinated understanding (Chih).[3] This means there is a general affinity between the character-

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[1] Supra, pp. 29-30, 101-03.

[2] Supra, pp. 103-05.

[3] Supra, pp. 24-28, 33-35.

istics of Jen in the empirical world and the universal Li. They both reflect the general meaning of experience in Chu Hsi's metaphysics. The necessity of eternal objects are implied in almost all of Whitehead's multiple categories. This means the ontological priority of eternal objects are categorically necessary for the explanation of the physical world. Likewise, in Chu Hsi's metaphysics, the necessity of Li is implied in his other three major categories, Ch'i (the actual), Hsin (the experient-in-becoming), and Hsing (the experient-in-actualization).

An eternal object, for Whitehead, is the datum for conceptual feeling. The datum "lures" the feeling. This lure enhances the emotional and purposive tone already resident in the subjective form. Thus the actualization, or the negation, of an eternal object, involves an intensification of the subjective form. Hence the eternal object and subjective form are inseparable in the final "satisfaction." In Whitehead's metaphysics, a conceptual feeling, whose ultimate aim is the actualization of an idea, does not correspond to "intellect" or "consciousness" of the rationalistic philosophy. It implies valuation as well as non-sensuous perception. Thus in many instances, even at the human level, the actualization of an eternal object is a perceptual, emotional experience at the non-conscious or non-intellectual level. An explication of Whitehead's categories would show that the non-conscious perception is in fact the genesis of conceptual feelings.

Of course, among the eternal objects of the "objective species," i.e., those objectified in the physical world, there are highly intellectual or abstract kinds--for instance, logical or mathematical concepts or concepts applied in mathematical physics. But even those objects of the conscious or intellectual types such as Whitehead's own categorical concepts, when entertained, would involve subjective forms; hence emotions and valuations on the

part of the percipient. In view of the generic importance of feelings in Whitehead's metaphysics, the entertaining of an eternal object, though a mental experience, involves emotion, purpose, or appreciation. Thus an eternal object must not be conceived of as an "idea" in the purely intellectual sense.

The embodiment of Li or idea is a non-intellectual, emotional, and perceptual experience. Thus for both Chu Hsi and Whitehead the actualization of an idea is primarily an entertainment of the subjective, valuational, and aesthetic experience. Both men stress the feelings of the subject as the basis for the ingression of an idea. Chu Hsi would certainly have welcomed Whitehead's metaphor that the subjective feelings "clothe dry bones with the flesh of a real being."[1] They are the "breath" which gives life to the received datum, i.e., eternal object or Li.

Both actual entity and Ch'i depart from the rationalist presupposition that the ultimate entities in the world are enduring substances independent from each other. Needless to say, an actual entity or Ch'i is principally an event, or a nexus, or an experience arising out of the togetherness of feelings. It is primarily a contextual or social entity. The doctrine of prehensions implies that an actual entity involves both physical and mental feelings. Thus there is no bifurcation of nature. Chu Hsi's doctrine of Yang and Yin implies that Ch'i is composed of both the physical (Yin) and the mental (Yang) poles. Both men agree, at this point, that the function of an idea is the individuation of an experience or a nexus of event. Such an individuation is a patterned experience with aesthetic harmony. The mental pole, through the ingression of the idea, organizes the physical feelings into a synthesis of feelings. For Whitehead, this new subject is a "superject" enjoying its "satisfaction." For Chu Hsi, it is "Hsing" on the verge of immersion into undifferentiation.

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[1]Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 37.

Despite the identities, described above, there are basic differences between eternal objects and Li(s). Eternal objects are internally ordered in accordance with the relevance of possibility for ingression.[1] Such an internal relatedness has a logical status in the conceptual valuation of God.[2] This means the relational essences of eternal objects exhibit an aesthetic complexity by virtue of the logic of relevance in the primordial nature of God. Thus eternal objects have logical implications as to their general characters which are explicable in terms of a mathematical logic, as is illustrated in the outline in the chapter on "Abstraction" in Science and the Modern World. This means that though an eternal object can be intuited, it is nevertheless a logical concept. Northrop called it a logical concept of intuition due to its theoretical import.[3]

The internal relatedness of the individual Li(s) is suggested in Chu Hsi's metaphor of "circles": a gradation of circles may be included in a larger circle.[4] Thus he said that "the myriad threads [i.e., ideas] of Li are all interconnected." But he explained the internal relatedness of Li(s) only by means of metaphors. There is no logical explanation of it. This also accounts for the absence of a concept comparable to the primordial nature of God in Chu Hsi's system. There is no function ascribed to him comparable to the ontological relevance of possibility for ingression such as we see in Whitehead's primordial nature of God. Thus for Whitehead the internal relatedness of eternal objects is in the primordial nature of God; whereas in Chu Hsi, since there is no logical implication of such a relatedness in Li(s), there is

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[1] Supra, p. 102.

[2] Supra, p. 106.

[3] Filmer S. C. Northrop, "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuition and Western Scientific Philosophy," Philosophy--East and West, ed. C. A. Moore (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 178-86.

[4] Supra, p. 72.

therefore no reason for the necessity of the primordial nature of God. The ordering (命) of Li into Ch'i is a spontaneous act by Heaven (天).[1] Since an idea has no logical status determining its relatedness to other ideas with respect to the relevance for ingression, it is only natural to conceive of the inception of an idea as being spontaneous. However, Li as the ideal structure is the ground of the experience of Jen. Hence Li is an aesthetic-ethic concept having no theoretical or scientific import.

The Ideal and the Actual

Eternal objects are logical concepts. As such they are neither good nor bad. "Goodness" in the moral sense, according to Whitehead's system, is derivative in that it is dependent on the degree of aesthetic satisfaction derived from the relevance between the empirical givenness of the percipient and the ingression of the eternal object. Thus "goodness" is meaningless apart from a consideration of the relationship between the eternal object in question and the actual world out of which the subject arises. This means that eternal objects, as possibilities, are potentialities for good or bad, and by themselves do not directly convey a moral standard. Chu Hsi's universal Li, as has been said, is not a realm of logical concepts in the sense of involving an analytic description of their internal relatedness. It is the ground of Jen. Since Jen, in the empirical sense, implies immediacy, perceptivity, and spontaneity,[2] the universal Li is therefore the ground of these characteristics which are conceived by the Chinese as being good per se. And individual Li(s) are diverse ideas participating in this ground. Thus Li(s) are conceived as being "good" for and by themselves. The failure of a perfect embodiment of an individual Li is due to Ch'i or the physical quality of the experient. But man is capable of transforming the "coarse" aspects of Ch'i, i.e., those elements

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[1] Supra, pp. 72-73.

[2] Supra, p. 89.

in man which drag him downward, to the fine elements of Ch'i.[1] In this way man is expected to display Li in the ideal sense--hence the attainment of Aesthetic-ethic life. As has been said before, Chu Hsi tended to identify the "good" with Li, and to associate Ch'i with a mixture of good and evil. This aspect of idealism is absent in Whitehead.

Not only does an "idea" in Whitehead's system have a logical status in the eternal relatedness of eternal objects, it also enjoys an "immortality" once it is embodied in an actual entity. This is metaphysically defensible through the doctrine of "objective immortality."[2] This doctrine means that once an idea is actualized in the occasion, it is a physical fact to be experienced by the concrescent subject. Through the transference of the cause into the effect, from the object to the subject, an actual experience enjoys its immortality in the empirical world. Needless to say, this doctrine presupposes the atomic character of an actual occasion, that is, the unit of experience is irreducible and unalterable. Because of the doctrine of atomism, which is the ultimate metaphysical truth,[3] objective immortality may be understood in terms of both prehension and inheritance. Thus an actual entity is a definite datum for prehension; also it embodies the defining characteristic of a personal society through inheritance from its immediate predecessor.

Since atomism is the ultimate metaphysical truth, an actual entity, in the last analysis, is the individual unit of experience. This means process or concrescence presupposes individuation. Thus the notion of substance, understood in the organismic sense, is basic in process philosophy.

Chu Hsi's Li, once individualized in experience, is called Hsing. Hsing does not have an "immortal" status in the world. Because of the alterna-

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[1] Supra, p. 67.

[2] Supra, pp. 128-30, 138-40.

[3] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 53.

tive process of Yang and Yin, or due to the rotation between Substantiality and Emptiness in the percipient (心), the individuation of an experience has but a momentary status in the world; it fleetingly passes into oblivion. Metaphysically speaking, what is actualized does not constitute an object for the subject. This means there is no "objective immortality" in Chu Hsi's system since what is "objectified" returns, or should return, to undifferentiation. As has been said, the "object" in his thought is the "other"--not an objectified past but the living, immediate "other." This means "objects" such as past deeds or historical data are conveived of as current events in flux; ontologically they are treated, as it were, in man's mind, as becoming, though historically they are the settled past. The implication of Whitehead's atomism is absent in Chu Hsi. As has been said, the notion of a unit or individuality is never consciously considered in Chu Hsi's thought. This also accounts for the fact that the individuation of an experience, i.e., Hsing, is not the ultimate fact; it does not entertain an autonomy by being itself.

Between Whitehead's doctrine of atomism and Chu Hsi's notion of flux we see a major difference in the Western and Eastern metaphysical thinking. Behind atomism lies the notion of substance which implies that an individualized experience as a fact in existence has its absolute and final status in the universe by virtue of being what it is. Though Whitehead's atomism implies the rejection of the traditional Western view of substance, nevertheless, because of his emphasis on substance, the principle of identity referring to the identity of an experience or a being can be postulated. Hence A cannot be B. On the other hand, in Chu Hsi's doctrine of Ch'i, flux or the becoming of an experience predominates. The notion of individuality or substance is not a metaphysical issue for him. Thus the uniqueness of an experience is not stressed. This perhaps accounts for the reason why the identity of an experience or a

decision is not a conscious concern in Chinese thought as it is in Western culture. The following passage by Hughes seems to convey a similar view regarding this difference:

> Behind the metaphysical idea of 'substance' lies the logical idea of 'identity'; and western philosophers laid down as a basic principle of thought that a thing cannot both be and not be, at the same time. Chinese philosophers, on the other hand, laid down that a thing is always either becoming or debecoming, if the term may be allowed. It is all the time on the way to being something else. Thus the idea of 'identity' is blurred.[1]

God

In Whitehead's system, the primordial nature of God is a metaphysical necessity in that the internal relatedness of eternal objects are possible because of it. Thus the "somewhere" of these infinite ideas are in God. This metaphysical necessity, however, is explainable through an examination of the empirical world. For occasion A has a reference to other eternal objects embodied in those nexūs constituting the environment to which A conforms. There is a causal relation between these nexūs and A. There is therefore a limitation imposed upon A by its antecedent occasions. What is embodied in A discloses a hierarchy of eternal objects which are internally related in accordance with gradations explanatory of the causal relationship between A and its environment. The disclosure of A at the same time exhibits the actual world in which A is situated. Thus the internal relatedness of occasions is empirically explainable through occasion A. This internal relatedness, therefore, presupposes an even more general character of relatedness in the realm of eternal objects.[2] Hence: "It is this realized extension of eternal relatedness beyond the mutual relatedness of the actual occasions, which prehends into each occasion the full sweep of eternal relatedness."[3] And the eternal relatedness

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[1] E. R. Hughes, op. cit., p. 52.

[2] Whitehead, SMW, op. cit., pp. 246-50. [3] Ibid., p. 247.

in God's conceptual valuation is the ultimate metaphysical situation in the world. This is the ultimate limit in the sense that it is the "given" character of the world of which reason must take account. This nature is itself not an invention but the ground of reason:

> God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality.[1]

Li was conceived by Chu Hsi as the ground of experience. In this respect it is comparable to the primordial nature of God. However, there is a difference, in Whitehead, between eternal objects and God in that the former is ordered in the latter's conceptual valuation. This is the exclusive function belonging to the primordial nature of God even though this function could not be carried out without eternal objects. In Chu Hsi's system there is no such distinction between function between the universal Li and individual Li(s). Whereas individual Li(s) are the infinite ideas of Jen, the universal Li is the Ideal or the ultimate generality of Jen. The latter is inclusive of the former. But the universal Li does not imply a relevance of order within its own conception.[2] Its supremacy rests upon its ultimacy as the maximum aesthetic-ethic standard. "In the universe there is nothing higher than Li and hence the term Ruler."[3] This term "Ruler" refers to the aesthetic-ethic sovereignty of Li which each experience envisages. It does not have a logical or theoretical import as Whitehead's God has. Hence it cannot be conceived as "God" in Chu Hsi's system.

The fact that Li does somewhat resemble the status of God in the Western theology or philosophy, yet was not so conceived by Chu Hsi, shows that God as a metaphysical ideal is not an object of persistent rational inquiry in the Chinese thought.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 249-50. [2] Supra, pp. 71-72. [3] Supra, p. 73.

There is, however, another concept, Heaven or T'ien, whereby ideas are spontaneously ordered into the world. In some respect, Heaven resembles the consequent nature of God of Whitehead. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Knowledge

The Non-Conscious Perception

The apparent similarity between Whitehead's two levels of perception and Chu Hsi's notions of Hsin and Hsing will be the chief concern in the present section on knowledge.

Both causal efficacy and Hsin refer to the bodily feeling of the percipient as it responds to an object. This is the initial phase of knowing, which is only vaguely entertained as something obscure and haunting in the recess of thought or memory and as persisting in the body, awaiting articulation.

An acquaintance with Chu Hsi's prerequisite of Jen as the condition of knowing[1] would disclose the fact that the nature of man involving the polarity between Substantiality (實) and Emptiness (虛) conditions his theory. Such a nature of man, with its implications, requires that man return to the state of Jen, wherein he has an internal relation to reality. In this state he is said to be rid of his "desire for things" or "egoistic thought," and to be in the mood of openness. He is then internal to Nature. The key concept enabling one to relate to Nature in this way is Realness or Ch'eng (誠) which refers to the subject's teleological awareness of the universal Li.[2] Since the problem of knowing is initially conditioned by a special view of man and subsequently issues in man's ultimate destiny (to be discussed in the following chapter), there is, strictly speaking, no independent epistemology in Chu Hsi. Ontology, epistemology, and anthropology are inseparable in him. On the other hand, it

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[1] Supra, pp. 42-48.

[2] Supra, p. 46.

would be unfair to say that Chu Hsi does not have a particular view on knowing, as Chapter II of this study indicates. However, at the outset of our present inquiry, it is important to bear in mind that Chu Hsi's view on knowledge is pre-determined by his view of the experience of knowing which is perpetual and personal. This limits the scope and the character of knowledge in Chu Hsi's thought.

Whitehead's causal efficacy does not explicitly presuppose a special theory of man, though an explicit view of man can be developed on the basis of it. Neither does causal efficacy necessarily result in an almost exclusive concern for man's ultimate destiny such as occurs in Chu Hsi's doctrine of Hsin.[1] Thus in the initial situation on knowing, Whitehead, following the tradition of Western epistemological inquiry, is concerned with knowing the objective world. Underlying this inquiry is the assumption that, given an adequate procedure, the objective world can be known apart from an analysis of human nature. Although the doctrine of causal efficacy departs from the "sensationalist" view of knowing,[2] it nevertheless is the starting point toward a theory of knowledge in the objective sense.

Although there is an initial agreement between our philosophers concerning the basis of experience, there is a major difference between them as well. Whitehead formulates general ideas on the basis of causal feeling, in terms of which he criticizes and interprets special sciences as well as common experience. This means that these ideas have an objective basis apart from one's immediacy. Hence knowledge is objective. Whereas Chu Hsi's general ideas, though derived from Hsin, i.e., perception below the level of sense experience, are nevertheless particular and perceptual. This means these ideas are as much about the subject as about the world. In fact, in the final analysis, they are

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[1] Infra, pp. 192-96.

[2] Supra, pp. 98-99.

for the aesthetic-ethic entertainment of the subject rather than for the assurance of the objective world. Hence knowledge is subjective. As to how one might know the nature of Tao (the general character of the world), Chu Hsi said, "Turn to oneself and look into one's own life."[1]

However, at the outset, both men affirm the importance of the non-sensuous experience, thus rejecting the identity between mentality and experience and recognizing the a-rational aspect of knowing in experience.

Sensuous or Conscious Perception

A superficial comparison would disclose a resemblance between presentational immediacy, i.e., sense-perception of the contemporary object, and Hsing, i.e., the perceptual knowledge of the "other." Both are derived from non-sensuous perception. Both are subject to a process of internal experience involving the reception of the "given" into the subject and the final synthesis of feelings. For Whitehead, the unity of feelings is now projected into the contemporary object as the presented sensa. For Chu Hsi, the unity of feelings corresponds to the "perceptual essence" of the "other." Thus presentational objectification and Hsing both refer to the clear, selective, manageable, and derivatory perception of the contemporary object. Furthermore, both consider the final perception as being inherently emotive and subjective due to the process of integration in the percipient body through which the original datum was transmuted into a unity of experience. Thus an eternal object is embedded in subjective form; Li is embodied in emotion or Ch'ing (情).[2] Also the contemporary object is primarily viewed by both as an event rather than an "enduring object." For Whitehead, the sensa, representing the contemporary object, really refer to the contemporary actuality which is in fact in process.

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLV, p. 5a; Philosophy, p. 276.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 7b; Philosophy, p. 240.

Therefore, the "chair-image" is but the sensa representing the "real chair" which is in becoming. For Chu Hsi an "object" corresponds to an event rather than a sense-object. This is partly because the notion of a sense-object is not a conscious topic of epistemological investigation in the Chinese experience and partly because all things are viewed basically as Ch'i, i.e., experience-in-becoming.[1]

But presentational immediacy and Hsing are really not of the same nature. For presentational immediacy as a "pure" mode of perception refers primarily to the sense-object as "appearance" to the perceiver. It is an analysis of the nature of presented sensa or the phenomenal world. Hence Whitehead said:

> For instance, we see the contemporary chair, but we see it with our eyes; and we touch the contemporary chair, but we touch it with our hands. Thus colours objectify the chair in one way, and objectify the eyes in another way, as elements in the experience of the subject. Also touch objectifies the chair in one way, and objectifies the hands in another way, as elements in the experience of the subject. But the eyes and hands are in the past (the almost immediate past) and the chair is in the present.[2]

Thus the "withness" of eyes and hands refers to causal efficacy in the immediate past of the subject, sense-perception of the colors and the touch refer to the presented chair as a contemporary nexus.

On the other hand, Hsing does not refer primarily to the sense-data of the "object" as such--but to the integration of feelings. In other words, even in Hsing, as derived from Hsin, the subject's concern is a conscious entertainment of the derived feelings rather than the projection of these feelings into sensa. This means the "objectified" perception is treated more as an internal experience rather than as a presented object. This is why Chu Hsi said, in his description of the fourfold feeling of Jen, that one should be more concerned with the antecedent feelings of an experience, i.e., the derived intuition as

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[1] Supra, pp. 56-58. [2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

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[1] Supra, pp. 56-58. [2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

bodily feelings (肉體感覺) rather than the knowledge of the object as such.[1] This also explains why Master Chou, the founder of Neo-Confucianism, on seeing the grass outside his study, was delighted in the greenness of the grass resident in his body rather than in the greenness (sensum) of the grass out "there."[2] Hence the problem of the sense-object illustrated by sensa never becomes an important issue for Neo-Confucianism. Instead, the epistemological inquiry, if it may be so called, proceeds from a different direction, stressing the subjective entertaining of the objective event. Hence Hsing refers not so much to the objectification but to the internalization of the "known." This internal approach to knowing, in fact, is a natural consequence of the subject-"other" relation in Chinese experience. The "other," which the subject encounters, is still in becoming. It is the subjective, perceptual essence of the "other" which contains immediacy and livingness, and is intuited by the subject. The "objective essence" of the "other" cannot be the subject's concern, since it refers to sensa external to the subject. Thus Hsing is really an extension or amplification of Hsin. The main difference between them is: that Hsin points to the reception of the impressed, non-sensuous feeling of the "other" into the subject, while Hsing refers to the conscious description of the experience of reception.

It becomes apparent that the relation between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy and that between Hsin and Hsing are not identical in nature. One is from non-sensuous perception to its precipitation into objective sensa; the other is from non-sensuous perception to its intensification into an internal, conscious experience. Whereas symbolic reference ends with the presentation of the sense-object, the process from Hsin to Hsing ends with the entertainment of the "other" as subjective experience.

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[1] Supra, p. 44. [2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLVII, p. 15a; Philosophy, p. 338.

For Whitehead, causal efficacy intuits the generic features of experience. General ideas of metaphysics or sciences are derived from intuition. Hence, a scientific theory, if valid, must not be alien or external to immediate experience. But intuition or causal efficacy is not the basis of a scientific observation which requires the conscious selection of sense-data. This is the function of the five sense-organs. "In particular all exact scientific observation is derived from such data."[1] Thus such observation depends on presentational immediacy. Whereas intuition is non-sensuous, observation is sensuous. But scientific observation presupposes a "theory," i.e., some generic idea derived from intuition; or else it would have no basis for the selection of the relevant sense-data. Sense-perceptions, though derivative, are very important in Whitehead's theory of knowledge because they, being means of observing the objective nature of things, can either verify or correct a scientific theory. Thus apart from sense-perception, no theory can establish its objective or rational basis. Hence:

> The respective roles of the two perceptive modes in experience are aptly exemplified by the fact that all scientific observations, such as measurements, determinations of relative spatial position, determinations of sense-data such as colours, sounds, tastes, smells, temperature feelings, touch feeling, etc., are made in the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy; and that great care is exerted to keep this mode pure, that is to say, devoid of symbolic reference to causal efficacy. In this way accuracy is secured; in the sense that the direct observation is purged of all interpretation. On the other hand, all scientific theory is stated in terms referring exclusively to the scheme of relatedness, which, so far as it is observed, involves the percepta in the pure mode of causal efficacy. It thus stands out at once, that what we want to know about from the point of view either of curiosity or of technology, chiefly resides in those aspects of the world disclosed in causal efficacy; but what we can distinctly register is chiefly to be found among the percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy.[2]

For instance, the general notion of relatedness or the extensiveness of things is derived from immediate experience in the mode of causal efficacy. On the

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[1] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 289. [2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 257.

other hand, quantum physics through the observations of the functions of atoms discerns the vector nature of things or the transference of energy. Such discovery conforms to the notion of relatedness or the extensiveness of things.

In Whitehead's own case, the notion of relativity, being the central notion in his metaphysics, is derived from immediate experience. Through the observations of the extensive character of sensa as well as spatial relations of the contemporary things, he formulates the notion of "Extensive Continuum"[1] in order to elucidate the notion of relativity. In observing the sensa, he traces the way in which they are derived from a common past involving the immediate past of the contemporary nexus and the immediate past of the contemporary perceiver. Thus what constitutes the contemporary sensa are in fact derived from the antecedence of the contemporary nexus, the prehension of which is, however, derived from the antecedent bodily feelings of the contemporary subject through the historical routes of its various bodily-organs. Thus the antecedent occasions of both the contemporary nexus and the contemporary subject are "potentialities" for the becoming of a new actuality which is the contemporary subject now; and the antecedent occasions of the contemporary nexus are potentiality for the becoming of a new occasion which is the contemporary nexus to be. Thus from the observation of sensa, Whitehead is able to conceptualize the notion of Extensive Continuum which, as the general character of extensiveness of things, explains the causal feelings of relatedness.

Thus the analysis of sensa is dependent upon the observation of "appearance." Through this analysis, concepts are invented to delineate the way in which the "appearance" of things is derived from causal efficacy or feelings of the extensiveness of things. According to Whitehead, sensa are eternal objects of the "objective species."[2] This means they have a relational character;

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[1] Supra, pp. 103-05.

[2] Supra, pp. 113-14.

that is, they are relevant both to the original data received by the percipient through the mode of causal efficacy and to the sense-data objectified in the contemporary object through the mode of presentational immediacy. Because of the relational character of sensa, concepts referring to the objective world still retain their internal reference to the original data. Hence, for Whitehead, concepts applicable to the objective world must have an aboriginal reference to causal efficacy. This is the empirical basis of Whitehead's theory of knowledge.

Since Chu Hsi's Hsing refers to the conscious feeling of the original data rather than to the derived sensa, his theory of knowledge does not give emphasis to the observation of sense-perception in the objective world. Hence "scientific observation" is negligible. Chu Hsi's notion of T'i Wu (體物)--knowing the thing through one's body, or Chu Wu (即物)--immediate contact with the thing; and Ku Wu (格物)--acquaintance with the thing should be understood as referring to causal feeling from the "other".[1]

According to Chu Hsi, the generic ideas of the world are derived from immediate experience. Notions such as Jen, Yin and Yang, Hsin, or Ch'eng, are intuitively derived. But the elucidation of these ideas depends on Hsing or the second level of knowing.[2] Thus in the elucidation of the formal elements of the fourfold process of Jen (Subjectivity), "I" (Action), "Li" (Togetherness), and Chih (Co-ordinated Understanding), the non-conscious level of the fourfold process of Jen is disclosed: Sympathy (Self-relatedness), Guilt and Shame (Sensitivity), Social Obligation (Solidarity), and Better or Worse (Worth). This level of knowing is no other than the causal feeling of the relatedness of things in the Chinese experience.

Both Whitehead's notion of Extensive Continuum and Chu Hsi's description

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[1] Supra, pp. 48-49.

[2] Supra, pp. 54-55.

of the fourfold Jen refer to the objective world. Needless to say, there is a vast difference in character between them. One is derived from the scientific observations of the sense-objects in the contemporary world; the other is derived from intuitions alone. One describes the abstract character of the physical world; whereas the other describes the aesthetic-ethic character of the world.

Because of the internal relation between the sense-perception and the causal feeling of the percipient, not only is there a symbolic reference from causal efficacy to presentational immediacy, but also vice versa. Thus the more the sense-perception is discerned, in which case conceptual reversion may be involved, the more is the antecedent feeling illuminated. To this extent there is a deepening as well as an intensification of subjective-valuation. This means knowledge of the sense-object does contribute to the self-understanding of the subject. On the other hand, presentational immediacy, considered by itself, is a "pure" mode. The sensa, apart from referring to the causal feeling in the subject, are nevertheless "there" in virtue of the "abrupt" ingression of the eternal object.[1] Because of the ingression of the sensa, the object is determined--a fact for prehension. For this reason sensa are the basis of objective knowledge.

Since that which is understood to be the "other" is primarily the elucidation of the aesthetic-ethic feeling of the subject apart from which the "other" has no meaning, there is no objective knowledge in the Western sense for Chu Hsi. Knowledge concerning the "other" is unalterably subjective; it must not be confused with scientific or theoretic knowledge in the Western sense. The quest for knowing is motivated by an urge to discipline one's life and conduct. Thus "knowledge" must be understood in the practical sense.

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[1] Whitehead, SMW, op. cit., pp. 246-47.

Once the basic difference concerning knowing between these two philosophers is pointed out, their converging points as well as their basic agreement on the importance of immediate feeling may be mentioned. The points of contact may be seen between Whitehead's propositional feeling and Chu Hsi's notion of Tao or the relation between Hsing and Li. A propositional feeling refers to the logical subjects which are the concrete facts constituting the actual world of the subject.[1] Thus a proposition arises from an environment in which the subject is situated. The subject and his actual world constitute the presented locus for the subject. The presented locus presupposes a common inheritance between the actual world and the subject. This means there is an internal relation between them, determining the particular perspective which is the locus of the subject. Thus a Whiteheadean proposition is relativistic; it begins with the observation of a set of facts viewed from a perspective:

> A proposition can employ partial truth because it only demands a certain type of systematic environment, which is presupposed in its meaning. It does not refer to the universe in all its detail.[2]

Therefore Whitehead rejects the prevalent view that a proposition speaks of a universal truth solely on the basis of its logical validity. Such a view of a proposition is quite in line with Chu Hsi's, or the Chinese way of knowing which gives a persistent emphasis upon the derivation of knowing from the experience which constitutes the subject. The following passage is but an example:

> The Master said: the term Tao [i.e., knowledge] is used in a universal sense, the term Hsing is used in the subjective sense. How do we know that Tao does exist among things [i.e., in the external world]? Simply by our experience of it here [i.e., by seeking it in our subjective knowledge]. Wherever Hsing is, there is Tao. Tao is Li as we find it in the external world; Hsing is Li as we find it in ourselves. But Li(s) which we find in the external world are all comprehended in Li which is myself. Hsing is the basis of Tao.[3]

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[1] Supra, p. 120.

[2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 17.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, p. 9b; Philosophy, pp. 23-24.

A Whiteheadean proposition, at least in its primary phase, is not an analysis of the logical validity of a statement, but the entertainment of a propositional feeling, beginning with the subject's indicative feeling of the logical subjects or concrete facts. This phase of propositional feeling corresponds to the causal efficacy of the subject. It is followed by a conceptual feeling whose datum is an eternal object predicating the meaning of the logical subjects. This whole process, according to Whitehead, is more of an emotional than of an intellectual nature.[1] The datum of a proposition, i.e., the eternal object, functions as a lure for feeling in the subject. "The subjective forms of propositional feelings are dominated by valuation, rather than by consciousness."[2] This domination is attributed in part to the bodily feelings caused by the prehension of the nexus of concrete facts and in part to the transmutation of these feelings, through the various physical organisms, in the body. Hence the predicative pattern of the proposition, which is but the unity of perception now projected into the nexus of the logical subjects, is intimately related to the physical feelings of the subject. This also explains why the truth of a proposition should be concerned with "interest,"[3] that is, an increase of intensity in and a sense of "importance" to the subject. The place of emotion is even recognized in an intellectual feeling (judgment), for an intellectual feeling is the outcome of the integration of a subsequent conceptual feeling with the primitive feeling of the subject.[4]

It is apparent that there is a subjective or personal aspect of truth in Whitehead's theory of propositions even though he firmly holds that truth is objective, i.e., corresponds to concrete facts outside of the subject. This

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[1] Supra, pp. 122-23.

[2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 402.

[3] Supra, pp. 122-23.

[4] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 416.

aspect of truth would be easily understood by Chu Hsi. A typical passage on truth is as follows:

> The Philosopher said further: Shao Yao Fu [a contemporary of the Ch'eng Brothers] said, 'Hsing [subjective knowledge] is the concrete expression of Tao [knowledge of external things], and Hsin [subjective feeling] is the container [i.e., the physical basis] of Hsing.' This is well said, for Tao in itself is without concrete expression; it finds it in Hsing. But if there were no Hsin where could Hsing be? There must be Hsin in order to carry out the principles in man.[1]

Thus knowledge of the external world is generated from one's immediate experience. Such knowledge refers back to one's fourfold feeling of Jen at the causal level:

> Master Ch'eng [Ch'eng I] put it well when he said, 'Hsing is Li [the subjective knowledge is the knowledge of the eternal world.]' Now, concerning Li, we know it is without a physical appearance. It is but the principles of things. In man his principles are known through his acquaintance with Jen [Love,] "I" [Right Action], "Li" [Solidarity] and Chih [Co-ordinated Understanding], which are man's knowledge of himself. But these four notions by themselves have no physical appearance; they are but principles. Because of these principles, man is able to do many things. Hence there are in him the feeling of sympathy, the sense of guilt and shame, the feeling of social obligation, and the sense of better or worse.[2]

Since truth has a subjective aspect, the verification of truth, in the last analysis, also requires an emphasis on the subject. This is seen in the implication of Whitehead's "correspondence theory" of truth,[3] according to which the ingression of an eternal object into a nexus of occasions takes an abrupt character. This means the individual essence of the eternal object, by virtue of ingression, is just what it is; it is a finite, definite concept breaking off from infinite possibilities. Hence the embodied eternal object corresponds to the nexus of actual occasions (logical subjects). This is the objective aspect of truth. On the other hand, the mode of ingression varies

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 6b-7a; Philosophy, p. 18.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLII, pp. 6b-7a; Philosophy, pp. 17-18.

[3] Whitehead, SMW, op. cit., pp. 247-48; Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 290-91.

in accordance with the subjective form derived from the causal feeling between the occasions and the subject. This subjective form undergoes further changes and modifications in the progressive synthesis of feelings, the result of which is the final ingression of the eternal object. The understanding of truth corresponding to the nexus of occasions is nonetheless derived from the bodily feelings of the subject. Thus truth is known through the presented locus in which the body of the subject is a dominant factor. Hence the verification of truth requires the reference of it back to the percipient body which has inherited this truth from its immediate past. This process involves an observation of the effects of this experience in the subject, to determine whether or not by virtue of this experience the subject has inherited a greater "satisfaction," hence intensity, as the basis for the reception of another experience. This also means the reference of truth to the subject is a relation of appearance (truth) to reality (the objectification of experience as the datum for prehension). Hence the verification of truth is a truth-relation, relating the truth to the subject. Thus truth for Whitehead has a pragmatic implication.

In the beginning of the section it was said that Chu Hsi's chief concern with the problem of knowing is for the enhancement of man's life and conducts. A description of Tao, or truth of the "other," is also an elucidation of the aesthetic-ethic meaning of the "other." This, in turn, generates aesthetic-ethic awareness in the subject. Hence what is said about the "other" reflects the condition of the knower. Thus for Chu Hsi, the only way of verifying Tao is through an intuitive reflection of the subject, to see whether or not his self-understanding has quickened his aesthetic-moral sensitivity. Accordingly, knowledge for Chu Hsi is thoroughly pragmatic.

Philosophical Knowledge

For Whitehead, philosophy, in the sense of metaphysics, is the elucidation of a set of most general ideas which transcend and yet are exemplified in different areas of intellectual as well as common experience. Whereas each intellectual field deals with less general ideas within the bound of a special area of experience, philosophy is concerned with the most general ideas which are applicable to the criticism of the less general ideas of the respective disciplines, and which provide a metaphysical basis to the respective fields. But, how are these most general ideas derived? They are derived from immediate experience or intuition. For Whitehead there are elements in immediate experience which are "stable"[1] though vaguely felt. They can be discovered and distilled out of the mass of immediacy. On the other hand, conscious experience, through the method of difference, is selective, dealing with the "unstable" facts of experience. But metaphysics is the search for the generic features in experience. These features are exemplified in every actual entity.

As Whitehead said, philosophy begins with immediate experience: "The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience."[2] But how can one begin with the "analytic observation of components of this experience"? One begins with an intuitive grasp of, or an insight into, some idea of a generic nature. Such an idea is "self-evident," i.e., serving as a "premise" in philosophy.[3] It is then applied in some special area of intellectual concern to see whether or not it is illustrated by the said discipline. In order to test its universal applicability, this idea

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[1] Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 44-45.

[2] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 6. [3] Whitehead, MT, op. cit., pp. 143-45.

is further put into application in another area of special discipline. This process of testing the applicability of an idea from one field to another till its universal applicability is ascertained is called the method of imaginative rationalization or descriptive generalization.[1] It is the method of speculation. At the same time the elucidation of this idea in the various fields of inquiry is the disclosure of its universal applicability; a first principle. In this way, a set of mutually interdependent ideas are established and verified as metaphysical principles. While most general, they are at the same time present in each and every experience. These stable, universal and interdependent ideas are therefore the basis of a philosophical scheme whereby experience is interpreted.

As we can see, Whitehead's philosophical method does not follow the traditional logical deduction of the West. According to the deductive method, the "postulates" (Northrop) from which the first principles are deduced are not derived from immediate experience, but from constructed theorems.[2] This means the postulates are conceptual in nature; their objectivity is based upon the inference of logical or scientific construction of thought.[3] On the other hand, Whitehead's first principles are derived from intuition or immediate experience. The implication in the difference between the two is: For the deductive method, in order to be adequate, objects of knowledge, the immediately perceived things must be inferred through a system of concepts which is only indirectly known to us through its logically deduced consequence.[4] Hence

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 7-8, 15-16.

[2] Northrop, "The Complementary Emphasis of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy," op. cit., p. 173.

[3] Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, op. cit., p. 295.

[4] Ibid., pp. 294-300.

immediate experience, apart from the deduced concepts, have no objective meaning for philosophy. On the other hand, for Whitehead, a theory or an hypothesis is directly intuited, provided it is subject to a vigorous test of application in experience.

Chu Hsi's philosophical ideas, such as Hsin, Yin and Yang, Jen, are the basic notions in Chinese experience. In fact, they cannot be understood apart from an intuitive grasp of experience peculiar to the Chinese. These notions are generic in the sense that they are present as permanent features in each and every experience within the Chinese tradition.

Whereas Whitehead's first principles have scientific import in that they are applicable to physical science, mathematics, theology, art, literature, sociology, etc., this certainly cannot be said of Chu Hsi's ideas. These ideas appeared individually in different books of the Confucian Classics as well as Yi King long before Chu Hsi's time. But it was through him that they were organized into coherent ideas for the interpretation of experience. They are first intuited as basic notions characterizing the nature of man; then employed to describe the nature of experience; then amplified to describe the different levels of beings on the basis of the description of experience; and, finally, generalized into the nature of Heaven (T'ien) as the ultimate pan-psychical reality. This method of description which relies on the application of metaphysical ideas is what I elsewhere called "participational generalization."[1]

In spite of the difference in the extent of application and in the scope of meaning between Whitehead's and Chu Hsi's generic ideas, there is a common ground, that is, the derivation of first principles from immediate experience and the application of them on different levels of experience. In

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[1] Supra, pp. 55-56.

this regard these two men, regardless of their difference in training and background, are in one accord in opposition to the method of deduction in philosophy.

Religious Knowledge

Whitehead's meaning of the term religion may be discerned by a reading of the following long but enlightening passage:

> Religion should connect the rational generality of philosophy with the emotions and purposes springing out of existence in a particular epoch, and conditioned by particular antecedents. Religion is the translation of general ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes; it is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity. Philosophy finds religion, and modifies it; and conversely, religion is among the data of experience which philosophy must weave into its own scheme. Religion is an ultimate craving to infuse into the insistent particularity of emotion that non-temporal generality which primarily belongs to conceptual thought alone. In the higher organisms the differences of tempo between the mere emotions and the conceptual experiences produces a life-tedium, unless this supreme fusion has been effected. The two sides of the organism require a reconciliation in which emotional experiences illustrate a conceptual justification, and conceptual experiences find an emotional illustration.[1]

The recurrent theme in this passage, as well as other passages in Whitehead's writings on the same subject, is the tension between the conceptual ideas constituting the essence of philosophy and the particular emotions, purposes, and communities constituting the essence of religion. In the generic sense, religion is concerned with particularity--particular feelings, tradition, and persons. Thus the basis of religion is rooted in the mode of causal efficacy. On the other hand, generically speaking, philosophy is concerned with generality --conceptual ideas applicable to experience of different fields. Although these ideas are originally derived from immediate experience, as generic features their chief function is to interpret the observed data in different fields of experience. This means the object of philosophy is "appearance" or conscious experience. To this extent, philosophical ideas are in one accord with concepts of physical sciences in their appropriation of sense-objects. For the purpose

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 23.

of differentiation, it can be said that whereas religion is chiefly concerned with causal efficacy, hence reality, philosophy is chiefly concerned with presented sensa, hence "appearance."

But the distinction described above is one of explanation only. In fact, religious knowledge and philosophical knowledge are inseparable. The particularities of religion must be identified, clarified, and interpreted into rational thought so that they may be found upon a rational ground. Otherwise, these particularities would be elements of mere private entertainment for the gratification of emotions only. Therefore, religion must employ metaphysical ideas in order to explain the universality of its particularity. Hence, "Rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special occasions, and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions."[1] Thus, "Religion is centered upon the harmony of rational thought with the sensitive reaction to the percepta from which experience originates."[2] On the other hand, philosophy in interpreting experience of all sorts, must not ignore or neglect religion as data of experience. When conceptual ideas and immediate experience are dissociated and made mutually exclusive, each would be struck with "life-tedium."

Needless to say, Whitehead's view of religion presupposes a separate field of philosophy and religion respectively. One is not the other. On the other hand, a tension is held within religious knowledge in which particularities are given a rational meaning and rational meaning is supported by feelings and emotions.

Insofar as the different sciences are chiefly concerned with the

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[1]Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), p. 32.

[2]Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 24.

objectified data of the respective fields, and inasmuch as the first principles interpret and criticize the findings of the sciences, Whitehead's metaphysical ideas have a conceptual or theoretical import. We may say that these principles have both the "formal" and "objective" characters. The "formal" refers to the subjective, internal, and immediate aspect of experience. This is the perceptual quality of Whitehead's metaphysical ideas. The "objective" refers to the objective, external, and mediate aspect of experience. This is the conceptual quality of his metaphysical ideas.

Though Whitehead does not identify religious knowledge with the "formal" character of his metaphysical ideas, there is a definite connection between them in that they both participate in causal feelings. But this aspect of experience, which religion acknowledges, must be treated as an "object" of inquiry. This means there is the need to employ the "objective" character of the metaphysical ideas in order to give a conceptual account to the emotive experience of religion.

It has been said that Chu Hsi's metaphysical ideas are thoroughly perceptual in character. There is no conceptual import in them, for they are not employed to interpret data of scientific or sense experience. Even in a rational elucidation of the metaphysical ideas, what is described never becomes an object in the Western sense. This means immediacy and subjectivity are always retained in the generalization of the non-sensuous experience. Thus the subject is never "alienated" from the content of description. If by "concept" is meant a theory applicable to scientific data, there is literally no concept in Chu Hsi's thinking.

Since Chu Hsi's metaphysical ideas are both general and particular, rational and emotional, the procedure of attributing the particular and the emotional to religion and the general and rational to metaphysics, such as

objectified data of the respective fields, and inasmuch as the first principles interpret and criticize the findings of the sciences, Whitehead's metaphysical ideas have a conceptual or theoretical import. We may say that these principles have both the "formal" and "objective" characters. The "formal" refers to the subjective, internal, and immediate aspect of experience. This is the perceptual quality of Whitehead's metaphysical ideas. The "objective" refers to the objective, external, and mediate aspect of experience. This is the conceptual quality of his metaphysical ideas.

Though Whitehead does not identify religious knowledge with the "formal" character of his metaphysical ideas, there is a definite connection between them in that they both participate in causal feelings. But this aspect of experience, which religion acknowledges, must be treated as an "object" of inquiry. This means there is the need to employ the "objective" character of the metaphysical ideas in order to give a conceptual account to the emotive experience of religion.

It has been said that Chu Hsi's metaphysical ideas are thoroughly perceptual in character. There is no conceptual import in them, for they are not employed to interpret data of scientific or sense experience. Even in a rational elucidation of the metaphysical ideas, what is described never becomes an object in the Western sense. This means immediacy and subjectivity are always retained in the generalization of the non-sensuous experience. Thus the subject is never "alienated" from the content of description. If by "concept" is meant a theory applicable to scientific data, there is literally no concept in Chu Hsi's thinking.

Since Chu Hsi's metaphysical ideas are both general and particular, rational and emotional, the procedure of attributing the particular and the emotional to religion and the general and rational to metaphysics, such as

Whitehead does, could not have been anticipated by Chu Hsi. What Whitehead conceives to be the genesis of religion, i.e., the particularity of feelings and emotions, is already provided in Chu Hsi's metaphysics. Hence the need for a religion is satisfied in his metaphysics. And there is no demand for a religion in contrast to philosophy in Chu Hsi's cultural situation. (Buddhism is viewed by Chu Hsi as a "metaphysics.") For the same reason, the notion of a rational religion consisting of a tension between metaphysics and religion could not have been anticipated by him either.

CHAPTER X

FREEDOM AND HUMAN FULFILLMENT

Freedom

Freedom in Terms of Efficient and Final Causes

Whitehead's notions on freedom appear chiefly in two discussions: (1) on the doctrine of contemporary entities, and (2) on the category of freedom and determination.

Although the doctrine of contemporary entities implies time and cause, it also exhibits the theoretical basis of ontological freedom.[1] As has been said, Whitehead's understanding of time is based on the meaning of change[2] and is closely related to the concept of cause. Change refers to the difference between the antecedent and succeeding atomistic occasions. Time refers to the temporal sequence of occasions in a personal society viewed asymmetrically, that is, from the antecedent to the inherited occasion.[3] Upon this meaning of time the notion of cause is based in Whitehead's metaphysics. Thus what constitutes the "given" is the efficient cause of the subject. The final resultant of the concrescent subject, i.e., its objectification, is, in turn, an efficient cause of the succeeding occasion by being received as the datum of the latter. It is apparent that both time and efficient cause refer to the manner of changes or differences among the atomistic occasions in the temporal sequence. Since these occasions are "objects" or "appearances" of things, to that extent

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[1] Whitehead, AI, op. cit., p. 255. [2] Supra, p. 133. [3] Ibid.

both time and efficient cause are concepts referring to the "public" world.

In the doctrine of contemporary entities the notion of time or efficient cause is not directly involved in that, though these occasions presuppose a common past and move toward a common future, as contemporaries each enjoys its own "process" or "becoming" without being conditioned by the other. In other words, not being in the past or future of one another, hence lacking efficient cause, the contemporary occasions are free from mutual involvement, each enjoying its own subjective, private experience. This means each is dominated by a final cause with respect to its subjective aim. And a final cause is the essence of freedom. A contemporary occasion is therefore in a "private" world. It is a subject aiming at its own self-creation. It is not in physical time since it is free from efficient cause. On the other hand, the enjoyment of privacy does not result in mutual isolation. For contemporary occasions share a "unison of becoming."[1] They are nevertheless a community of concrescence by virtue of their unison of immediacy.

Chu Hsi's notion of Hsin, in the ontological context, discloses the alternative process of Yin and Yang in the percipient.[2] The alternative process of Yin and Yang exhibits the fourfold process of Jen. Thus Hsin, Yang and Yin, and Jen imply the self-creation of an experience. Both the doctrine of contemporary occasions and the notion of Hsin imply self-creation explicating ontological freedom. However, once this is admitted, differences in freedom between these two men inevitably loom. The remaining section will be a description of the meaning and function of freedom in the system of each man respectively.

Freedom understood as final cause is not complete in Whitehead's

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 189. [2] Supra, pp. 64-65, 85.

philosophy until it is related to efficient cause. This is seen in the following category:

> The Category of Freedom and Determination. The concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally free.
>
> This category can be condensed into the formula, that in each concrescence whatever is determinable is determined, but that there is always a remainder for the decision of the subject-superject of that concrescence. This subject-superject is the universe in that synthesis, and beyond it there is non-entity. This final decision is the reaction of the unity of the whole to its own internal determination. The reaction is the final modification of emotion, appreciation, and purpose. But the decision of the whole arises out of the determination of the parts, so as to be strictly relevant to it.[1]

According to this category, what is received and felt in the concrescent subject is internally determined. The subjective form of the received datum is the initial constituent determining the concrescent process. The particularity of the subjective form is due to the reception or the inheritance of the datum. Thus the datum conditions the concrescence. This is the initial meaning of "internally determined" or "whatever is determinable is determined." But efficient cause is not the whole matter in the concrescence because of the presence of a subjective aim. The function of a subjective aim is to respond and to adjust the internally determined form (or forms, since a subjective form undergoes continual adjustments) in terms of subjective needs, interests, and purpose. This function is the final cause of the subject, which directs the determinant toward a final synthesis. Thus in regard to the possibility of decision-making, the subject is "externally free." However, selection among alternative possibilities is limited since it is based upon the internal determinants of the subject. On the other hand, the possibility of choice is a real fact in the subject. Regardless of the limited choice, this total reaction toward the internally determinated is a final decision which terminates the process and "cuts off" the completely given from negative and alternative

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

possibilities, thus making it an exclusive act in the face of the world. Freedom as an "outcome" is absolute, for what is decided is unalterable. But freedom as a "function" is "relative"; it depends on the "given" which is the real potentiality of the subject.

Insofar as the final act is a total reaction to the internally determined, it is an aesthetic-valuational response to the concrescent process, hence an expression of responsibility toward the subject. Insofar as the final act is an objectification, it is being experienced as a determinant in the constituent of another actual entity, hence as an expression of responsibility toward the world. Thus superject is the foundation of morality and freedom:

> Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate experience is most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final decision of the immediate subject-superject, constituting the ultimate modification of subjective aim, is the foundation of our experience of responsibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-reproach, of freedom, of emphasis.[1]

It is apparent that, according to the above description of the category of freedom and determination, efficient and final causes are internally related, mutually enhancing. Efficient cause is the base from which final cause arises. Hence the strength, as well as the aim, of the final cause is dependent on an adequate appropriation of the initial given, since the origination of feelings, which elicits conceptual valuations, is derived from the datum. This means "real potentiality" determines the relative freedom of the subject. On the other hand, once final cause is achieved in terms of "satisfaction," it, in turn, is an efficient cause by being objectified in an emergent occasion. Thus the degree of "satisfaction" determines the real potentiality of the succeeding occasion.

The internal relation of these two modes of causation is in fact another way of stating the ontological principle which:

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., p. 74.

> . . . could also be termed the 'principle of efficient, and final, causation.' This ontological principle means that actual entities are the only reasons; so that to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities. It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitution' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process.[1]

Thus the "real internal constitution" of an actual entity, as fully determined, is the efficient cause of the concrescent process in question, and the "subjective aim," directing the process, issues into a decision which is a creation causa sui. It is apparent that the ontological principle is explanatory of the mutual enhancement of these two modes of causation in an experience.

The joint relevance between the ontological principle and the category of freedom and determination shows the universal presence of the two modes of causation in all actualities. Even the lowest form of occasions, dominated by conformal feeling, enjoys final cause through "appetition" or urge toward conformation to inheritance. "Appetition" is nonetheless a valuation. Hence there is no vacuous, valueless, physical existence. In the higher form of occasions, final cause issues into novelty (conceptual reversion)[2] which accounts for evolution in the world. On the basis of the mutual enhancement of the two modes of causation, Whitehead attacks modern physical sciences' rejection of final cause and their exclusive emphasis upon efficient cause. On the other hand, Whitehead does not deny the importance of efficient causation in sciences but wants final causation to be recognized by them. In this way, physical existence, which inescapably results in inertia, can be explained in terms of efficient causation; and mental origination, which elicits valuation, can be explained in terms of final causation. Thus the polar elements of decay and evolution are both taken into account.[3]

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[1] Whitehead, PR, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

[2] Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929), p. 24. [Hereafter abbreviated as FR.]

[3] Ibid., p. 23.

Whitehead himself admitted that his ascription of final cause to the material universe was not derived from direct scientific observation; for the general operation of the mysterious upward impulse of the universe is veiled from our observation.[1] It is derived partly, however, from an intuition into the human body which is analogous to the physical cosmos, and partly from a general understanding of the history of the physical universe.[2] It is his conviction that, in attributing final causation to the universe, the efficient causation can be more imaginatively, or constructively, explained; thereby the narrowness of scientific method may be transcended. Thus without doing damage to the physical sciences, his correlation of the two modes of causation is a great re-construction of the Newtonian world-view exemplified in the philosophy of Immanual Kant, in which there is a radical separation between the phenomenal world, the object of science, dominated by efficient causation, and the noumenal world, the object of human spirit, dominated by final causation.

For the purpose of analysis, and without violating the organic relation of these two modes of causation, we may associate the function of efficient cause with "objects" or "objectification" and the function of final cause with "subjects" or "satisfaction."

Freedom in Terms of Yang and Yin

In considering the implication of freedom in Chu Hsi's thought, we may begin by recapitulating the meaning of the alternation of Yang and Yin. Yang refers to the extensive activities of the subject whereby the latter becomes related to the "other." Yin refers to the intensive activities of the subject whereby the latter contracts its received feelings by synthesizing them into a unity of experience. Thus, on the surface, there is something like the

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[1] Ibid., p. 19. [2] Ibid.

"efficient cause" in Yang, and the "final cause" in Yin. There is a similarity, therefore, between Whitehead's ontological principle and Chu Hsi's principle of Yang and Yin. Just as the former is illustrated by every actual occasion, so is the latter exemplified by every instance of Ch'i. An occasion discloses the concrescence which is the subject. An instance of Ch'i discloses the fourfold process of Jen, which is Hsin or the percipient. As Whitehead's subject is directed by its subjective aim, moving toward "satisfaction," so Chu Hsi's Hsin is directed by Ch'eng, or a teleological awareness, moving toward Hsing.

But Chu Hsi's alternative principle of Yang and Yin does not imply a doctrine of objectification. Hsin does not begin with an objectified datum as a constituent in its internal process. Hsin begins with Emptiness. This means there is no objectification in it. It begins de novo.

The Emptiness of Hsin means literally the emptying of the previously enjoyed experience--good or bad. This radical demand is based on a Neo-Confucian "epistemological" presupposition which holds that the possession of a realized experience is a hindrance to the reception of an in-coming experience.[1] When Hsin is, in the initial situation, so possessed, it is then "externalized"[2] (有外之心); meaning it can no longer function as a Yang-Yin process because there is a barrier between the "other" and the subject, hence the "essence" of the "other" cannot be experienced. This is the reason why Hsin should be empty. Emptiness implies an attitude of "openness"[3] (廓然大公), whereby a teleological awareness is elicited. It is this awareness which enables one to meet the "other" in a spontaneous encounter, without which nothing is truly experienced.[4]

Since Yang or the extensive activities of Hsin do not imply an objectification, there is no function of efficient cause in it. However, a question

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[1] Supra, p. 44. [2] Supra, p. 43. [3] Ibid. [4] Supra, p. 47.

could be raised as to the status of the "other" into which the subject enters. Can it be considered as the "efficient cause"? It may be recalled that the "other," like the subject, is in becoming. Hence it is not an "object." The relation between the "other" and the subject is one of spontaneous encounter. Unlike Whitehead's subject-object relation, it does not involve categories of causation.

As has been said, the final synthesis of the process under the function of Yin seems to resemble the final cause. Whitehead stresses two aspects of final causes: One is the gradual modification of feelings under the guide of subjective aim. This is the "private" function of the subject. The other is the actualization of an idea by virtue of which a decision is made. This is the "public" function of the subject. Of the two, the latter is more important because it is through the decision that an experience is made determinative--hence a datum for prehension. In Chu Hsi's thought, it is the "private" function of the subject which is dominant in Yin. The "public" function of the subject is not stressed in view of the fact that experience as a decision is not his concern. The determinateness of an experience, at most, amounts to an "internal decision"; it is not a decision for prehension. Since a definite experience has no final status, no final cause can be attributed to Yin. Freedom as an expression of self-exertion or self-recognition is not found in Chu Hsi.

Whitehead's two modes of causation must be viewed against the background of Western philosophy or theology in which there has been a polemic between physical sciences and metaphysics. This polemic is best illustrated by the modern philosophy of idealism in which there is a dichotomy between Nature and Freedom. On the other hand, in Chu Hsi's cultural background no such polemic exists. Since there have been no physical sciences exemplifying a

theoretical discipline in traditional China, efficient causation was never elevated into a philosophical problem. Likewise, neither could the notion of a final cause be consciously formulated since the absence of efficient causation would render such a task unnecessary.

It is evident that Whitehead's meaning of freedom in terms of final cause does not correspond to what Chu Hsi implies by freedom. Freedom for him is not an achievement. It is rather a mode of living according to the alternative rhythm of Emptiness and Substantiality. In Emptiness, the subject does not possess a determinateness of feeling. It is a state of Wu-Wei or undifferentiation. In this mood, Hsin is said to be able to penetrate into the body of the "other"[1] (置心在物中). Once the perceptual meaning of the "other" is grasped, the subject is said to be in Substantiality. This is the state of Yu-Wei or differentiation. According to Chu Hsi, the "aliveness" of Hsin is equivalent to its "openness."[2] This means whenever Hsin is possessed by "egoistic desire," it is "dead." Therefore, in order to maintain its life the percipient must renounce the previously enjoyed experience. Hence: "When Hsin is attracted by an external event, it needs to be attentive to it. But when the event has been dealt with, Hsin must not continue to busy itself with it."[3]

Freedom for Chu Hsi is therefore radical in contrast to that of Whitehead. It is radical in two senses: (1) It does not presuppose the determinateness of a past. Hence it transcends time or the causal chain of history. (2) It refers to an experience ending in self-negation. This act of renunciation is the refusal to be "objectified" or "dead." For the possession of an experience objectified is equivalent to the loss of the immediacy of the subject.

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[1] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 12b; Philosophy, p. 180.

[2] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 9b; Philosophy, p. 173.

[3] Chu Hsi, Bk. XLIV, p. 9a; Philosophy, p. 172.

This loss is the "death" of the subject in the metaphysical sense. Thus freedom in the sense of renunciation transcends "death." A life according to the cyclical rhythm of Yang and Yin is one of perpetual immediacy in which time or death is overcome. Freedom of this kind stands at the opposite pole to that of Whitehead. The latter presupposes a definiteness of time and issues into objectification which is but another definiteness of time. It is evident that for one, time is the obstruction of freedom; for the other it is its basis.

Human Fulfillment

In this section our concern is to make explicit some of the metaphysical implications of the respective philosophies insofar as they give meaning to the status and destiny of man in each system. Within this context, our central theme is a comparison between freedom in terms of creativity and freedom in terms of Jen.

Life as Conceptual Reversion

For Whitehead, the essence of life is conceptual reversion.[1] Hence an organism characterized by mere conformal feeling lacks life. This also means that life demands self-transcendence over mere repetition of the past even if the past involves previous conceptual reversion. Thus a certain degree of discontinuity or breaking away from the past is essential to life.

On the other hand, conceptual reversion must be grounded in the initial physical datum. The past is nevertheless prehended as a physical datum. This is the basis of conformal feeling. But the positive prehension of the physical datum also involves a negative prehension in that the irrelevant physical feelings are eliminated from the initial datum in order to gain a perspective for the subject. Thus the derivation of the objective datum from the initial datum

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[1] Supra, pp. 149-50.

requires a negative prehension. Conceptual reversion occurs when a secondary conceptual feeling originates from the content in the objective datum. The datum of this conceptual feeling is an eternal object of a more complex nature, which is partly affinitive to and partly diverse from the eternal object embodied in the objective datum. Thus there is a contrast in the concrescence between the envisaged idea and the embodied content. This contrast generates conscious experience. Since the secondary conceptual feeling is derived from the objective datum, the subject, in receiving the "reverted" idea, nevertheless affirms its objective datum. But the objective datum is now transcended by the reception of the "reverted" idea in the new subject. Thus conceptual reversion retains the subjective forms of the original physical feelings. The emotions generating from this adjustment of aim are also retained in the subject. It is the intensity of these subjective forms which provides ground for the reception of the "reverted" idea. This means conceptual reversion must appropriate the feelings of the earlier phase of concrescence, which are derived from the original physical feelings of the datum. Thus there is a continuity from the past.

Man, in the initial situation, is bound to a conformal feeling of his "actual world" from which he arises. The "actual world" is the inheritance of his past in the present; it is also, in part, the inheritance of the past of the environment in which he is situated since his past and that of the environment often share in the same "presented locus."[1] This also means that his "actual world" is a nexus of actualities dislosing his "relational essence."

Due to the hybrid physical feeling in man, he has a tendency to treat his "actual world" in the same way he treats his past "actual world." This results in a mere reproduction of the past in the present. A prolonging of it

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[1] Supra, p. 115.

would end life in boredom and inertia. Sin, therefore, is man's refusal to allow the hybrid physical feeling to transcend his "actual world." The only way to deliver him from it is through conceptual reversion initiated by a negative prehension of the attainment of his past. The feelings and emotions about, as well as the repudiation of, the conformed idea provide motivation for his mental pole to conceive of an idea which is partly identical with and partly different from the conformed idea. The final incarnation of the reverted idea therefore is the actualization of his life now as a total response to his past. The reverted idea discloses the way in which the many determinate feelings in him are directed toward their synthesis. The final synthesis of feelings constitutes his "individual essence" which is a unique creation.

Since the essence of life is conceptual reversion, the degree of man's freedom or creativity is in proportion to the degree of man's ability for self-transcendence. The depth of conceptual reversion is dependent on an organic relation between the early valuation of the physical feelings and one's subsequent conceptual feeling originating from the primary phase of valuation. This means there is a close fusion of the mental and the physical in man as he actualizes an experience. Thus, although such an act is dependent on the mentality of man, yet his mentality is nevertheless derived from his physical feelings. On the other hand, inasmuch as man's physical feelings need to be interpreted by mind, mentality is the final function of self-transcendence. Hence the degree of freedom is closely associated with the degree of mentality. But due to the anarchic tendency of mentality[1] it can do either of two things to disrupt the organic relation of the mental and physical poles of man: it can adhere to the primary physical feelings by subjugating them to the conformal feeling of the past, or it can dissociate itself from its physical

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[1]Whitehead, FR, op. cit., p. 27.

basis through distortion or abstraction. In either case, there is a denial of conceptual reversion, hence an impediment to man's creativity.

Whereas man cannot expect to experience novelty in every decision he makes, it is nevertheless true that whenever conceptual reversion does occur, it is an act of creativity. Subjectively, it brings a high degree of satisfaction. Objectively, it is now a determinate fact exerting its influence upon himself as well as others. These two aspects of man, namely, satisfaction and objectification, are the locus in which the "individual essence" of man is actualized. The former indicates the way in which he is responsible for himself and the latter indicates the way he is responsible for others.

The evidence of man's freedom is objectification whereby an experience is determined. Through the concatenation of objectification, in the temporal sequence, there is the reiteration of freedom, which is also a characterization of one's creativity.

Objectification discloses the fact of objective immortality with regard to human experience. A determined experience implies the immanence of one's past in it. Hence the value created in one's past is "alive" by virtue of being appropriated by the immediacy of the present experience. This also includes the past experiences of others since they are immanent in the past of the subject.

Life in Terms of Emptiness

It is evident that the fulfillment of man, expostulated in Chu Hsi's metaphysics, differs widely from Whitehead's view. The essence of life for him is Jen,[1] meaning in this context: naturalness, effortlessness, or spontaneity. What is opposed to, or hinders, life is struggle, effortfulness, or deliberation. Life, understood within Chu Hsi's categories of immediacy in connection with the principle of Yin and Yang, implies neither a conformation

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[1] Supra, pp. 83-84, 85-87.

to the past as its physical datum nor an adventure into the future as a possibility for ascendence. It is basically a conformation to Nature provided Nature is understood as the illustration of the principle of the alternation of Yin and Yang. This conformation requires a degree of Emptiness in the subject.[1] The greater the degree of Emptiness, the easier the access to an event, and the more life the subject possesses. Man is endowed with life more completely because his capacity for Emptiness surpasses the sub-human creatures. Evidently, Emptiness characterizes mentality in that it suggests the capacity for the reception of experience. Thus greater Emptiness implies greater mentality.

In view of the metaphysical meaning of Emptiness, man's freedom consists primarily in an open response to whatever he encounters from one cyclical movement to another. What has been experienced is now over, its immediacy returns to where it is originated, namely, the ground of undifferentiation. Since freedom is the expression of the immediacy of an event, experiences whose immediacy is over are not to be entertained any more. They are to be eradicated. Thus sense-experience, i.e., presentational objectification, is adverse to man's freedom. Since time is a determination involving a temporal sequence of the determinate sense-experience, it, as such, is also adverse to human freedom. It makes man take definite experience seriously; to that extent, he can no longer hold his Emptiness.

As has been said, freedom, or a life of ever-presentness, is an attempt to answer the human problem of transitoriness or death in Neo-Confucianism.[2] For Chu Hsi, life refers to the immediacy of an experience and death to the loss of it. According to the temporal view of time, such as Whitehead holds, what is "dead," i.e., objectified, can be brought to life through the immediacy

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[1] Supra, p. 86.

[2] Supra, p. 87.

of the concrescent subject. According to the cyclical view of "time," the subject cannot bring the "dead" into life without hindering its present life. The immediacy of the subject refers to its response to the "other," not to the conformal feeling of its past. Under this view, each alternation of an event is an independent act, generating its own freshness. It is experienced, with its joy or sorrow, as an instantaneous occurrence for and by itself.

An ideal man, for Chu Hsi, is one who can respond to, and receive from, whatever he encounters, in human affairs or in contact with Nature, with complete openness, so that in each experience the feeling of the "other" may be his own feeling. In this way, he experiences universal identity, which is a life of complete attachment to the world. But, on the other hand, none of the encountered experiences could really play a permanent part upon him precisely because he has to deny a permanent attachment to any of them. This means he really cannot take them seriously; for were he to do so he would be forced to establish enduring relationships with them. This is exactly what he does not wish to happen. This is why he has to be continually empty, i.e., continually refusing to be permanently involved with passing events. On the other hand, were he to establish a permanent relationship with these events, thus allowing him to be influenced and transformed by them, he would not be able then to relate spontaneously to the "other"; for then he would be a person of definite taste, interest, attitude, etc. Spontaneity presupposes undifferentiated feeling.

A life of continual Emptiness and Substantiality enables man to alleviate anxiety and despair, the source of which lies in man's permanent involvement in remembered things, thus allowing him to live a life of undisturbed peace. But such a life tends to avoid the transforming power of the depth of joy or sorrow resulting from an attachment to experience.

The Consequent Nature of God and Heaven

There seems to be a resemblence between Whitehead's consequent nature of God and Chu Hsi's Heaven in that both refer to the immanent function of the Divine. But a close examination would disclose that the function of the one does not correspond to that of the other: (1) The term, the consequent nature of God, describes the way in which creations are preserved, and transmuted for novel occurrences, in God's physical prehensions. Inasmuch as this objectification presupposes God's conceptual valuation, hence his primordial nature without which no human creation is possible, the consequent nature of God must be viewed as integral to God's original purpose of creation.[1] Therefore, the consequent nature of God is a fulfillment of God's primordial nature which is his original purpose of creation. On the other hand, Heaven or the Universal Mind responds to man's experience through its Mindlessness. It fills its Mind with the immediate experience of man. This means Heaven does not presuppose an original purpose of creation. (2) The function of the consequent nature of God is to preserve man's creations without loss.[2] Human creations, being the evidence of man's creativity and being the actualization of ideas derived from the primordial nature of God, are immortally preserved as a fulfillment of God's original purpose of creation. This means God takes account of man's decisions as a historical reality for the future perspective of the world. Hence the consequent nature of God is the God of history involving a definite inheritance of human experiences for the basis of his novel advance. On the other hand, the function of Heaven is a cyclical alternation between Mindlessness and Mindness.[3] It receives man's immediate experience but does not keep it as a permanent deposit. Man's creations return to the ground of undifferentiation. This

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[1] Supra, pp. 144-45. [2] Supra, pp. 139-40. [3] Supra, pp. 79-82.

means they are not a fulfillment of an original divine purpose; neither are they a fulfillment of man himself, since they are viewed as an obstruction to a life of spontaneity. Thus Heaven's function is not to preserve man's creations but to respond to the immediacy of these creations. For it is through the moments of immediacy, or what transcends time or history, that Heaven and man enjoy a mutual intimacy.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

At the end of our investigation, after a presentation of the individual and the comparative analysis of the two systems, a brief recapitulation of the important ideas, followed by a few generalizations, is advisable in order to conclude the present essay with a proper perspective.

The main point of contact between the philosophies of Chu Hsi and Whitehead lies in their discernment of subjectivity, hence the emphasis upon feeling, purpose, valuation, as being intrinsic in experience.

Subjective experience discloses the relatedness of feelings as the matrix of experience. The relational character of feelings implies that each feeling contains both a physical and a mental pole. The bi-polar character of feelings exhibits a pan-psychical, naturalistic world-view in contrast to a view entailing the bifurcation of nature.

The relatedness of feelings also displays the process character of a thing. Thus a thing is basically an event, the analysis of which discloses the togetherness of feelings.

The relational character of feelings further shows that primary perception is non-sensuous or non-conscious. This level of perception is a major interest in Chu Hsi's philosophy. It is intuition in the Chinese experience.

Because of their emphasis upon the emotive, bodily, and subjective mode of experience, both men hold a non-intellectualistic view of knowledge. Whitehead's relativistic view of a proposition, as well as his view of the

relationship between "appearance" and "reality," implies a subjective aspect of truth, which is shared by Chu Hsi.

The adherence to the importance of the aesthetic and perceptual quality of knowing leads both men to place intuition as the basis of philosophical knowledge. Speculation is the generalization of the intuited ideas when they are applied in different areas of experience.

The fundamental difference between these systems of thought lies in the fact that for Whitehead there is a correlation between the objective and the subjective aspects of experience, but for Chu Hsi subjectivity dominates so that whatever is said about the objective world is but an extension of subjective experience.

Under Whitehead's notion of objectification, there is a cluster of concepts which are peculiarly Western in character; they are: object, sensum, sense-perception, efficient cause, time, space, extensive continuum, real potentiality. The rationale of these concepts is partly drawn from the philosophical understanding of modern physical sciences. Thus, these concepts contain a theoretical component. They explain the objective character of the world. The genius of Whitehead's metaphysics lies in his success in relating the concepts of the objective world with concepts of the subjective world. This is exemplified by the primary metaphysical situation of object-subject. His concepts referring to the subjective world are predominantly aesthetic and emotive; they are, for instance, subject, subjective aim, subjective form, concrescence, valuation, final cause, satisfaction. Through the causal relation of object and subject, Whitehead describes how concepts of the subjective world are organically related to concepts of the objective world. In this way, the theoretical component is fused with the aesthetic component, and vice versa. Hence these two components apply to both kinds of concepts.

An examination of Chu Hsi's ideas clearly shows that they refer to the subjective world. For instance, under the notion of Jen there are: feeling of sympathy, the fourfold feeling, spontaneity, effortlessness, emptiness, feeling of undifferentiation. Under the notion of Hsin there are: the percipient subject, intuition, bodily feeling, non-conscious perception, life. Under the notion of Hsing there are: subjective truth, subjective knowledge about the world. All these notions are grounded in aesthetic feeling of the subject. They do not refer to the objective world of theoretical experience.

The contrast between Whitehead's concepts of the objective world and Chu Hsi's notions of the subjective world eventually discloses two radically distinct metaphysical modes of thinking. One mode is conditioned by the joint efforts of science and the human spirit; the other is conditioned mainly by the human spirit.

Through the correlation of the theoretical and aesthetic components in experience, Whitehead is able to demonstrate the importance of the definiteness of an experience through various terms: they are, for instance, decision, atomistic occasion, the actualization of an idea, value, fact, superject. These notions express, in different contexts, the spirit of freedom and creativity under the condition of time and history.

In view of the alternation of Yang and Yin, no definiteness of an experience is metaphysically important for Chu Hsi. What is important is spontaneity, effortlessness, undifferentiated feeling, emptiness, life. These notions express the spirit of freedom in opposition to the condition of time and history.

To Whitehead, since human creation has value by and for itself, it is a fulfillment of the original divine purpose of creation, of the primordial nature of God. Inasmuch as human decisions constitute values in the making of

time and history, they are worth saving through the sustaining power of God, which is His consequent nature.

Under Chu Hsi's notion of spontaneity, the universe is viewed as a continual rhythm of cyclical alternation between coming-into-being and passing-into-non-being. Each alternation creates its own value-affirmation and value-renunciation. There is no divine purpose of creation or preservation other than the spontaneous rotation between being and non-being. This is the ultimate character of the world, the exemplification of which is Heaven. Man, venturing to fulfil this nature, stands in intimate relation with Heaven. In this way he identifies himself with the process of nature.

Beyond the foregoing remarks concerning the affinities and differences between these two thinkers, some generalizations consequent to the present investigation can be made in relation to other issues:

1. The result of the present inquiry gives one the impression that the common elements between Chu Hsi and Whitehead tend to dissolve in the light of their differences. This is due to the fact that the distinctive characteristics of the respective systems stand out more basically than the common ground between them. This fact verifies the thesis, stated in the Introduction, namely, that the points of affinity between them, while indicating a genuine convergence of thought, may not be considered final in view of the ultimate character of each system.

2. The thesis, stated above, also implies a view, described in the Introduction, that a system of metaphysical ideas has an internal relation with the metaphysical presuppositions of the culture out of which it arises. Thus, in a real sense, a study of Whitehead is a microscopic understanding of the unique character of the Western culture, and a knowledge of Chu Hsi reflects the traditional thinking of the Chinese experience. In a metaphysics, such as

Chu Hsi's or Whitehead's, there are tacit assumptions and ideas of ultimacy whose logic of existence cannot be explained in terms of the system itself because they are the "given" of the culture, which determines the formation of a system of thought. This means a metaphysics implies an "a-rational" element in that it is not its task to give a rational explanation of the "why" of the "given" in its system. In view of this fact, the difference between Chu Hsi and Whitehead can be ascribed, in the last analysis, to the difference in the "given" of the Chinese and Western traditions.

3. It is undeniable that there is a religious dimension in both Chu Hsi's and Whitehead's thought, which derives its genesis from the respective cultures. We are thus assured that a metaphysics invariably reflects the religious faith of the given culture. This means the contrast between the God of Whitehead and the T'ien of Chu Hsi implies a basic difference between the Christian and the Chinese religious orientations. For instance, for the one it is the doctrine of God that dominates; for the other it is the notion of the living Spirit.

4. Neo-Confucian thought, due to its intrinsic meaning and character, cannot be interpreted in terms of the Western rationalistic tradition of the Enlightenment with its emphasis on conceptualistic thinking and its reductional view of the human spirit. Our comparison of Chu Hsi with Whitehead shows that neo-Confucian thought is grounded in ideas devoid of a relationship with scientific theories. It also shows that it is wholly unconcerned with the Aristotelian logic or the substance-quality mode of thinking. This means neo-Confucianism is categorically at variance with ideas and methods characteristic of the Western rationalistic philosophy. Thus this study would contend that the interpretations of neo-Confucian thought by Western scholars, moulded in the rationalistic mind inevitably distorted it, because, in the nature of the

case they lacked an adequate intellectual medium for its expression.

5. Modern Chinese scholars in their effort to translate neo-Confucian thought to the modern world under the imagery of Western rationalism, invariably misrepresented the original intent of neo-Confucianism. For instance, the interpretation of Chu Hsi by the spokesman of the Chinese philosophy, Fung Yu-lan, is dominated by Aristotelian concepts.

6. Whereas we concur with Needham's view that Chu Hsi's thought is comparable to the modern organismic philosophy of the West, as our investigation shows, we find his view that neo-Confucian thinking is the forerunner of the post-Newtonian sciences to be unacceptable on the ground that the neo-Confucian speculation is indifferent to conceptual or theoretical concern even though some of its ideas are germane to the organismic-relativistic thinking of modern sciences. It is one thing to say that some of Chu Hsi's ideas can be conceptualized, thus bringing them into harmony with modern sciences; and another thing to say that these ideas, by themselves, contain a theoretical import. Therefore, with Northrop, I repudiate the view that there is a conceptual or scientific concern in neo-Confucian thought. To hold the latter would mean another form of distortion of the original purpose of neo-Confucianism.

7. Insofar as Chu Hsi's thought is faithfully presented, it is my contention that it is chiefly concerned with internal meaning and relationship, not with propositions of abstract or universal truth.

8. Such a view of Chu Hsi, on the surface, would seem to place him on the side of the romantic intuitionists or the later neo-Kantians in the West. He would be in rapport with the intuitionists in their opposition to the formalistic-deductive thinking of the rationalists, and in their stress on the correlation between reason and emotion. But he would part company with them in that he does not separate mind and spirit from their bodily context as the

intuitionists of that period tend to do. Again, he would agree with the neo-Kantians' concern with human spirit or freedom as a central problem in metaphysics. But he would not share in the bifurcation of man and nature, which is characteristic of the Kantian or neo-Kantian metaphysics. At this point one may well ask, based upon the analysis of Chu Hsi, if a comparison with Bergon would not have been more pertinent, and possibly more rewarding, than a comparison with Whitehead. This might be true with respect to non-conceptual knowledge or intuition, and insofar as the immersion of the self in the immediacy or the flux of events is concerned. But in Chu Hsi one does not find the dichotomy between life and matter, or between intuition and intellect, such as we find in Bergson. There is in Chu Hsi a more conciliatory relation between life and what is external to life; between intuition and rational elucidation. Furthermore, the biological basis of Bergson's philosophy gives to his thought an orientation which is as alien to traditional Chinese thinking as are the theoretical concerns of Whitehead's philosophy. On the whole, to my knowledge, the general scheme of Whitehead, being both empirical and rational, is more suitable than the thought of Bergson for a comparison with Chu Hsi. Furthermore, because of the correlation between the intuitional and the theoretical components in Whitehead's thought, a comparison of Chu Hsi with Whitehead can entail a sharper contrast than a comparison with Bergson.

9. The reason Whitehead's metaphysics is intriguing to the Chinese mind, which still remains under the influence of neo-Confucianism, is that it discloses the emergence of the human spirit or mind out of the interaction of events and happenings. This view is native to the non-Aristotelian and organismic thinking of the Chinese. Whitehead's assumption that the act of thinking, and every other manifestation of the human spirit, originates from man's physical feelings speaks to the Chinese. On this assumption Whitehead explicitly

formulates the doctrine of non-sensory perception. To my knowledge, his system presents the first major philosophical attempt to come to terms at a constructive level with human sensibility in the Western culture; whereas non-sensory perception is a long-established view in neo-Confucianism. This makes the study of Whitehead, by a Chinese thinker, an enterprise involving an internal relationship with his own cultural tradition. Through this experience he may be induced to tackle other systems of Western thought less closely related to his traditional thinking.

10. Furthermore, Whitehead's concern with internal relations, depicting the relational character of the self and of all events as being organic and integral to all existence, presents a Western version of the relational ground of all beings found in Chu Hsi. Since the Chinese look upon the self primarily as an organism in a social context, Whitehead's ontology would make sense to them. But Whitehead's organismic philosophy is more completely worked out than Chu Hsi's, particularly with respect to the connection between internal relation and presentational immediacy, inheritance and knowledge, intuition and the objects of sciences. This means that a modern Chinese, influenced by Western learning yet interested still in retaining his cultural heritage, can look into Whitehead for clues to a possible solution to his spiritual or intellectual issues pertaining to religion and philosophy.

11. Whitehead's description of the doctrine of presentational immediacy, showing the way in which the knowledge of a presented object discloses a relational ground between the self and the object, is another way of stating that, in the act of sense-perception, the relational reality is simultaneously given with the response to the presentational object. This is the empirical demonstration of the essential relatedness of all beings. I believe there is an implicit acknowledgment of this in Chu Hsi's theory of perception as is seen

in his description of the derivation of Hsing from Hsin. Once the doctrine of sense-experience, or presentational immediacy, can be incorporated into a reconstructed meaning of Hsing in Chu Hsi's thought, showing that our knowledge of a sense-object is derived from the ground of relatedness, then the relational character of subjective existence is inevitably disclosed in Chu Hsi's thought. Thus, one can say, with Chu Hsi, that, whereas existence always involves a subjective pole, it is not a subjectivity isolated from its relational ground.

12. Thus, when we say that Chu Hsi is not concerned with the objective character of the world constructed in terms of abstract thought, such as Whitehead and other Western philosophers, influenced by natural sciences, generally are, and that in neo-Confucianism all ideas and thought can be immediately experienced, we are not prepared to say that for Chu Hsi truth is subjectivity in the sense that Kierkegaard or modern existentialists have meant it. Subjectivity for Chu Hsi conveys the implication of internal relations and the relational ground of existence. It is a subjectivity disclosing the self in relation, not the self in isolation.

13. Although Whitehead says that his atomism implies relatedness, hence the flux of the world, one cannot deny that, in the atomistic occasion, the ultimacy of individuality is implied. This implication owes its importance not only to the atomistic theory of the sciences, but also to the historical emphasis on self-determinateness or self-definitiveness in the Western culture. In Chu Hsi's philosophy the notion of individuality is always adumbrated, not only because there is the absence of the atomistic theory of sciences, but because determinateness or definitiveness of self-expression is not considered metaphysically important. On the contrary, the self receives its final character as flux or as an on-going process. Here we seem to have

reached the ultimate contrast between the Western and Chinese experience. Each is defensible, I believe, in terms of the value-orientation of the respective cultures. I am inclined to think that, unless the sciences can develop in China in such a way that atomism becomes not only a scientific but a metaphysical concept; and until the Western influence takes root in the ethos of the Chinese experience, philosophical thinking in China will continue to be inattentive to atomism.

14. Finally, we may ask, does Whitehead's thought offer pertinent clues which might help to render neo-Confucianism more relevant to modern thought and experience? I believe it does. One may demonstrate this, I believe, by employing Whitehead's ideas to make explicit what is implicit in Chu Hsi's thought, and to give specific modern meaning to his ideas without transforming his metaphysical presuppositions. A further question may be raised: Does Whitehead's thought provide possibilities of critically revising or reconstructing neo-Confucianism along lines of coming to terms with scientific concepts? This question is difficult to answer in that an appropriation of scientific concepts is bound to alter the basic principles of neo-Confucian thought; hence the task would most likely result in a radical transformation. Besides, as has been said, there is an "a-rational" element in metaphysics because of the presuppositions of a given culture. A Chinese who attempts to reconstruct neo-Confucian thought, not only has to come to terms with scientific generalizations, but also with the given character of his cultural tradition. One is not certain whether he can do both simultaneously. Indeed, one wonders if these two aspects are really compatible. At the present, however, I believe that Whitehead's organismic thought is the Western philosophy most capable of furnishing a medium for the understanding of neo-Confucianism; and its scientific implications can be utilized for the reconstruction of

neo-Confucian thought in the modern world. But the result of this task would most likely alter the presuppositions of neo-Confucian thinking since in them there is no theoretical component. Thus, insofar as scientific generalizations can be appropriated by neo-Confucian thought, as a system of ideas, it would move closer to the spirit of Western philosophy; insofar as this is not done, it would remain distinctly a type of oriental thought.

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